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(B r own, Tuttle, Ingraham)
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F~deral/1983

PUGH

(same as above)

v.

( .-·...

GERSTEIN

;

o

,
5e~? k. s;
Gerstein, a Fla. state ' attorney, review in 73-477 of a decision
A --------------------~
CA 5 which held that the Constitution requires that arrestees held

-2,

11

It

for tr1al on informations filed directly by the state attorney must,
without reasonable delay, be given a preliminary hearing before a
judicial officer.

In 73-5542, certain .Fla. prisoners
(resps. in 73..
,

477) seek review of that portion of the CA 5 judgment which held that
a possible six-day lapse between information and preliminary hearing

-

was permissible.
2.

FACTS:

Resps in 73-477, certain prisoners (including alleged

felons and misdemeanants) awaiting trial in the(i8it ji courts of Fla.,
filed a class action in the SD Fla.

----------------------------

(J: King) seeking declaratory and

inj,unctive relief (42 U. s.c -~ t _hat a preliminary hearing before a
committing magistrate on probable cause after arrest and before trial
was _required by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Resps asked the

court to compel petr, the state attorney in Dade County, Fla., to grant
such preliminary hearings or to declare that resps were entitled to
such a hearing.
Persons ' arrested for felonies and most misdemeanors in Dade
County, Fla. are routinely taken to the Metropolitan jail.

Aside from

"capital" cases, Fla. law provides that all cases may be commenced by
the filing of an information by the prosecuting attorney under oath or

z

by grand jury indictment, or by presentment to a justice of the peace
~

for issuance of an arrest warrant.

Fla. statutes also provide that

after arrest, with or without warrant, the officer shall take the
arrestee before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.

The Fla.

judiciary has consistently held that such hearings are not required
where the state prosecutes by the filing of an information certifying

probable cause for arrest.

Fla. law provides for arraignment "before

trial" and the average period between arrest and arraignment in Fla.
was found by the DC to be 10 to 15 days.
In its final order of Oct. 12, 1971, the DC found that under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, "arrested persons, whether or
not released on bond, have the constitutional ~ight to a judicial
hearing on the question of probable cause."

The DC then directed the

state attorney to submit a plan of implementation; a plan submitted
by the Dade County Sheriff, Wilson Purdy, was substantially adopted
by the court. The elaborate Purdy Plan (App. 47-54) required that

c

arrestees be taken before a committing magistrate within three hours
of arrest for appointment of counsel if indigent, advisement of constitutional rights, and the setting of a preliminary hearing
ing appeal to CA 5, the judiciary of Dade

Cou~ty

system of committing magistrates in felony cases.

da~e.

Pend-

established its own
Soon thereafter,

however, the Fla. set adopted amendments to the Fla. rules of criminal

·-

procedures, effective Feb. 1, · 1973.

Rule 3.13l(a) provides that "a

defendant, unless charged on an information or indictment, has the
right to a prelimiJ;l.ary hearing on any felony charge against him."
CA ·5 then directed the DC to hold a hearing to determine the constitutional validity of the new rules as opposed to the elaborate Purdy
Plan, as amended by DC
.------...

orde~.

The DC found constitutional violations

in numerous aspects of the new rules; the decision was affirmed by
CA 5 (reasoning of DC and CA discussed below) •
...--.____....

J

-4-

3.

DECISION OF CA 5:
(a) On appeal, the CA 5 held that since the relief sought was

-not

"against any pending or future court proceedings as sgch," citing

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407

u.s.

67, 71 n.3, the abstention doctrine of

Younger v. Harris, 401

u.s.

37 is inapplicable.

The court indicated

~

__.,

that its assertion of jurisdiction would not affect the pending prosecution of the prisoners but would only require a preliminary hearing for
'

.

those members of the class who had not already been tried.

The CA

recognized that the resps could "have filed suit in state court for a
declaratory judgment and other equitable relief," but said that such
a procedure would require a second state court proceeding to adjudicate
a federal claim not based on the merits of the defenses to the state
criminal actions.

The CA said that Younger has never been

i~terpreted

to require a federal court to abstain where the federal claim could not
be "adjudicate¢!. in a

~ingle

decline to so apply it now."

pending or future state proceeding and we
The CA therefore ,said it need not consider

whether the instant case comprised an "exception" to Younger (it should
be noted that the court in effect indicated that the Younger exceptions
of irreparable injury and inadequate state remedy were satisfied -- this
is what the DC said}.
(b) CA 5 held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that arrestees charged by information in Fla. be afforded preliminary
hearings without unnecessary delay (thus holding the new rules unconstitutional).

The court distinguished the decisions in Hurtado v. Cal.,

-5~

110

u.s.

u.s.

516; Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229

91; and Beck v. Washington, 369

u.s.
u.s.

586; Ocampo v. U.S.,

234

541 as dealing only with

absence of a procedure for the determination of probable cause prior
to arrest, as opposed to afterwards.

The court found that Fla.'s denial

of a "probable cause" hearing after arrest but before arraignment is
constitutionally impermissible because it permits the prosecuting at"--

j

!

j

.f\ "

torney to certify the existence of probable cause by f~~ an information, and he is not sufficiently detached to make this decision •

....-------

Citing McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332; Coolidge v. NH, 403 U.S. 443;
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

u.s.

471; Shadwick v. Tampa, 407

u.s.

345

for the proposition that a person required to determine probable cause
must be neutral and detached.
the effect that an
constitut~onal

The CA said that its prior decisions to

arre~tee pr~ceeded

right

~o

~gainst

by information has no

a preliminary hearing (Jackson v. Smith, 435

F.2d 1284; Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 6) were distinguishable
because they dealt with whether the absence of a preliminary hearing
was a denial of constitutional rights which would vitiate the subsequent
conviction.

Here, says CA 5, it is dealing with a question of the

validity of a present confinement.
(c) The CA finally directed its attention to the remaining
portion of the amended rules of criminal procedure in Florida, and
agreed with the DC's findings.

/

It found that the new rules violated

J

equal protection in that they disallowed preliminary hearings for

-6-:-

misdemeanants, citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407

u.s.

25.

It found

that the State had failed to justify the distinction in the new rules
between the time between arrest and preliminary hearing for capital
and life offenses (7 days) and all other cases (4 days) and that it
too was violative of equal protection.

As to the provision in the

rules that where ·the time period between arrest and preliminary
hearing is less than seven days, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are

~ r- .~1 e,e. xcluded,

,

the CA re f use d t o d ec1'd e wh e th er s1x
· d ays d e 1 ay wou ld b e

unconstitutional as opposed to four · days, since no prisoner among the
class "argues that he has been accorded a preliminary hearing more
than four but less than six days after his arrest."
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr state attorney in 73-477 argues that the

federal courts should have abstained.

-----

He also argues that the decisions

of this Court in Hurtado, Lem Woon, Ocampo, and Beck control and require
reversal here.

Petr argues that many states permit the charging of

crimes by information without a preliminary hearing.
the charging by the

pros~cutor
'

Petr argues that

by information is as sufficient a
\

determination of probable cause as the charging by the grand jury.
Petrs also cite conflict with numerous circuits which have determined
that the absence of preliminary hearings does not constitute a constitutional violation.
In response, the resps urge that the decision below was correct.
Recognizing that the decision will produce turmoil in Fla. and that it

.....--------..

decides a constitutional issue never decided by this
state that the_y therefore "do not oppose certiorari."
./""--.

Court, ~

-7In 73-5542, a cross-petition to the petition in 73-477, resps
(as petrs therein) argue that theCA's toleration of the four day
period for preliminary hearing is also a constitutional violation.
5.

DISCUSSION:

The petition in 73-5542 should, in my opinion

be denied, since it raises a question subsumed by the petition in
73-477.

The Younger issue is somewhat unusual since these are state

prosecutions pending; but the action of the CA does not appear to
affect those proceedings.

The resolution of Steffel v. Thompson, argued

this week, could conceivably shed some light here.

The most important

issue is the holding as to the requirements of preliminary hearings.

--

This Court has never held that the Constitution requires a preliminary
hearing, and this has also been the consistent view of the federal courts.
-...____,

(See cases inn. 113-14 to FRCrP 5, 18 U.S.C.A.)

FRCrP

prov~des

for a

preliminary hearing for federal prisoners before a committing magistrate,
but it has not been suggested that this is a constitutional requirement.
United States , 318 U.S. 332; Mallory v. United States,
354

u.s.

449.

The line of cases leading to Beck, to the effect that a

State may dispense with a grand jury and charge by information if it
<lbS< ·H C.:..

chooses, does . not, as the CA .correctly suggests, deal with the f:a4lure
ii..
dt· 'f t' r~"''"v' \ , ( ,\
of~ probable cause~ by a neutral magistrate after arrest.
The decision
here is obvious]Y a far-reaching one, and, in my opinion, merits
-------~

consideration by this Court.
There is a response.
11/14/73
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/

,

No. 73-5542
Cert. to CA 5
{Brown, Tuttle, Ingraham)
Federal/1983

PUGH

v.

Timely

GERSTEIN

See memo for No. 73-477.

11/14/73

r

Buxton

},

/

~.-·

ourc . . . . . . . \-/1 • :-.

vocea on .................. ,

• -1 • • •••

1:1 •••

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ............... . , 19 .. .

No.

RICHARD E. GERSTEIN, STATE ATTORNEY FOR ELEVENTH JUDICIAL
OF FLORIDA, Petitioner

vs.
ROBERT PUGH, ET AL.

9/12/73 Cert. file d .

/F
/

~

~.~

~~s~

~!(

~ '

HOLD
FOR

CERT.

Powell, J .................... .
Blackmun, J ................. .
Marshall, J .................. .
White, J ..................... .
Stewart, J ................... .
Brennan, J ................... .
Douglas, J .................... .
Burger, Ch. J ................ .

MERITS

MOTION

AB-

NOT

~---r---t---...---,---.--+--...----+-~--l SENT VOTG

Rehnquist, J ................. .

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

D

N

POST

DIS

AFF

REV

AFF

G

D

lNG

73-477

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Jack Owens

DATE:

No. 73-477
(Caution~

March 25, 1974

Gerstein v. Pugh

Jury Speech follows.)

Most states utilize grand juries or, if proceeding
by information rather than indictment, require a hearing be f ore
a neutral magistrate shortly after arrest.

The federal

government normally proceeds by indictment and grants a preliminary hearing soon after arrest.

Thus, most jurisdictions

generally insure that someone other than law enforcement
officials makes an early determination of whether it is l ake ly
that a criminal suspect or arrestee has committed a crime.
Florida and a few other states, however, have placed a lower
premium on protecting liberty and, more than likely, have
hindered their own interests in reducing jail an d police cos ts
by allowing law enforcement personnel to put people in jail
on the basis of their own ex parte decision to prosecute and
to leave tho se people there for as much as a month before they
get a hearing.
Technically speaking, the most relevant (old)
constitutional precedents allow this.

--------------- -----------------

The grand jury requirement

2.

of the Fifth Amendment has not been incorporated against the
states, and states are permitted to proceed by information
rather than indictment.

But it is no great leap for me

from cases like Morrissey v. Brewer

&~no~

and~
0-

v. Scarpelli

(hearing rights of those whose parole/probation is revoked)
to this case.

I think due process notion s,·~

evolve to require speedy

could easily

preliminary hearings for anyone

arrested on the basis of an information rather than as a
result of grand

ju~y

action.

In fact, I'm amazed that all

states don't do this voluntarily.

Holding in jail people

against whom there is no real case is a waste of everyone's
resources, especially the state ~ ,
Of course it is true that many arrestees have access
to bail.

It is equally true that the detainees will ultimately

get the most comprehensive hearing there is -- trial.

But

the bail thing doesn't persuade me.

If anything, it suggests

a form of economic discrimination.

And although trials are

held fairly speedily in Florida, I still can't buy holding
a guy in jail for 30 days on no one's say but the prosecutor.
Such a system simply should not exist in a free country.
is very simple to fix, to everyone's benefit.

And it

It seems

particularly odd to have all the hoopla about right to a
hearing over whether X defaulted on the monthly payments for
·k
I think the due process clause should be relied
on rather than the Fourth Amendment, although both have been
advanced in this case.

j.

a TV set and yet countenance the crim:j_nal law system Florida
operated prior to this suit.

1

I

n

L

.

A

_

_

.tL- .,_..., '

~~ ~

VI ........'.

c..U> ;}

-J-,1

'~ ~~-~-,
L

At any rate, this looks to me to be a case for
interring old, bad precedents and for making some sensible
new law.

Florida should be grateful if you do.
There is a serious Younger v. Harris problem here.

~

Technically speaking, the state courts were open to hear this
constitutional claim and state prosecutions had obviously begun.
But I think that, without too much violence to precedent and
without letting too many hobgoblins loose, it is possible to
conclude (i) that state criminal trial courts were not an
adequate forum, since by the time trial arrived the damage
would have been done; and (ii) the relief sought was not the
enjoining of a state prosecution.
Flex your muscles a bit.

Affirm this one.

JBO
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

DAtE:

FROM:

September 13, 1974

Lewis F.Powell, Jr.
No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh
The above case was argued here on March 2S, 1974, and at

our Conference on March 29 the Court voted at least 8 to 1 to
affirm CAS.

But as the discussion at Conference evolved, we

began to have second thoughts - especially as to the impact
of our decision on federal practice and the federal rules based
on early decision of the Court.

Accordingly, we finally decided

to carry this case over to the present term to enable the
Solicitor General to file a brief (and possibly to argue
orally).

Apparently, an invitation also was extended to the

attorneys general of the various states to file briefs amici.
The Question
At the time this case (and companion cases) were before
CAS, all criminal cases in Florida, apart from capital cases,
apparently could be commenced by "an information filed by the
prosecuting attorney under oath".

Apparently most criminal

actions were commenced upon an information sworn to by the state
attorney, either before or after arrest; the accused person would
then be held in jail (if unable or unwilling to post bail) without a hearing of any kind until arraignment.

CAS noted that

this incarceration may last as long as 30 days.

CAS held that

2.
the federal Constitution (4th and 14th Amendments) required
as a minimum a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer
promptly following such an arrest.
The case is confused (at least according to my present
recollection) as a result of the fact that Florida procedure
(in Dade County, which was the county involved) was significantly
changed in accordance with an order of the federal District Court.
Moreover, the individuals who instituted this action, as a class
suit, have long since been convicted on misdemeanor charges,
served their sentences and are out of jail.

Thus, there is a

lingering question of mootness.
But we set the case for reargument on the constitutional
issue, passing the mootness point on the theory (at least
tentatively) that the issue will reoccur and otherwise would
evade review.
General Comments
The briefs in hand, as of this date, are those filed at
the last Term, together with perhaps 8 or 9 briefs amicus filed
by attorneys general of a number of states.

The Solicitor

General's brief (which I am particularly anxious to see) is not
in hand.
The original briefs - both on behalf of petitioner and
respondents - meander all over the subject, and are not really
helpful.

I have examined several of the briefs amicus, and

at least have been impressed by the fact that if we adhere to

3.
decision last March to affirm CAS, we will effect a major change
in what has been perceived as settled constitutional law.

See,

e.g., amicus briefs filed on behalf of Massachusetts and California.
Although I have not studied the Federal Rules carefully and
have never had any experience with federal criminal procedure,
it does appear that the Federal Rules allow the initiation of
misdemeanor and petty criminal cases by the filing of sworn
informations by U.S. attorneys, and that defendants in such cases
are not entitled to any preliminary hearing prior to arraignment.
The theory is that the sworn affidavit of the U.S. attorney
establishes adequate probable cause.
I

invite your attention to Jack Owens' brief memo to me

of March 25, (which he entitles a "jury speech") which is
certainly persuasive.

MY present disposition remains, as it was last March,
to conclude that due process requires an early hearing before a
neutral magistrate promptly following arrest.

But I do not

think such a hearing should be elevated to the status of a
"mini-trial".

That is, it should not be adversary in nature,

counsel should not be required, nor should there be a right to
confront witnesses.

I would think, for purposes merely of

establishing probable cause for arrest, a neutral magistrate
need only be convinced by appropriate affidavits or testimony
of law enforcement officers that probable cause in fact existed.
All of these are troublesome issues, and I would welcome
your thoughtful consideration and advice - especially after
the SG's brief has been received.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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-
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Thus, there is a

lingering question of mootness.
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issue, passing the mootness point on the theory (at least
tentatively) that the issue will reoccur and otherwise would
evade review.
General Comments
The briefs in hand, as of this date, are those filed at
the last Term, together with perhaps 8 or 9 briefs amicus filed
by attorneys general of a number of states.

The Solicitor

General's brief (which I am particularly anxious to see) is not
in hand.
The original briefs - both on behalf of petitioner and
respondents - meander all over the subject, and are not really
helpful.

I have examined several of the briefs amicus, and

at least have been impressed by the fact that if we adhere to

.._..
'

3.

decision last March to affirm CAS, we will effect a major change
in what has been perceived as settled constitutional law.
~·&·•

See,

amicus briefs filed on behalf of Massachusetts and California.
Although I have not studied the Federal Rules carefully and

have never ha• any experience with federal criminal procedure,
it does appear that the Federal Rules allow the initiation of
misdemeanor and petty criminal cases by the filing of sworn
informations by

u.s.

attorneys, and that defendants in such cases

are not entitled to any preliminary hearing prior to arraignment.
The theory is that the sworn affidavit of the

u.s.

attorney

establishes adeouate probable cause.
I

invite your attention to Jack Owens' brief memo to me

of March 25, (which he entitles a "jury speech") which is
certainly persuasive.
My

present disposition remains, as it was last March,

to conclude that due process requires an early hearing before a
neutral magistrate promptly following arrest.

But I do not

think such a hearing should be elevated to the status of a
"mini•trial".

That is, it should not be adversary in nature,

counsel should not be required, nor should there be a right to
confront witnesses.

I would think, for purposes merely of

establishing probable cause for arrest, a neutral magistrate
need only be convinced by appropriate affidavits or testimony
of law enforcement officers that probable cause in fact existed.
All of these are troublesome issues, and I would welcome
your thoughtful consideration and advice - especially after
the SG's brief has been received.
L.F .P., Jr.

BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein

DATE:

October 18, 1974

No. 73-477, Gerstein v. Pugh

This case was here last year and you have your own
notes and memoranda as well as Jack Owens memorandum.
Before I discuss several jurisdictional problems - none
of which do I believe necessarily bars review - let me
address the issue on the merits.
1.

Frankly, I think some confusion arose last time

around because the Court was somewhat unclear as to what
was at stake.

--

The Fifth Circuit, and the district court,

held that a "preliminary hearing" before a neutral magistrate
~

--------------

is required before someone is detained

pre-t~al.

The

~ -------------------------~~~-

simple use of the words "preliminary hearing", however, was
bound to confuse the issue.

A preliminary hearing, as the

term is now used, encompasses much that is irrelevant to this
case.

Usually, if such a hearing is given at all, it is

given to all defendants, not only to those who are confined
pre-trial.

Moreover,

although~

purpose of a preliminary

hearing is to determine probable cause, they also serve other
purposes, such as being a vehicle for discovery.

And the

2.

rationale upon which a probable cause hearing rests is that
someone should not be required to face trial unless there is
probable cause to believe that he has committed an offense.
The instant case raises an issue that is somewhat
different from the proader issues inherent in the use of a
probable cause hearing.

Respondents here argue that pre-

trial incarceration, in and of itself, is a substantial
deprivation of liberty, and therefore due process
requires a hearing to establish probable cause to confine.
In effect, I think the gravaman of respondent's contention
is that bail determinations are insufficient because, even
before bail is considered, a magistrate should decide that
there is probable cause.

Thus, I would suggest that the

) issue in this case is what does due process require before
someone may be required to post bail or, if unable, to remain
confined pending trial.*

* My view of the issue is buttressed by the problem of
relief. Assuming a hearing is given to those who are detained
pre-trial, and assuming further that probable cause is not
shown, what relief would then be appropriate? At a usual
"preliminary hearing," as they are now known, a defendant, be he
incarcerated or not, is discharged. He can, of course,
subsequently be reindicted, but a failure to show probable cause
leads to a dismissal. In our case, however, if what is being
tested is probable cause to confine pre-trial, then, if the
court finds no probable cause, presumably the defendant
should be released pre-trial. The charges against him,
however, should not be dismissed.

3.
Traditionally, of course, either an indictment or
information is sufficient to bring someone to trial.

And

if the person is likely to flee and cannot meet bail, he
is incarcerated pending trial.

The decisions below would add

an additional requirement of an adversary hearing with counsel
and witnesses before someone who has been proceeded against
by information can be held pre-trial.

The first question

then, must be why should someone who is indicted by a
grand jury not get a preliminary hearing.

After all, those

indicted by a grand jury do not get an adversary hearing
with the attendant opportunity of viewing the state's
evidence.

Second, the

d~cisions

to those confined pre-trial.
hardly a fixed group.

below limit relief

That group, however, is

Presumably if a hearing must be held,

it should be held rather promptly.

Thus defendants who

must meet a bail requirement can delay payment, get the
benefits of a preliminary hearing, then meet bail and be
released.

In short, by spending a day or so in jail the

defendant could secure a preliminary hearing. *

* As a practical matter, many defendants require
several days before they can raise bail.

4.
In view of these considerations, I think you could
reject the adversary hearing requirement imposed below.
If for no other reason than strong
historical tradition,
.__

____

our
....___ system allows pre-trial incarceration on the basis
of

an~

parte hearing, typically before a grand

j~ry.

J Thus, I see no reason for not limiting the decision below
to an ex parte hearing before a neutral magistrate when the
state proceeds by information.

While this may seem to be

nothing but rubber-stamp, we shouldn't kid ourselves about
the role played by grand juries either.
kind

of~

I also think that this

parte hearing should be required for all defendants,

irrespective of whether they can post bond.

It seems to me t hat

if the state has not convinced a neutral magistrate of
probable cause, the state should not be permitted to require

I bail

or even to keep a person answerable for an offense.
I realize that, in effect, I have suggested no special

due process for those confined pre-trial.

But I see no

way of speaking eloquently of liberty and then noting that
pre-trial incarceration is a far greater intrusion than the
on ~ involved

in Mitchell v. Grant, et al., without concluding

that a full preliminary hearing or mini-trial is required.
It is extremely hard tb make the full due process argument
and then say that

an~

parte hearing is sufficient.

Thus,

I would avoid the general due process line of cases, and
speak instead in terms of the history of our criminal

5.

PEocedures and some of this Court's early cases.

I would

conclude that rudimentary fairness requires that, after
arrest,

*

,. I

the prosecutor convince a neutral magistrate

that there is probable cause to proceed with the prosecution
which includes the possibility that a defendant may be
confined pre-trial.
Acceptance of this approach would not have a significant
impact on the Federal Rules.

Presently, whenever there is

an arrest without a warrant, the government must get a
complaint under Rule 4(a) which requires that the government
establish probable cause.

Thus, it would appear that only

in cases where an arrest warrant was issued would there be
need to expand the rules to require a post-arrest
showing of probable cause.

I

~

parte

This would be so only if a post

* I note that when marrest warrant is secured, the
police must establish probable cause before a magistrate.
One might argue, therefore, that the prosecutor need not
make such a showing after arrest. I think that the argument
is unpersuasive because in determing probable cause for an
arrest the magistrate might well consider different factors
from those he would consider after arrest. Since the ex
Garte procedure is not very cumbersome, the government-can
ardly complain if it is required to make a post-arrest
showing. Nevertheless, since the issue is not critical you
could say that a determination of probable cause is only
required at some time - either before or after arrest.

6.

arrest hearing is required.

See preceding note.

If, on the other hand, a preliminary hearing,
adversary in form, is required, the federal rules will have
to be changed for misdemeanor cases since frequently the
government proceeds by information, and therefore the rules
do not require a preliminary hearing.

The SG claims that

requiring a preliminary hearing in federal cases when the
government proceeds without an indictment would have no
practical consequences.

In the District of Columbia, however,

there are approximately 1,000 misdemeants each year who
are incarcerated pre-trial, sometimes for so long as 90
days or more.

These people do not now, under the local

equivalent of the federal rules, get a preliminary hearing.*
I agree with Jack Owens that it is anomalous, to
say the least, to require hearings in all of the cases
in which this Court has required them, and still permit
pre-trial confinement without an adversary hearing.

Indeed,

* Any holding of this Court requ~r~ng an adversary
hearing could not reasonably be limited to felons since the
purpose of the hearing relates to pre-trial detention, which
is functionally the same for felons and misdemeants.

7.

after Morrisey and Gagnon, it is hard to argue that an
adversary hearing, perhaps without counsel, is not compelled.
Nevertheless, the costs and difficulties of imposing such
a constitutional requirement may well outweigh the
anticipated benefits.
2.

There are also three jurisdictional questions

presented in this case.
First is the question of mootness.

These respondents

have been convicted and thus are not longer in need of a
preliminary hearing.

Nevertheless, it would seem that this

is a classic case for application of the "capable of
repetition yet avoiding review" doctrine.

Pre-trial detention

will almost invariably be too short to allow an appeal, and
therefore I would think the abortion cases should be controlling.
Last year's O'Shea case does not undercut this conclusion since
in that case there was no clear likelihood of repetition nor
was it apparent that review would be evaded.

Moreover, in

O'Shea the Court refused to assume that petitioners would
commit a subsequent crime.

Here, like in Spomer, the companion

case to O'Shea, respondents need not assert that they will
commit subsequent crimes, but only that they
and not given a hearing.

~~l
·

be arrested

8.
Second, this case raises a question under Preiser v.
Rodriguez,

which held that habeas corpus is the only way

to challenge the fact or duration of state confinement.
The only relief sought by respondents, however, was a
hearing, and not release.
ordered only a hearing.

Likewise, the federal courts
Thus, a technical application of

Preiser would appear to allow this as a § 1983 suit.
Having said this, though, I am by no means sure that
Preiser should not be stretched to reach this situation.

I

It

seems to me that federal courts should not, by mandatory
injunction, require states to give hearings.

All that a federal

court can do is to order that, unless a hearing is given, the
~

prisoner will be released.
sought in this case.

This should have been the relief

If it had been, the relief would have

been a classic form of habeas, requiring exhaustion of
state remedies.

Thus, you might want to consider applying

Preiser to bar jurisdiction.
The final issue is a Younger question.

In this case,

there was a state prosecution and respondents did seek
injunctive relief.

As I read the Younger cases, however, I

think they would not apply here because respondent's
injunction was not directed at the criminal proceeding "as
such" but rather at the state's right to detain pre-trial.
That matter is wholly unrelated to guilt or innocence and thus

9.

would not even fall within Perez v. Ledesman, which dealt
with suppression of federal court evidence.

I would think

that a sensible line for Younger would be whether the
federal interference goes to the issue of guilt.
In any event, even if Younger is applicable, I think
the harm to

responden ~

is such that the narrow band of

exceptions to Younger should govern.

If an incarcerated

prisoner cannot get his case considered by a federal court
before trial, he probably loses all chance for meaningful
relief.

After trial there is no appropriate remedy for

someone who claims to have been illegally confined pretrial.

If this case had been a habeas case, with

exhaustion of state remedies pre-trial, I think federal
review clearly would be permissible.

Hence, if there is any

bar to federal jurisdiction in this case, it is based on
the Preiser problem, and not the Younger problem.
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GERSTEIN v. PUGH et al.
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit
No. 73-477.
1.

Argued March 25, 1974 -- Reargued October 21, 1974-·
Decided
1975
The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial

dete~ination

of probable cause as a prerequisite to

extended restraint on liberty following arrest.

Accordingly,

the Florida procedures challenged here whereby a person
arrested without a warrant and charged by information may
be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending trial
without any opportunity for a probable cause
are unconstitutional.
(a)

dete~ination

Pp. 7-15.

The prosecutor's assessment of probable cause,

standing alone, does not meet the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and is insufficient to justify restraint of
liberty pending trial.
(b)

Pp. 13-15.

However, the Constitution does not require

judicial oversight of the decision to prosecute by
information, and a conviction will not be vacated on the
ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without
a probable cause determination.
2.

P. 15.

The probable cause determination, as an

2.

initial step in the criminal justice process, may be
made by a judicial officer without an adversary hearing.
Pp. 15-21.

(a)

The sole issue is whether there is probable

cause for detaining the arrested person
proceedings, and this issue can be

dete~ined

by the use of informal procedures.
(b)

Because of its

pe~ding

l~ited

further

reliably

Pp. 16-18.
function and its

non-adversary character, the probable cause

dete~ination

is not a "critical sta&e" in the prosecution that would
require appointed counsel.

Pp. 18-19.

483 F. 2d 778, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

No. 73-477

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

Argued 10/21/74
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Justice PowellHere's a draft of a proposed memorandum on
the one case that was held for Gerstein. The
Gerstein issue is easy, since we addressed it
explicitly in the opinion, but I wasn't sure
xke how much we should say about the other issues
in the case. If you think it unnecessary to
say anything about them, the memorandum could
stop at the end of the first paragraph, adding,
"I therefore will vote to deny the petition."
I did not attempt to ~ go into the othe~issues
in any detail, but thought just to alert the
other Justices to them, in case they wish to
grant on something other than the Gerstein
question.
penny

SPOTLIGHT ON THE PRELIMINARY HEARING

[ 540 1

1 For brief historical accounts of the birth and evolution of the preliminary hearing,
see Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing-Better Alternatives or More of the Same?,
35 Mo. L. REv. 281, 284-85 (1970); Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation
to Avoid the Prelimin«ry Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Magistrates Act
of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1361, 1365-78 (1969); Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An
Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. REv. 164, 165-67 (1965); Comment, The Prelimirwry
Examination in the Federal System: A Proposal for a Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1416, 1416-17 (1968).
2 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, Advisory 05fumittee Notes, reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. (Supp.
1973); 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE 11 5.1.02[1] (2d ed. 1973).
3 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969).
4 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
5E.g., United States ex ref. Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142, 149 (1926); see Goldsby
v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895).
6 An information is a formal accusation drawn by the prosecutor and filed with the
court after he has determined the existence of probable cause.
7 Cases holding that an indictment precludes a preliminary hearing include Costello
v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, J63 (1956); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250
(1932); Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26, 32 (lOth Cir. 1973); United States v.
Mackey, 474 F.2d 55, 56-57 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973); United States
v. Dorsey, 462 F.2d 361, 363 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870 (1972); United States
v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972). See Jaben
v. United States, 381 U.S. !14, 220 (1965). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
adopt this proposition. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (c).
Cases holding or suggesting that the filing of an information precludes a preliminary
hearing includ'e Barber v. Arkansas, 429 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1970); Virgin Islands v.
Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135, 1136 (3rd Cir. 1970); United States v. Funk, 412 F.2d 452, 4H
(8th Cir. 1969); Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Stephens v.
United States, 341 F.2d 100, 101 (lOth Cir. 1965); Roddy v. United States, 296 F.2d
9, 10 (lOth Cir. 1%1); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1953)_;
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure adopt this view. FED. R. CruM. P. 5 (c).

The preliminary hearing 1 provides a forum for determining whether
there is probable cause to believe that an accused committed the crime for
which he was arrested. 2 The hearing is adversarial in nature, and the constitutional rights of the accused to assistance of counsel3 and cross-examination of witnesses 4 are recognized. Despite the assortment of due process
guarantees available to the accused if the preliminary hearing is held, however, courts have consistently ruled that there is no right to the hearing
itself.5 Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that a prior grand jury indictment or the filing of an information6 by a prosecutor precludes a preliminary hearing. 7 When an arrestee is detained solely on the basis of an information, the prosecutor alone has determined the critical issue of probable
cause for arrest and detention.

PUGH v. RAINWATER:

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Recent Develop

s 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.), cert. granted sub n
(1973) (No. 73-477).
9 483 F .2d at 784-88.
lQPugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.
434 (1972). Later orders of the district court
F. Supp. 1286. See note 19 infra.
11 332 F. Supp. at 1109-10. The remaining tw
jury or a preliminary hearing and were not und
cedures were: (1) the filing of an information
who witnessed the crime and made a warrantless
on the basis of an affidavit of an officer who
made an investigation; (3) the filing of an infor
but before the arrest of the suspect. !d.
12E.g., State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2
13 483 F.2d at 780, 781 & n.8. If an arrestee
bail, he could be imprisoned for as long as thirty
contact with his case. ld.
14The plaintiffs alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.
was grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
15 The defendants included the sheriff, police
the peace, and judges of the small claims courts.

In Pugh v. RainwaterS the United State
Circuit recently declared that holding an
prosecutor's information is unconstitution
his right to a determination of probable
arbiter, thereby violating the fourth and
the case's immediate impact is limited to pr
is detained solely on the basis of an infor
tend it to be a step towards recognition
constitutional right.
When the case was first filed in federal
officials in Dade County, Florida, used sever
individual with the commission of a crime.
the charge on an informationY Because
peatedly regarded a prosecutor's informati
of probable cause, the filing of an inform
liminary hearing. 12 Under this system, th
governmental official to determine the e
arraignment or perhaps ev~n trial.1 3
The plaintiffs in Rainwater had been arr
the authority of a prosecutor's informatio
preliminary hearing after their arrest. Cla
preliminary hearing before a judicial offic
on behalf of themselves and others incar
basis of informations. They sought declarat
pelling various county officials 15 to grant
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ld. at 1113-14.

3).

;r

1

the basis of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Stating that Younger applies
when the plaintiffs seek to enjoin a state proceeding "as such," the court noted
the Rainwater plaintiffs were seeking relief not against the prosecution itself, but
inst ·the practice of permitting the prosecutor to be the sole judge of probable
se. 483 F.2d at 781-82. The court noted that if the plaintiffs were barred from
ing relief, no remedy would exist. Pretrial incarceration would end at the time
trial, and their claim to a preliminary hearing would be mooted by either conion or acquittal. !d. at 782.
9 Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914).
OLem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
1 483 F.2d at 784. While the Supreme Court has never held that a preliminary
ring is not required after the filing of an information, in Costello v. United States,
U.S. 359 (1956), Justice Black stated that such is the case:
An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like
an information dra·wn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call
for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Anlendment requires nothing
more.
at 363 (emphasis added). Many states require that the preliminary hearing be held
r to the filing of an information. See Note, Initiation of Prosecution By lnforma-Leave of Court or Preliminary Examination, 25 MoNT. L. REv. 135, 136-37 & n.S

s The circuit court refused to hold that the district court should have abstained

ld. at 1115. The district -court also ordered the officials to submit a plan for proing a preliminary hearing in all cases prosecuted by information. !d. at 1116. The
ailed Purdy Plan, submitted by Sheriff Purdy of Dade County, was azepted by the
rt. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1972). The Fifth Circuit stayed
plan's implementation to allow Dade County's judiciary to establish a plan, but
r autnorized implementation of the Purdy Plan. 483 F.2d at 779. After the Florida
·r eme Court issued amended rules of criminal procedure, the district court found
ain aspects of the new rules invalid. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.
. 1972).

f

trict court, after deciding that a neutral and detached arbiter must
mptly determine the existence of probable cause and that the prosecutattorney was not neutral and detached, held that in information cases,
e fourth and fourteenth amendments require a preliminary hearing. 16
e court ordered the appropriate Dade County officials to give the plains preliminary hearings.H
bn appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 18 Although Supreme Court cases
conclusively established that a preliminary hearing is not required prior
an arrest19 or the filing of an information,20 the court of appeals regarded
e question of whether the Constitution requires a subsequent judicial find~ of probable cause as unsettled.21 Moreover, the court distinguished
bditions existing before and after an arrest. Before arrest a probable cause
rring would place a heavy burden on the state, since delay might give
e accused an opportunity to escape apprehension altogether. After an
est, however, when the accused is in custody, the court saw no danger
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22

483 F.2d at 784.
The court used recent Supreme Court precedent t
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914), indicating that the
to determine probable cause:
It is insisted that the finding of probable cause
properly be delegated to the prosecuting attorne
is erroneous to regard this function . . . as bein
There is no definite ;~,djudication. A finding tha
not equivalent to an acquittal, but only entitles th
present, leaving him subject to rearrest . . . . [S]i
not prescribe how "probable cause" shall be deter
permissible for the local legislature to confide thi
as to entrust it to a justice of the peace.
Id. at 100-01.
24 403 u.s. 443 (1971).
25 408 u.s. 471 (1972).
26 407 u.s. 345 (1972).
27 Id. at 350.
28 E.g., Buchannan v. Wainwright, 474 F.2d 1006 (5t
435 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947
393 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1968).
29 483 F.2d at 786-87. While the court's distinction o
part valia, in Kerr v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1%
footnote: "As a general rule there is no constitutional
prior to indictment or trial." !d. at 80 n.2 (emphasis
broad enough to include situations where pretrial con
United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677-78 (5th Ci
(1972).

of losing him before a probable cause hearing
that no strong interest of the state justified deni
In ruling that Florida prosecutors were no
decide when probable cause exists, the court relie
cases stressing the importance of not entangling
functions. 23 In Coolidge v. New Htrmpshire 24 the
a search warrant issued by the state's Attorney
chief investigator and pro.secutor in the case. Th
v. Brewer.25 that someone not directly involved
whether there is probable cause to believe that a
conditions of his parole before the parole can be
also cited Shadwick v. Tampa, 26 in which the Su
adherence to the principle that arrest warrants
of probable cause drawn by a neutral and detac
by an officer engaged in the competitive enterpri
The court brushed aside prior Fifth Circuit cas
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. T
noting that they simply establish that failure to a
will not vitiate a conviction. 29 The court emphas
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07 U.S. at 348.
he issuance of search or arrest warrants is almost necessarily an ex parte prog. Requiring adversary hearings on the issuance of a warrant would cause the
harm that requiring a warrant seeks to prevent: unjustified interference with
s' lives. Also, adversary hearings could make the warrant useless if obtained,

1

1

nging only the validity of their present confinement, an issue on which
lwas no controlling precedent.
:rzwater's holding that probable cause must be determined by a neutral
etached arbiter, and that the prosecutor does not qualify as such, rests
m ground. In Shadwick, for example, an arrest warrant issued by a
clerk was challenged because it was not issued by a judicial officer.
upreme Court rejected this attack, stating that the only requirements
cia! who issues a warrant must meet are neutrality and the capacity
termine whether probable cause exists. In the course of concluding
he clerk passed these tests, Justice Powell cited "the now accepted
that someone independent of the police and prosecution must determine
ble cause." 30
the prosecuting attorney cannot constitutionally determine probable
for an arrest or search warrant, he should not be constitutionally
le of precluding a preliminary hearing, particularly when an indil is arrested and detained without a warrant. If filing an information
reclude a preliminary hearing, the prosecutor can single-handedly
ct the arrestee to pretrial incarceration and the embarrassment and
se of trial. The decision to restrict an individual's freedom so signifishould not be made exclusively by the prosecutor.
ad narrowly, R ainwater does not squarely create a due process right
preliminary hearing. Rather, the court applied a principle long recogin the issuance of warrants: to be an effective safeguard, probable
must be determined by an individual not involved in law enforcement.
e the cases the court cited establish that probable cause must be deby a neutral and detached arbiter, they do not compel the conclusion
the determination of probable cause must be made in a preliminary
ng. For example, if a grand jury returns an indictment before or after
or a neutral and detached officer issues an arrest warrant before or
arrest and prior to the filing of an informaticn, it would seem that the
tee has had a determination of probable cause by a neutral and ded arbiter, despite the ex parte nature of the proceeding. In short,
ed that probable cause must be determined by a neutral and detached
r, why must the determination be made in a preliminary hearing?
ing in the fourth amendment dictates that probable cause must be
mined in an adversarial proceeding. 31 Because the fourth amendment's
rement of neutral and detached determination of probable cause is
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32 483 F.Zd at 787. The Supreme Court cases cited by
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Stanlev v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 64
U.S. 535 (1971); \Visconsin v. Co~stantineau, 400 U.S. 433
397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 3
3<1 "We believe the right to a preliminary probable cause
is subjected to pretrial incarceration is .. . essential to d
789.
34 397 u.s. 254 (1970).
35/d. at 262-63.
3 6 Jd. at 267. ·

Further, the Court stated that the opportunity to

The extent to which procedural due process
cipient is influenced by the extent to which he
suffer grievous loss" ... and depends upon w
terest in avoiding that loss outweighs the
summary adjudication.ss

The court's reference to Supreme Court cases
hearings prior to deprivation of property hig
anomaly. An individual's property may not be ta
hearing, yet his personal freedom may. The Fifth
an individual should not be incarcerated withou
heard 33 rejects this anomaly and goes beyond hold
ing pretrial incarceration has a right to a determinat
a neutral and detached arbiter.
Although there appears to be no federal case whi
of due process, an accused is entitled to an advers
carceration for any significant length of time, prio
a right ought to exist. In Goldbe1·g v. Kelly 34 th

Incarceration of an untried defendant for up
scrutiny by a judicial officer of the basis for
more odious to a sense of justice than the t
property without a hearing. Yet the Supre
held that such deprivations of property are imp

satisfied by ex pane proceedings, that amendment
fashioning a constitutional right to a preliminary he
The proper implement for fashioning a right t
on the state level is the due process clause of the
Close analysis of Rizinwater reveals that the court
foundation for future recognition of such a right.
requiring a hearing before persons can be deprive
stated:

1974]

Virginia Law Review
[Vol. 60: 540

38

37

/d. at 269.
408 u.s. 471 (1 fJ72~.
39 /d. at 485.
40 483 F.2d at 787.
41 See Ploscowe & Spiero, The Prosecuting Attorney's Office and the Control of
Org~J!lized Crime, in 2 MANuAL FOR PROSECUTING ATrORNEYS 318 (M. Ploscowe ed.
1956).
4 2 ln L. GRFIEW, CRIMINAL PitocmuRE FROM AltREST ro APPEAL_ (1947), the author ·
States: ·
Magistrates and . justices of the peace are . . • ignorant of the law as compared ·
with the prosecutor. Hence they are more likely to be dominated and overridden
by the prosecutor than they are to exercise an effective checking influence. A
better check than a weak preliminary examination is the grand jury.
ld. at 75. See generally W. LAFAVE, ARREST-THE DECisiON To TAKE A SusPECT INTo
CuSTODY 35-36 '(1965); THE CHALLENGE oF CRIME IN A FREE Socmrr, A REPORT uv THE
PREsiDENT'S CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF jUSTICE 130
H~V; Weinberg & Weinberg, supra note 1, at 1371-72 .& .,nn.4-S~SOJ;

1

o confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses are fundamental to the
oncept of due process. 37
A case cited by the Fifth Circuit supports the proposition that due process
eguires an adversarial preliminary hearing. In Morrissey v. Brewe~ 8 the
plaintiff had been accused of violating parole rules and had been returned to
rison without a hearing. The Supreme Court held that because reincar1c eration constituted a grievous loss, the parolee was entitled to a hearing
lb efore someone not directly involved in the case to determine whether there
lwas probable cause to believe that the parolee had violated the conditions
of his release. 39 Although arrest and search warrant procedures are ex parte
in nature, the Court in Morrissey required an adversary hearing. The reasoning that incarceration is a grievous loss and that due process requires a
hearing before a neutral arbiter seems equally applicable to the situation
involved in Rttinwater.
The preliminary hearing may provide the accused significantly more
protection than other methods of determining probable cause. The Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Rttinwater cited statistical data indicating that replacing ,
the information system in Dade County with hearings before a magistrate
had significantly reduced felony caseloads.40 The advantage that the preliminary hearing enjoys over an information, replacing a perhaps overzealous prosecutor with a presumptively neutral magistrate, is absent if the
h'earing is compared to a grand jury proceeding. The grand jury is presumed
to be impartial; although it has been labelled a mere rubberstamp for the
prosecutor, 41 the same criticism is made of magistrates. 42 The chief advantage of the preliminary hearing over a grand jury proceeding is that the
hearing is adversarial, while the accused has no right to appear . before the
grand jury. Additionally, in a preliminary hearing the accused has the
benefit of counsel, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the opportunity to present his own case. In this country at least, this procedure is
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43 For a strong argument that the preliminary hea
device than grand jury proceedings, see Weinberg &
44 See Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interes
For a discussion of the effectiveness of the prelim
terests, see Note, Constitutional Right to Cotmsel at
L. REv. 143, 156-65 (1970).
4>5 See, e.g., FED. R. GRIM. P. 16.
46 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Bl
901 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. den_ied, 380 U.S. 944 (19
v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194, 198 (ED.N.Y. 1967).
415 F.2d 158, 161 (3rd Cir. 1969); Sciortino v. Za
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Crump v.
Cir. 1965). For a general discussion of judicial deci
the preliminary hearing, see Weinberg & Weinberg,
47 E.g., THE PREsiDENT's CoMMISSION oN LAw ENF
JuSTICE; TAsK FoRCE REPORT: THE CouRTS 143 (196
N01:e, Preliminary Hearing in the lJistrict of Colu
vice, 56 GEO. L. J. 191 (1967);. Note, The Prelimin
supra note 1, at 176-80.
48 See sources cited note 44 supra.
49 Chief Justice Burger has expressed a preference
Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 25 (1970) (Burger, C.J., disse
50United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, ~71 U.
Ill E.g., Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26, 32 (
sas, 429 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. lfJ70); Walker v. Rodg
SciOftino -v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967)
IYillard v. Bonu.r, 342 F.2d 789, 79G (~h Cir.), cert.

presumptively the most effective method of det
There are additional benefits derived fro
hearing. The prosecutor can use it to test the
pending additional time and effort or to prese
witnesses prior to trial.4 4 The accused gain
potentially unnecessary trial and a chance to d
cution's case. Because opportunities for disco
narily very limited, 45 both courts 46 and co
further utilization and expansion of the preli
preliminary hearing is a poor vehicle for di
discovery rules o( a jurisdiction have been
which reduces opportunities for unfair surprise
While the Fifth Circuit may be moving to
is a constitutional right to a preliminary
progress is likely to be slow because of stron
Supreme Court language indicating that there
preliminary hearing at any time. 50 Many circ
there is no due process right to a preliminary
requested. 51 Other cases impliedly state the id
that a grand jury indictment or an inform
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. Burke, 281 F.2d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 875 (1960), 371 U.S.
3 (1963).
52 See cases cited note 7 supra.
53 FED. R. CruM. P. 5(c).
54 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .
ny offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of greater than one year is an
nfamous crime within the meaning of the fifth amendment. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (a),
dvisory Committee Notes, reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. (1969).
55 In Note, An Examination of tbe Grand Jury in New York, t CoLuM. JL. & Soc.
OB. 88 (1966), Dean Paulsen is quoted as saying:
[I'he] [g)rand jury is a poor construct for protection of the accused and there
is little difference between its operation and a McCarthy investigation.
d. at 90 n.20. See also Antell, Tbe Modern Grand Jury: Benighted SupergO'IJermnent,
A.B.A.]. 153 (1965). For commentary expressing a contrary view see Dession, From
ndictment to Information-Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163 (1932); Hall,
nalysis of CriticiSm of tbe Grand Jury, 22 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 692 (1931).
56 In two cases, both juvenile court proceedings, the United States Court of Appeals
or the District of Coluriiliia has- held that the Constimtlon requires a preliminary
earing. Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.Zd 838 (D.C. Crr. 1971) ; Cooley v. Stone, 414
.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In neither case was the issue of whether an indictment
bviates the need for a preliminary hearing before the court. Rather, the cases conidered the need for a judicial determination of probable cause without the necessity
f deciding whether a grand jury proceeding would eliminate this requirement. In
lue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965),
he District of Columbia Circuit held that an intervening indictment did not necessarily
reclude a preliminary hearing. However, the decision was grounded in what the
ourt perceived to be congressional policy as expressed in a stamte applicable only to
he District.
li7 Sci<irtino v. Zampano, 385' F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. deniedl 390 U.S; 906:,.
09'68):

earing. 52 The Federal Rutes of Criminal Procedure provide for a prelimiilary hearing only if it precedes the issuance of an indictment or the filing
'f> f an ·m f ormatiOn."
· ~a
A primary obstacle to establishing a constitutional right to a preliminary
fiearing is the fifth amendment, which explicitly requires indictment or
presentment by a grand jury in cases involving capital or otherwise infamous
f rimes. 54 Although the grand jury has been severely criticized because its
f haracteristic secrecy and the ex parte nature of its proceedings provide
little procedural protection for the accused, 55 the fifth amendment makes it
~nomalous to hold that an adversarial preliminary hearing is always required
o satisfy due process. 56 A constitutional right to a preliminary hearing
ould protect an accused by serving as a check on grand jury findings, but
his sort of quasi-appellate review would 'result in a wasteful duplication of
ffort. Moreover, it is by no means clear that a magistrate would have the
Prower to undermine the grand jury's constitutional role by negating its
finding of probable cause. 57
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A post-indictment preliminary examination w
government's burden of showing probable caus
ing the indictment. Even if the commissioner
could not undermine the authority Q{ its findi
385 F.2d at 133. Accord, United States v. Hinkle, 307
r;s FED. R. CruM. P. 5 (a).
~ 9 The Federal Rules use the term "preliminary
nary hearing." There is no difference in meaning.
oo Although it Is possible to hold a preliminary exa
appearance, ordinarily counsel need time to prepare
and a separate date is set. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, Ad
Amendments, reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1973)
liminary examination should be held at the time of
Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in W arran
1128 (1972).
61 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
62Jd.
63 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (c) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant is entitled to a preliminary e
charged with an offense, other than a petty o
judge of the district court..•. H the defenda
examination, the magistrate shall schedule a
[P]rovided, however, that the preliminary exa
defendant is indicted or_if an information aga
trict court before the date set for the prelimi
64 Fro. R. CRIM. P. 7 (a) states:
An offense which may be punished by death s
An offense which may be punished by impris
y.!!ar or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by

Rainwater did not constitutionalize the ad
but, if affirmed by the Supreme Court, will re
systems in which the prosecutor .alone certifi
cause. This would undoubtedly cause wider
hearing, particularly in those jurisdictions whic
Although the Rainwater court did not ad
Criminal Procedure, the case impliedly rende
tionally suspect, since in certain circumstances
to be proceeded against by information alone.
making an arrest with or without a warrant is
before a federal magistrate without unreason
ceeding is called the initial appearance and m
preliminary examination,59 which is the subje
determination of probable cause is made at th
accused is informed of his right to a prelimin
liminary examination is not waived by the
schedule a hearing. 62 Rule 5 (c) provides, ho
is filed or the defendant is indicted before the
liminary examination will not be held. 63 S

1974]

Virginia Law Review

waived, it may be prosecuted by information. Any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information. An information may be filed without
leave of court.
65
With respect to the person who waives his right to an indictment by a grand jury,
is result does not seem unreasonable, since he has o,nce rejected an opportunity to
ave probable cause determined by a neutral party.
6618 u.s.c. §§ 3146, 3148-49 (1970).
67
The decision in Rainwater and the order to grant preliminary hearings applied
nly to individuals actually incarceratea on the basis of informations. 483 F.2d at 789.
lowever, persons freed upon posting a bond should also be afforded a hearing before
: neutral arbiter, since they must undergo the expense and inconvenience of preparing
defend against a criminal charge. Cf. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345
1973) (restraints on an individual who was released on his own recognizance pending
ppeal of a misdemeanor conviction constituted custody for the purposes of federal
abeas corpus).
6
8 In considering the amended Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, see note 19
:pra, and testing them against its holding, the Rainwater court determined that Flora's attempt to deny a preliminary hearing to misdemeanants was impermissible. Relyin part on Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), which extended the right
court-appointed counsel to all individuals charged with an offense punishable by
prisonrnent, the court stated: "In short, the offense charged is irrelevant to the man
carcerated prior to trial. ..." 483 F.2d at 789.
Further dealing with Florida's amended rules, the court did not find it necessary to
ecide whether the lapse of as long as six days between arrest and preliminary hearg permitted by the Florida Rules violated due process. /d. at 788. The court did,
owever, strike down as violative of the equal protection clause, a provision which
ould have allowed the preliminary hearing to be delayed several days in cases inolving offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. /d. at 789-90.

I The Rainwater decision highlights the inconsistency arising from constitu. onal protection of the right to a hearing before deprivation of property
nd the simultaneous failure to guarantee such a hearing to one accused of
trime. The fact that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure result in un1c rutinized incarceration in certain cases points out the need for a reexamiation of pre-trial procedures. The Rainwater court's emphasis of the prerninary hearing's role is a significant step in the direction of fairer treatment
'or those accused of crime.

i>rosecution by information when an accused faces sli~ht penalties or when
dictment by grand jury is waived. some individnals mav never have
i>rohahle cause determined by a neutral party despite their having requested
nreliminary ex<~mination . 65 Assuming that these persons have been unable
to secure release by meeting the requirements of the federal bail provisions, 66
this svstem seems distinguishable from the Florida system struck down in
~ainwater only because, absent waiver of indictment by an arrestee, it may
~e "~f' d to prosecute only minor offenders. Since a primary evil caused by
ck of a neutral determination of probable cause is pretrial incarceration, 67
r ere seems to be no basis for affording less procedural protection for those
ccused of less serious offenses. 6 8
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JusT ABOUT EVERYBODY vs. HowARD HuGHE
den City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973
About Everybody vs. Howard Hughes has m
characterizes Joseph Golden's The Superlawyer
to obtain a glimpse of the gods. In this case, h
denizens of Farragut Square, but rather Howa
of Trans World Airlines, a large part of the
munity, and, of course, some very skillful law
the book is an inside view of the fight for contr
lies in Mr. Tinnin's grasp of the nature of a c
the strategies it engenders. Every stage of the
external facts and the objectives of the protago
picture of the function of the legal process in r
the way in which private parties manipulate the
achieve their goals. The reader's interest in th
quickly subsumed by his interest in the way on
regard it is important to note that the primar
such, rather than the substantive law of antitr
liarity with the law lends a deeper appreciation
such a way that the layman can appreciate the au
PuBLIC INTEREST AovocACY: MATERIALS FOR
By Michael Meltsner and Philip G. Schrag.
Company, 1974. Pp. xii, 418. Responding to
emphasis on clinical law programs and courses
of advocacy skills, the authors have compiled a
for the use of law professors and students invol
focus of the volume is on public interest law,
readable but also provides insights and guidanc
of this sort of practice. The authors have divi
major parts. The first, entitled "The Practic
primarily contains excerpts from articles conce
caseload and political constraints on public int
the lawyer's effectiveness, and types of instit
priate for public interest advocacy. Part II d
vocacy techniques and includes chapters on pl
on Fuentes v. Shevin), interviewing clients, draf
and examination of witnesses. The book closes
dramatize the challenges encountered throughou
tion. The authors also pose a myriad of provoc
torneys' tactics and strategy.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 73-477
Richard E. Gerstein 1 State Attorney for Eleventh Judicial On Writ of Certiorari
Circuit of Florida,
to the United States
Petitioner,
Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.
v.
Robert Pugh et nJ.
[January -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring. ·
I concur in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion) since
the Constitution clearly requires at least a timely judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to pretrial detention.
Because Florida does not provide all
I
defendants in· custody pending trial with a fair and reliable determipation of probable cause for their detention,
the respondents and the rnernbers of the class they represent are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
Having determined that Florida's current pretrial detention procedures are constitutionally inadequate, I think
it is unnecessary to go further. I would not, therefore, in
the abstract, either attempt to define the minimal procedural safeguards that must be accorded to incarcerated
suspects awaiting trial or to specify those procedural protections that are not constitutionally necessary.
It is the prerogative of each State in the first instance
to develop pretrial procedures that provide defendants iu
pretrial custody with the fair and reliable determination
of probable cause Jor detention required by the Constitutiou. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U. S. 471,488. The
constitutionality of any particular method for determining probable cuuse can be properly decided only by evaluating a State's pretrial procedures as a whole, not by
1

~~
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isolating a particular part of its total system. As the
Court recognizes, gn'at diversity exists among the procedures employed by the States in this aspect of their crimi- ·
nal justice systems. ·Ante, at slip op. 22.
There will be adequate opportunity to evaluate in an
appropriate future case the constitutionality of any new
procedures that may be adopted by Florida in response
to the Court's judgment today holding that Florida's
present procedures are constitutionally inadequate.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 73-477
Richard E. Gerstein, State Attorney for Eleventh Judicial On Writ of Certiorari
Circuit of F lorida,
to the United States
Petitioner,
Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.
v.
Robert Pugh et al.
[January -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JusTICE DouG_.
I.As, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, AND MR. JusTICE MARSHALL
join, concurring.
I concur in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, since
the Constitution clearly requires at least a timely judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to pretrial detention. Because Florida does not provide all
defendants in custody pending trial with a fair and reliable determination of probable cause for their detention,
the respondents and the members of the class they represent are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
Having determined that Florida's currant pretrial detention procedures are constitutionally inadequate, I think
it is unnecessary to go further by way of dicta. In particular, I would not, in the abstract. attempt to specify
those procedural protections that constitutionally need
not be accorded incarcerated suspects awaiting trial.
Specifically, I see no need in this case for the Court to
say that the Constitution extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human being tfianis requiredto
test the propriety of garnisheeing a commercial bank account, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
- U . S . - , the custody of a refrigerator, Mitchellt .,.,C ~ ~,_Jl,

~~
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W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600; the temporary suspension
of a public school student. Gross v. Lopez,- U.S.-;
or the suspension of a driver's license, Bell v. Burson, 402
U. S. 535. Although it 'may be true that the Fourth
Amendment's "balance between individual and public
interests always has been thought to define the 'process
that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal
cases," ante, pp. 21-22, n. 7, this case does not involve
an .initial arrest, bJ.It rather the continuing incarceration
of a presumptively innocent person. Accordingly, I cannot join the Court's effort to foreclose any claim that the
traditional requirements of constitutional due process are
applicable in the context of pretrial detention.
It is the prerogative of each State in the first instance
to develop pretrial procedures that provide defendants in
pretrial custody with the fair and reliable determination
of probable cause for detention required by the Constitution. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,488. The
constitutionality of any particular method for determining probable cause can be properly decided 02;9:: br!lva!:_
uating a State's retrial procedures as a whole, not by
isolating a articular art of ·
system. .As the
ourt recognizes, great diversity exists among the procedures employed by the States in this aspect of their criminal justice systems. Ante, at slip op. 20.
.,
There will be adequate opportunity to evaluate in an !~
appropriate future case the constitutionality of any new .
procedures that may be adopted by Florida in response
to the Court's judgment today holding that Florida's
present procedures are constitutionally inadequate.

lfp/ss
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No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh

This case involves the Florida

procedur~here

arrest is made without a warrant. as ie

an

~s~al~ ~e

case'-.
upon information by the prosecuting attorney,,land held
in jail/ pending the other steps in the criminal process,
.lhear~ng,
.
.
d tr~a.
.1 ~~·
~.g., a b a~
arra~gnment an
-1-?J.d..;.
l.A-r , / ) J t.. /-<- ~ .J <.. ~t:
""1 /-~..__
We hold ~tha the prQae e~~er'~~emeftt ~f

h,-..
,
I~ '- ~
/ ~bable eaase

"

standing alone

justify detention pending trial.
Amendment

is not sufficient to
Rather, the Fourth

require ~ fair and reliable determination

of probable caus; i 's a condition to any significant
pretrial restraint on liberty.

Moreover, this

determination must be made by a judicial officer
promptly after arrest.

\~

)

i

But we do not accept respondent's argument/ that
a full adversary hearing - with counsel, confrontation
and cross examination of witnesses - is required by
the Constitution.

The determination of probable cause

for detentionJ'is merely the first stage in the elaborate

2.
criminal justice

system~esigned

to safeguard the

rights of those accused of criminal conduct.

At this
1
r~.
initial stage, we think a mini-trial is not req ire
~

!

(,;

,

t

and is not necessarily in the interest of either the

1

suspect or society.
Accordingly, and for the reasons more fully set
forth in our opinion 1 we affirm in part and reverse
in

par~he

decision in this case by the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Mr. Justice Stewart has filed

.,

vv.-~E ~ ...IJ:"~

a c§t~~n ~nion, }

in which Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall have
joined.

.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

January 10, 1975

Re:

No. 73-477 - Gerstein v. Pugh

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your circulation of
today.
Sincerely,

/~

,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

/
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 14, 1975

Re:

No. 73-477 - Gerstein v. Pugh

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely'~
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Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 15, 1975

Re:

No. 73 - 477

-

Gerstein v. Pugh

Dear Lewis:
Would there be any point in adding, at the end of
footnote 2 on page 2, a phrase such as "See note 20, ~
"? When I first read footnote 2, I wondered whether
there was an inference that if the described procedure had
been challenged, there might be a chance of success. Footnote 20 provides an answer to this and prompts me to suggest
the addition to footnote 2.

---

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
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Case held for No. 73-477 Gerstein v. Pugh
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

No. 73-6950 Mega v. West Virginia.
In this case we held that a person charged by
prosecutor's information was entitled to a judicial
determination of probable cause for pretrial detention.
Our opinion noted expressly that we had no intention of
changing the settled rule that illegal arrest or detention
furnish no grounds for vacating a subsequent conviction.
tfip .QP. at 15. In Mega, · the Petitioner seeks reversal of
conviction for ·· possession of marijuana because he was
denied a preliminary hearing after grand jury indictment.
The statement in Gerstein thus disposes of his claim, without reference to the fact that Petitioner was held under
indictment rather than an information or other form of
prosecutor's charge.
There are other, independent issues raised by the Mega
petition. Petitioner also raises questions about the State's
failure to disclose certain evidence, and its refusal to
grant immunity to an informer witness who was present at
the time of the alleged drug transaction and who asserted
a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify about the
occurrence. Petitioner contends the informer's testimony
would have supported his entrapment defense. I do not find
this claim worthy of our consideration, and I will vote to
deny the petition.

f__1-.;?
L.F.P., Jr.
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No. 73-477 GERSTEIN v. PUGH

MR. JUSTICE POWELLf delivered the opinion of
~

the Court.

The issue in this case is whether a person
~ Y'V'e'3teJ

~~ etl~eod~

~

under a prosecutor's information is

constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of
probable cause for

e ~~+ria.l Y'edratM-1· of liberLt.j.

~nt1on~

I~
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson
were arrested in Dade County, Florida.

Each was charged

v

. h severa 1 o ff enses un d er a prosecutor ' s ~n
. f ormat~on.
.

w~t

Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
/
,.
/

him cf rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson was
held in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
In Florida, indictments are required only for
prosecution of offenses punishable by death.

All other

criminal off enses may be prosecuted by information, and

2.

violations of municipal ordinances may be prosecuted
by a simple affidavit or docket entry.
Proc. 3.140 (Supp. 1974).

Fla. RJsacrim.

At the time respondents

were arrested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure
authorized only one method for determining the existence
of probable cause to hold a suspect in jail pending
trial.

Fla.

R~rim. P~:122

(amended 1972).

This

proceeding, an adversary preliminary hearing, was not
available to a suspect who had already been charged

See..

by informationJ~Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla.)
cert. jCdenied,
411 U.S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hardy v.
oc

~

0'-V

Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972)J State v. IlerflilRd
r_e_l..
09 (Fla. 1968)-; Sullivan v. State _ _
MeODry,

4~ 8~.

2

~94

(Fla. 1951); Karz v. OVerto ,

11A
So. 2d 763 (FJ:.a.

249~

l~s~ ;wJa Cf'4 .,._l,.__t.M..
preliminary

1)~a

hearing was held and the suspect discharged, the
r'etu.~ k~
prosecutor could reinstate the charge and hale him

3.

-h

"back

int~ custody i:mmeE:ii:atel~

by filing an information.

See Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965);
Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962).

As a result,

a person charged by information could be detained pending
trial solely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class
action against Dade County officials in the federal
district court, \31 claiming a constitutional right to

;

-~

a ')

tt1

4
-

~"f.1A~¥"t "-'r

a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause

0

4

~ f_:r_b~ a•kea :je~declaratory and injunctive relief. Cl
Respondents Turner and Faulk,

"~~ u~rQ

also

~

-&: .........

custody

unde ~informations,

subsequently intervened.

in

5

Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for Dade County,
was one of several defendants.

6

After an initial delay while the Florida legislature
considered a bill that would have
hearings to

e~"W:l

9Pe

- Mt1
. , ('( rf clasa

plai~4£f

1l

~ '1):,

~ci

.

preliminary

~
.l
the District Court

4.

1107

~

( ~ Fla.

1971) .

-f~e.. c~ S""..

A(-fVl c"_,.c/ / ,

'I~ eou~e-F-H-f-¥ed t:l;u~ Qas ~

,

Pr/2 3(b) (2).> ~
1

a s a class action under

~

Civ.

<'..-O·U.Jfi

~held

that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all

i V\~ At V'i11'1 .( •
arrested persons Aa r1ght to a judicial hearing on the
('

~M

Ll

0

question of probable cause.

The District Court ordered

the Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs
an lirumediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further

detention.~

It also ordered them

to submit a plan providing prelLminary hearings in all
~-~'cases instituted by informat~n~ly one J;lan~
by Saeriff-E Wilson Purdy

was submitted, and the

District Court adopted it with modifications.
order prescribed a detailed post-arrest
te all arreseea

~~~

The final

procedure . ~

336 F. Supp. 490.

Upon arrest

the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a
"first appearance hearing."

The magistrate would explain

the charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint
counsel if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable

5.

cause determination unless either the prosecutor or the
accused was unprepared.

If either asked for more time,

the magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary
hearing," to be held no more than four days later if the

" 3C~c{

j.lli:lS 1°11\

~cuL ~tM.. .!ulta

A accused would

tt..a. • ~~ Ja.tu. ;) ~
at Hv ~. . __ :a- f-tt..t_ . ~T

C!M./.:ltce/"-;j. GVw.( t'Y\.0 'W~c(
-t (. 1
&t'l (' wa.Q.

be entitled to counsel, and he wou d be

allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript
made on request.

If the magistrate found no probable

cause, the accused would be discharged.

He then could

not be charged with the same offense by complaint or
information, but only by indictment returned within
thirty days.
to hold

The plan also provided sanctions for failure
hearings at the prescribed times.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed
the District Court's order pending appeal, but while the
case was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary
voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own.

6.

Upon learning of this development, the Court of Appeals
vacated it &-&£ay an

remanded the case for specific

findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County
system.

T~ Before the District Court issued its
~)

findings~

the Florida Supreme Court~e procedural

rules governing preliminary hearing~, and the parties
agreed that the District Court should direct its inquiry
to the new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person
must be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours.
Fla. R>c rim. Pf1'.130. 1

1S

~

fhis "first al'p-;aranc 0

~ i tM_fatc to #..t.
at

~~

t~ " fir st appearance hearing' l~~d~red by the District

l'f\ all

recpe(tt~

bu.

e

('.h(Jict~ll'tte:

CourtJ.-1\t he-maga.,s.tr-a.te must :inf-orm the <lef

eka.rge, 1 give- him-

opy of-t

---hie cOftStitu.tiona-l } :ights

used
~·

i~

~~laint,

advise him o

And appoint counsel f-or him i

entitled to release on bail or other

t'V\1!15-h-aiv

M-_'fiot

.S

conditions ~

make a det ermination of probable cause. A_'i:te'f"'.

7

~

The rule amendments also changed the proc edure for

preliminary hearings, restricting them to p felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or XRBi«emxa indictment.
Rule 3.131; see In re Rule 3.13l(b), Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 282 So. 2d ____ (Fla.

1972)~

In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
answered
that the amended rules had not xemaxeB the basic
constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by
information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause.
1286.

Reaffirming the original ruling,

355 F. Supp.

xe the District

Court declared that the continuation of this practice
was unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals

8.

affirmed, 483 F. 2d 778, modifying the District Court's
decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the
form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended
Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was
provided to all defendants in custody pending trial.

'

Id. at 788. ~
7

State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for

review, and we granted certiorari because of the importance
of the

issue. ~

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

'"'•
'

9.

II.

(

As framed by the proceedings below, the issues

are whether a person who is arrested and charged with
crime is entitled to a judicial determination of probable
cause to justify restraint o
~ 4-

his liberty pending trial,

)

?

~~
J ../.lj) 7A..(
and if so,~~het er only an adversary earing will serv~
~it ~A , .
A.
Hiato:r: ically~ oth the standards and procedures

,. • . /-nc.

;;.,-

for arrest and detention have been derived from the
Fourth Amendment and its common law antecedents. See
~r v. h 'r.
'i' ~ u.s. 2.c11, :v-tt/-'24" (rq73);
-Gf.er~i-ted &ta-t:ea,..-35 7 tJ. S • "4'8-o, 485 -"'8-6 ( 195 8)

4)

A

J-

Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex Parte
Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806).

The standard for

arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was
committing an offense o"
(1964).

Beck v. Ohio, 479 U.S. 89, 91

See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98

(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176

10.

(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
This standard represents a compromise between the

individual ~ s

right to liberty and the community's responsibility for
controlling crime .
"These long-prevailing standards seek
to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded
charges of crime. They also seek t o give fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community's
protection. Because many situations which
confront officers in the course of executing
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room
must be allowed for some mistakes on their
part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading
sensibly to their conclusions of probability.
The rule of probable cause is a practical,
nontechnical conception affording the best
compromise that has been found for accommodating
these often opposing interests. Requiring
more would unduly hamper law enforcement.
To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim
or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra; at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever
possible.

The classic statement of this principle appears

11.

"The point of the Fourth Amendment,
which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
Re~iring

that a magistrate review the factual justification

for every arrest beforehand would offer maximum protection
for individual rights,
needs ef ef:fe.e.H.ve law enforcement.

To accommodate these

opposing interests, the Court has expressed a preference

I

I

I

for the use of arrest warrants when possible, Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 479-482 (1963), but it has never invalidated an arrest
supported by probable cause, solely for lack of
- - SeeKer v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334

u.s.

699, 705 (1948). 13

.1<'

Under this practical

#

~4' ,·c.~~ I

~i~,

12.

crime.

The policeman 1 s judgment

Jusli{;es

~also j ustif~

a

-17) -1 ~ b :
<'~ d vJ. ~ :
brief period of detention ~n connection with the arr~
_g, f e f s >U o J.A.-~ a.~~ fe-"c d ,.., J.. (I ....J-.J
) but once the suspect is in custody the reasons that
1

-.J

• •

.,

justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral
judgment evaporate.

There is no longer any danger that

the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the
police submit their evidence to a magistrate.

And, from

the suspect's point of view, the consequences of prolonged
detention may be

more serious than the interference

~

Left~thy~~retrial

occasioned by arrest.

i&..t_
imperil

confinement may

r-c ('ts /(~
defendant's job, interrupt his source of

su ~

~e

~A-¥e::u.·~

income, and d&Mege his family relationships.
.,

~

f

- "t.l•-. (

,-.e.ondit-iona

. Ir

Even

}I

"Y ·~_ ~ ~
-..., ~~-.tn~ C.t/"J-(,lt /~
release~~enaing tria ~"IDa¥-invo.l.v:e setlsstzautital
)

~ !r " ~ 1'\. ; r • . ' : er.· -t
restraintJ on libe~ty ~ When the stakes are this high,
(I ,

f

the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is
essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful
protection from unfounded interference with liberty.
Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a

Rider A, p. 9 2 (Gerstein)
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b 1
+~~. (I (I ,.. ~
As f rame d b y t h e procee d 1ngs e ow, tne 1ss~~

4-w-o
1

~

~

whether a person arrested and held for trial on an
t~'U{' i "l

j

information is entitled to a ,., determination -by-B=--'-jud-iei:a.

~t . t_~

office:)_ of probable cause for /f(he

wt

(' ~ -l ~

c
(
'
re ~~red

cuJ _p(' t-,.. l~h:1

wha-t fo-rmali'l:ies are

I)

t

I'

arre s t~

0~1 ~

I

and i f s oJ

(j ~

'\

le

iH l the Hlaking of tlti ~

i!~~~l=J-r-~td ~ 1k ~ c)t
(i.M_ hJ.
~ •lk ~

A-w

0

t
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Maximum protection of individual rights could be assured
by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would
severely

handicap~eeessary

an

legitimate law enforcement.

In striking a balance between these opposing interests,
the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest
warrants when possible, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96

(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-482
(1963)~

but it has never invalidated an arrest s~~f.ted
t {J

tf'"

~

.~ ~~- ~()t

by probable cause solely because ef the absence of aJ.

~~!:'.a~t"

M.e.u.NL 0... MttLhl-t

a.m. t

. "'

~ 1?

13.

~This

result has historical support in the common law

that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
~Carroll

v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for
an arrested person to be brought before a justice of the
peace shortly after arrest.

2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown

77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-17

~,cr

(<'o

kunt?.

(4th ed. 1762).

oJ,

1~

McffittJ 115 tJ,S, ~78> t-{Cfg~qq {_tgF5)"':<1

The justice of the peace would "examine"

the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there
was reason to believe the prisoner had committed a crime.
If there was, the suspect would be committed to jail or
bailed pending trial.
from custody.

If not, he would be discharged

1 Hale, supra, at 583-585; 2 Hawkins, supra,

at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of

14

England 233

(1883) ~he

initial determination of probable

cause could al;d be reviewed by higher courts on a writ
I

of habeas corpus.
I

2 Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen,

~

supra, at 243; See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75,

14.

criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption

u.s.

7

8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807);

\
(3 Cranch) 447 (1806); _E_x_P_a_r_t_e__
H_am_~_·l_t_o_n, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
17 (1795)* In re
(€. c.

K~

...

Fed. Caso 3b3 (Noo 730) J-

J

1869)-(M' tter, Circui-t Justi."C"e)

lv..:L ~t'
~~ramers

Bailey,~

and

itl1

f,

~

4-C.d-t IC i!.
of the Bill of Rights 'nay

model for a "reasonable" seizure.

~regarded

See

it as a

g81UU!a:ll~

Draper v.

United States, 358 UoS. 307, 317-320 (1959)(Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Under the Florida procedures ehallenged here,
a person arrested without a warrant and charged by
information may be jailed or subjectedm other restraints
pending trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. Ljt

There is no provision for a test of

probable cause at the first appearance before a magistrate
or at the hearing to set bail;

Fla.

R~rim.

P

3.130;

C4-.l

see Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (3th 8i:.r. 1973).

15.

e suspect cannot demand a preliminary hearing.
Fla.

R~rim. P ~: l3l(a).

The Florida Supreme

Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to
test the probable cause for detention under an information.
Sullivan v. State ex rel McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla.

1951).~

The arraignment may be delayed as much as a month,
and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause

I'

may be raised

~then. ~

Petitioner defends this practice on the ground
pr r t\u uYt 's JJ. "' ; .'1 · ID ~ ·lr
that the~information ~tself ~ a determination of
~-b
probable cause a~he-pr~eeutor's

judgme~~~

sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending trial.
Although a

eftt'\~·<' .d ~.0 t.J1

p~see1:1tor

~tion affe~

tA--

,.,

dec is ion that the evidence warrants

Q..,--. ~~

!YI

some protection against unfounded

"

detention, we do not think prosecuterial judgment
standing alone
Amendment.

m
~ts

the requirements of the Fourth

Indeed, we think the Court's previous

16.

decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure.
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon
a United States Attorney's information was invalid
because the accompanying affidavits were defective.
Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly state
that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the
judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth

Amendment.~

M0r.e recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971), the Court held that a
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and
detached magistrate.

We reaffirmed that principle in

Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), and
held that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest
warrant must be determined by someone independent of
police and prosecution.

\ 20 ~
~

The reason for this

17.

"A democratic society, in which respect
for the dignity of all men is central,
naturally guards aginst the misuse of
the law enforcement process. Zeal in
tracking down crUne is not in itself an
assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not
alone prevent disregard of cherished
liberties. Experience has therefore
counseled that safeguards must be provided
against the dangers of the overzealous
as well as the despotic. The awful
instruments of the crUninal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The
complicated process of criminal justice is
therefore divided into different parts,
responsibility for which is separately
vested in the variops participants upon
whom the criminal law -reUe.s for its
vindication." b

~cNabb

v. United States,

318

u.s.

332, 343 (1943).

In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of
?'UJ- ;f .J-.«_ -/ _.

l

.; I

probable cause eennot justify restraint on liberty pending
;'\

trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to

r-

f

judicial oversight of

-Vl (. 1

'

~decision

I

.r
to prosecute.

.... IJ~

<"- '

I

Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that
L-'J.

?

I

(#!:_&::;p.r.ac.es.s-does-not: m&ke judicial hearing~~ prerequisite
to prosecution by information.
586 (1913)

~

nu.

Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. "
-1

We-a.lso.-intend no ...departure from
'\

the established rule that illegal arrest or detention

18.

-a ~ubsr'l.CAC -tT
does not void attf\uLhetwise val::td conviction.

Frisbie v.

Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436

l~s )

(1886).

a

This rule,, as the Court of Appeals noted below,

su. ~{Y ~t

w-f

1\

'('

~~ -a-eha.lleag

v. '0

""r{ ..l_

~o

\-~Yt tC...fl

[Yt.e-t-o.O., 0

<! iLU./.1
·a-t:tenrpt to reverse

J rt

F

""~o A1-\1\~

et. o r ¥

pt:esent confinerneat

c J:

Ot;"-¥aea te --a..

1"'

t) :

•

~

I

conviction

t t" rt·

~

J

(I'

~ om

4

•

-tC..t_

-t...) ~uf- a. ~- -ut-i.r~
th.e.....groun;i

Otl-

..J..IV

rf

;( that the defendant was detained pending trial without
~ probable

cause . eetermina ·

483 F. 2d , at 786-87.

Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6

A~,.
F. 2d 838

-U,;,
with Brown v.

Fauntleroy,~442

CAS"

(~th €~~.

D.c..,

1968),

·1

(~.e.

e~t.

1971),

1), ~~

.--U. .
and Cooley v. Stone 2 414 F. 2d 1213
i.

(D• ·•· c;ir

cJ;:)

1969).

III

~lift \(

l. ,·.. ~, ~1 C'hu.~-t*

~ng-questi-on-

C\-MA

I L~ C' u~ t

is whether the adversaryJ

01 (1-prA
~ 0ct ttat ~ft._t c{ rq ,. _ ;, 'i ~ ~
by the District Court and approved by
51 ~~ttfJ(C
Q

J..

17<

kea~ing ~rdered

the

tL

~rt? p£..

A-ppeals is manda: d b y- th

.tbe Diser-i-e-t:

1ourt' s ~ ree,

onstitut'ion

Under-

as- modified on appeal, the

/

ause - determination must be made either at the
4iX'ilt- appearance cOr several days later .

\.

In eiEhe'P <!as.a,

-tt must be accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-

19.
and compulsory process for witnesses.

_)

-'A full preliminary hearing of this sort is modeled
after the procedure used in many states to determine
whether the evidence justifies going to trial under an
information or presenting the case to a grand jury.

See
,.,__

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Y Kamisar, W.
LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedurd( 957-967 ) qqb-1000
(4th ed. 1974).

The standard of proof required of the

prosecution is usually referred to as "probable cause,"
but it may

appr~ch

a prima facie case of guDt.

Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure,

l~~ta~

tVo.
Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft 5, 1972).
II

employed.

on_

When the
I

hearing takes this form, adversary procedures
a~r•J~

A.L.I dl

c~h-.,~dl-t~

are ~a±ffle&t

The importance of the issue to both

the state and the accused justifies the presentation of
witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on
~~~0

cross-examination.

This kind of hearingArequires

appointment of counsel for

~indigent defendant~

v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).

Coleman

~ f>&:PAd"f• t~'- , f,
And, as the ~ ieel!e becomes

~

..

'

11
·
~ ~~~_;y_ t?: , ,'.. v -le ~
N ~ ~ ~"'"
bk. t' ._,... u.d; t/1aj~ I,
-' 1..)
Tmore difficult and the proced':res more complex, 1

~

-1- t
the less likely it is that
be held

~tty
~

;'\

,t;

~he ~~

I'

~ "X<..r~ -I-

--.!I

t

iminary hearing can

('('I!

...

after arrest. A A.L.I :J Model Code of

Pre-arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not

e~se t'al

~eah1 ~

for the

probable cause determination required by the Fourth

jfrrst

Amendme~ ~ A ~ny practice that fosters delay will

ry?}v,;'-'Jf

( thwart the purpose of the probable cause determination,

::I'
1r

t'r;L

which must be held promptly after arrest if it is to

(Y~ I~·

I

:rolv #A/

guarantee freedom from unjustified restraints on liberty.

flV' #1 f.l-t

~

v

f-1-'

,y.- ~'
~

trf

'\

\ ~ . the issue of probable cause for detention can

~ /_.,.)._~ t..U... ~ ~ ~--~be determined reliably without a full adversary hearing.

.

t-"fi ·...., ~

- _)'

~~

r~. ~

~~

)

I

11fl The standard is the same as that for arrest.

That

standard -- probable cause to believe the suspect has
committed a crime --\ haEi t;aditionally~been decided
in nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written
testimony, and the Court has

appr~oed

the se informal

21

modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence
confined to that which long experience in
the common-law tradition, to some extent
embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized
into rules of evidence consistent with that
standard. These rules are historically
grounded rights of our system, developed
to safeguard men from dubious and unjust
convictions, with resulting forfeitures
of life, liberty and property.

...

~i~egar

\

.

din dealing with probable cause, however,
as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative
to what must be proved."
v. United StateS , 338

u.s.

160, 174-175 (1949) •

cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).

;z--

~e

--,-,--

use

tl~ q< ("
of informal procedures is justified not only by the lesser

:

consequences of a probable cause determination but also by
the nature of the determination itself.
~ctio

~primary

of confrontation and cross-€xamination is to - aid

in asse'S-sing witness credibility and re j olving conflicts
in testimony.

6A)

/ It

-A determination of probable/ cause does

not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence
~a.-

that a reasonable-doubt or preponderance standard demands,
1\

Rider A, p. 22 (Gerstein) 12/9/74

lfp/ss

J(ut we find no basis for holding as a matter of

a\I

that~ the

constitutional principle

formalities and safe-

guards of 4 trial must be observed in making the Fourth
Q)'~
Amendment determination of probable cause.

Our system

of criminal justice already is criticized, fairly in
(5k,~(A..H<'('

some respects for its
t '

c "'

1

)

obese~
'~{•('t(,

to procedural and

f

I

KKR~KRxxx evident~

1 formalities

~ich

result in delayed justice, often in repetitive trials,
and in burdensome expense

~

~

IN-

both the accused and the

"

state.

Rider A--alternative

p. 22

pc

but in most cases their value would be too slight to
justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle,
that all the formalities and safeguards of trial must be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of
probable cause.

Our system of criminal justice is already

overburdened, and it may be fairly

criticized when

overemphasis on procedural and evidentiary formalities

•

~Q~)

X'~\ "\O ~

(

'AS'~-~ Jf~
1w>.,

7 \' ...-C-;;\)-~

I

~~..Y

& ~\~'-

I

Jt
'
l~\o

22.

~ Y\.>,0
\0 "
I

I

~n

and credibility determinations are less crucial

l·c··
,r t 1 ~~ L
lc-t=he-issue is tihe existence o ~ evidence support....~ a
to say that confrontation

belief in guilt.

and cross-examination might not enhance the reliability
of probable cause determinations in some cases ~ but the
delay that might result if live witnesses must be
produced for every preliminary determination counsels
against requiring these procedures as a

constitutiona~

. . 1
23\
pr 1.nc
1. p e .___;

the other hand, allowing the accused to be
and participate in the probable

rndnat.ion

2
~~·ri-~

delay the

h~~ng-or

~

burden the

~tate.

~O

In

respect the post-arrest determination differ

1

,f 'he 1 jM..e'~ <i' I'
.
from the procedurej) used in applying for warrants.
Warrant applications are ex parte proceedings by necessity,

-Rider

.s,

I'. 22

its l;~:od b~r,(~~ ~J._)
KX~XNEXBiKX~XHKRXHKXKxmiRaxi~

Partly because ef

the probable cause determination
is not a "critical stage" in the prosecution that
would require appointed counsel.
as "critical stages"
would
that/impair

~

We have identified

those pretrial

procedures

defense on the merits if the accused

( Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); \
is required to procee without • counsel. United States
/"\

v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967 ).

In Coleman v. Alabama,

'-

where the Court held that a preliminary hearing was a
critical staSe of an Alabama prosecution, the majority
and concurring opinions identified two critical factors
that distinguish

the Alabama preliminary hearing from

the probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment.

First, under Alabama

the hearing was to determine whether

law the function of

~ evi&!A-t"c.

t~e

"\o<as

suf :H:eeen ~

J't~s-ht·~d

ev~~nee

A

~

to just ·::-t~ charginS the suspect with an offense.

finding of no probable cause could mean that he would
~ourth

not be tried at all.

Amendment )

efProbable ~use

is addressed only to pretrial custody.

determination

To be sure, pretrial

ltl-der B, eont-~

to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the
preliminary hearing.

The Court noted that the suspect's

defense on the merits could be compromised if he had no
legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses'
testimony.

This consideration does not apply to the

informal, nonadversary procedure required under the
Fourth Amendment.
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding
appropriate, however, do not

ju~tify

denying the suspect

an opportunity to be present and participate in the

/

determination~Our

system of justice operates on the

premise that the

subject of a judicial proceeding is

entitled to participate unless there is good reason to
exclude him.

See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall . )

<._~ fow-c 1t... .4vv\J!M~h~ is 7U>+

tudt

•tat C41A.~Jt.

107, 12Z-123 (1873). )\ The procedures normally followed

/

~ CvV\ i4

o...J"tL

iV\0

~~ fp

~

in applying for lllla••n••n-li••,...7~ "ilan:=aate ·~ Fal ~
iftto t he eate~ery- adiinpreellllli~~ ia ~ ;ilk: ~ H:eeessit~

k

1U C.4

~tjJ

OJ.)._..

Q~etat ~ ex parte proceedin~sl\ ;NOtifying the suspect would
often frustrate the purpose

~·

of the warrant.

See T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional

Interpretation 81-82 (1969).

But when the suspect is

already in custody, and the only issue is probable cause
for detention, he should be allowed to participate in the
determination.

Allowing him to appear before the magistrate

and giving him an opportunity to speak or to submit

)
written evidence for consideration along with the state's
presentation could enhance both the reliability and the

bw(~ ~ . . . .

fairness of the proceeding.
state would be minimal.

t 1/l

The incomrenienee

t~

the

Virtually all jurisdictions

require that arrested persons be presented to a judicial

seQ.
officer within a short time after arrest , AA.L.I., Model
Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230-31 (Tent. Draft No. 1,

1966) ,

dN

~ Every

jurisdiction makes some provision for

setting bail or determining other conditions of pretrial

L~

release.

11.\7- 3loS
~7

Y~le

kat~) ~u.stice I s l"e "., n, c At \

See No-t--e-, Bail:

cl

tA/ \

An Ancient Practice Re-examinedo-.

(\ct7~)

L.J. 966, 977

(1971) ~

Since the defendant is

already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may

be decided at that time with little or no inconvenience
to the state.

In fact, the suspect's first appearance

before a magistrate ~as 1 traditionally} been considered the
proper time for determining whether there is probable
cause for detention.

1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 589-90

(1736); 2 id. at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-17
1

(4th ed. 1762) ; see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,

( Awts1VtdaW\ J -pv-cs~~ '

:tfu.

"- ~t 5~ M; ~~, l, l~t~ •?lJq.>

342-44 (1943By' Although the Federal Rules of Criminal (
,

I• 1

.J

Procedure hla:e: 1:aa: er explicitly acknowledge;

n~~ ~~r;,·,j

this function

of the first appearance, this Court has interpreted them
to require a determination of probable cause at that
stage.

Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965);

2$

Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
The determination we require under the
Amendment is similar in some respects to

Fo~

th~formal

preliminary hearings that due process requires upon arrest
leading to revocation of parole or probation.

Morrissey v.

rewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.

(!u t~
(

25.

-

determination following arrest, serve to justify
detention pending a final determination in the case.
But there are differences.

In Morrissey, the lead case,

we said that at the preliminary hearing the parolee should
be allowed to bring individuals who can give the parole
officer relevant information on his behalf, and, on a
qualified basis, should be able to insist that a person
who had given adverse infonnation be made available
for questioning in his presence.
~ ea ~~

408 U.S. at 487.

The

provision for live testimony is just i fied by

the differences between proceedings leading up to
revocation of probation or parole and those preceding a
criminal trial.

In the first place, when criminal

proceedings are instituted by information the prosecutor

IIi
makes an official oath that he is s atisfied
(' Y.t.

cause

~ probable

f .
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(g).

The formality

attendant upon this procedure, as well as the professional

r-'

~
~t ttf4{
responsibility of the prosecutor, afford greater protection
I

It

----------~ ------------------------------1
than the more unstructured
decision of a probation or parole officer.

25

noted in Morrissey, the parolee often is
arrested "at a place distant" from the state or the
institution to which he may be returned for the final
revocation hearing.

408 U.S. at 48).

In such a case

it may be impossible or impra tical to ensure the
presence of witnesses at the

fina~

hearing.

Criminal

prosecutions, however, customarily are held near the
place of the crime, and the Sixth Amendment protects
the accused f;orn testimony of witnesses who cannot be
present at trial.

As a result, there is less

re~son

to use the preliminary hearing as a device for gathering
and preserving live testimonY..

'7-r---------------------------l

_j

There is no single proper method for making the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment.

The states have many different patterns of

criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide

Florida requires every arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner
released.

Fla.

R~Crim. P ~: l30(b).

At that appearance

the defendant is told of the charges against him, furnished
a copy of the complaint, advised of his constitutional
rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent.

The

magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other conditions
of pretrial release.

One of the factors typically

relied upon in making this decision is the weight of
evidence against the accused.

ABA Standards Relating to

the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial Release
;c;;;

§

5.1 (1974); See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b).

£StU!

cc..

Expanding that

determination to a test of probable cause would be a
na ~al way of integrating the probable cause decision

with existing procedures.
In other states, existing procedures may satisfy the

,

~

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

already
Some states
...
~

follo~ing the suspect's first appearance.
Stat.

§39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9.

E.~., Colo. Rev.
Others may

choose simply to accelerate their existing preliminary
hearings.

What the Fourth Amendment requires for

pretrial restraint on liberty

~is a reliable determination

of probable cause made either before or promptly after
arrest, and preferably no later than the first appearance
before a judicial officer.

If made after arrest, the

suspect must be allowed to be present.
(2

choose the procedure that best

.{o 1ts
.

~G

.

.

f',;

Each state may
'I

i~a£e£

this determination

. 'I '

ex1st1ng practice.

/

IV

~D

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination
of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment.

As we

do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's

FOOTNOTES

1.

Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.

On March 16 an information was filed charging him with
robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of
a firearm during commission of a felony.

Respondent

Henderson was arrested ,March 2, and charged by information
on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and entering
and assault and battery.

The record does not indicate

whether either was arrested under a warrant.

hearin~ Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),

f ,(:'\. ,..
~ ~·. t 31
.
Abut that procedure is not challenged in this case.

yt\; .
3.

:.)

The complaint was framed under 42

u.s.c.

§

1983,

'

and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U.S.C.
§

1343(3).

2.

4.

Respondents did not ask for release from

state custody, even as an alternate remedy.

They only

asked that the state authorities be ordered to give
them a probable cause determination.

This was also

the only relief that the District Court ordered for
the named respondents.

F. Supp. ____ .

Because

release was neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did
not come within the class of cases for which habeas corpus
is the exclusive remedy.

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 29732974 (1974).
5.

Turner was being held on a charge of auto

theft, following arrest on March 11, 1971.

Faulk was

arrested on March 19 on charges of soliciting a ride
and possession of marijuana.
6.

The named defendants included justices of

the peace and judges of small-claims courts, who were
authorized to hold preliminary hearings in criminal cases,
and a group of law enforcement officers with power to

3.
7.

The District Court correctly held that

respondents' claim for relief was not barred by the
equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state

~ot U .5. 31 (1tl'11),
prosecutions A The injunction was not directed at the

'IC>u

-;y,t ...:,._.,

state prosecutions as such, but only at the legality
GJ1A t'ss wz.

~t

of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing , A~
~"'\Ut J, -ft-o...U:..Rrl~ th ~ -fv 1-t. ~al ~~e~~:-rhe.
~ order to hold preliminary earings could not prejudice
l SE'c C..C ov~t v.
c ic ,, t) 41'1 f.'7d 1073_, IOf:l (CA3 1'1'13)./
..
------../
the conduct of trial on the merits ~ ~· Perez v. Ledesma,

--

401 U.S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117

J.

(195:)
r 40t

llu~

eveft ifr't:he -principle of Younger v. Harri"' ,

•• 37 ( 971), were deemed to

t)lis case

would qQB ify as one in which equitable r
grant~d.

Illegal detention is an irreparable

"both great

nd immediate," and the threat it po s es to

"'

a suspect's
gainst

could b

be eliminated by his defense

single criminal

v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (3rd Cir. 1973).

~

f.

I

~

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems

to provide that every defendant confined for 30 days
is entitled to a mandatory preliminary hearing upon
application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently
·has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion
to deny the hearing.

ct.

(Fla. App. 1967).

"

J
'"

See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323

~

But cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763
~

(Fla. Ct. App. 1971}.

]

tf •
•

A~ ~s rvl\~cr- hJd

a

s.t~i

This erder was ~mt otttsid

1AM.~S~11\.a \ >

'1k; islative. ru-_{e"
· ri:eaicti

was ""--<>t ~d.t_ ~ jw-J.A..d.J..£t'
I( of a singie judge by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. The

it

f

original complaint did not ask for an injunction against
enforcement of any state statute or legislative rule of
statewide application, since the practice of denying
preliminary hearings to persons charged by information
was then embodied only in judicial decisions.

See note

~

5.

had jurisdiction over the appeal.

On remand, the

constitutionality of a state "statute" was drawn into
question for the first time when the criminal rules
were amended.

The District
't:s

:Lajttru:t i"e deeree t o itreoti"t'rtte that holding.

Its

supplemental opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory
judgment that the amended rules were unconstitutional ~
-/k ~~~ <! ·'ve tb(! r , . ,.
I r'11~l!)'lOlc +~t l-u(~j
~ and the opinion in the Court of Appeals is not
l ·-W Cb-v\C .u ,.;
~
j I'~ "Dtcitu t [I~ u tf c:L:cf
rt
inconsistent with f ais eenstreeti~ -&e~ 483 F. 2d at 788

~

j

0

1,.

(.

e..-v.J-s~{ (I~ tV~

l

o-t

tt daft"', ' ~q_ -rwc.

tl

r,'2

Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not
required for the issuance of this order.

See Kennedy v.

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-55 (1963); Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 606-08 (1960).

,o178K..

6.

I o.
~

The major difference between the District

Court's order and that of the Court of Appeals centered
on the question whether a probable cause hearing is

ck~d. P~~J ~~ ~ ., · l'
required for all arrested persons Aor only for those
confined pending trial.

The District Court's

original decree required preliminary hearings for all

33~ F. ('uf ., o..t - .
arrested persons. On remand, the District Court made
~

an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who
neither suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment

3?5 r c "'r~r 1cd - ·
upon conviction.

I\ The

Court of Appeals explicitly limited

the hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those

4£ ,
who are jailed pending trial.
· h out
w1t

~fa~
.£, exp 1·1c1t
· 1 y,
~ay 1~

. 2J ) a.+ '1 <6 ~ ~

AIts

opinion also s uggests,

·
· h t 1s
·
t h at t h e h ear1ng
r1g

similarly limited to felony defendants who are confined
pending trial.

l4...1 ~ 78 'fJ 78Cf •

The Court of Appeals vacated both the portion
of the District Court's order that prescribed
(tf(<'N' i
time periodsAfrom those

eetttei ne~

differea~

in the amended rules,

7.
It affirmed the District Court's holding on remand
that the amended rule~ extended time periods for
capital and life-imprisonment offenses was a violation
of equal protection.

In light

&~~ur

disposition of

-to
the specific terms of the
District Court's decree.

f.

At oral argument counsel informed us that

the named respondents have been convicted.

The i~

pre\J..u'C\1

.ft~
de~ivatioa -of-. whi:eh-they-eempla-in~ therefore has

ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of
cases in which the termination of a class representative's
claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members
of the class.

See Sosna v. Iowa, No. 73-762.

Pretrial

detention is by nature temporary, and it is most
•

II/~

unlikely that any

siagl ~ individual

could have his

constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is
either released or convicted.

The individual

~d

nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is

~-.

f?-t1

~

t·

0

certain that other persons will be detained under the

8.

allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
/'
in short, is one that is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review."

"

At the time the complaint was filed, the named
respondents were members of a class of persons detained
without a judicial probable cause
.Distrist
8ft

Cgu.;~;t

beh.ftlf <>£

suh&il'il1ently

determination ~

ee:r=tifie~e

ela:es

bv.:t

-

respondents )were still in custody
~ iffi~

aeti ~

hose who suffe-red a similar depr±vat+on

A. 'the record does not indicate whether any of

~-, sfr ,·c.T

~

Co-wr C..u-rt:-h d -f-tt_

c

-t~ <W'A

-£h~ Ram.e d ~

wkw

~~

a~aiting trial~

cU .. o
Despite the absence of such a showing, which would
r

k avotd
t.~.s
ordinarily be required )\under Sosna, this case is not
moot.

The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained

at the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release
on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or a guilty
plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial.
It is by no means certain that any given individual would

9.

Mo <'ovvt>

to certify a class action.

~aetheless ~

this is the

kind of case in which the constant existence of a class
of persons suffering the deprivation is certain.

The

attorney representing the named respondents is a public
clients
~ ..

with a continuing live interest in the cas e .

;th_ (HJNU ~.)

~

$_osvya

Aease ~ therefore, is a suitable exception to

the ~ rule

+·

that

Stl:BBCEJ:UCHS.

cJC\ss afl J ,
~ •'s
mootness of aA"capable of repetition,

() f'd.

.
. " e l asa
yet eva d 1ng
rev1ew

1

.

:

lJ.:.;.I
I

.

aet10~ 1s

..
governe d b y d eterm1n1ng

whether the named representatives were members of the
class at the time of certification.

__ ; ,$·

See Sosna, supra at
1

(c q

Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159

~g st Cb:~

1972).

Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which
was overruled in turn by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated
the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is
whether and under what circumstances an officer may enter

10.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971); i d.
at 510-512 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States
357

u.s.

493, 499-500 (1958).
•

The primary motivation for the requirement

seems to have been the penalty for allowing an offender
to escape, if he had in fact committed the crime, and
the fear of liability for false imprison
not.

ent, if he had

But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant

of commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more
than brief detention.
'~hen a private person hath arrested a
felon, or one suspected of a felony, he may
detain him in custody till he can reasonably
dismiss himself of him; but with as much
speed as conveniently he can, he may do either
of these things.

I

I
I

1. He may carry him to the common gaol,
. but that is now rarely done.

2. He may deliver him to the constable
of the vill, who may either carry him to the
common gaol, • • • or to a justice of peace
to be examined, and fa r ther proceeded against
as case shall require • • • .

I

3. Or he may carry him immediately to
any justice of peace of the county where he
is taken, who upon examination may discharge,
bail, or commit him, as the case shall r equire.
And the bringing the offender either by the
constable or private person to a justice of
peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining.

_,

;!1 id. at 589-90.

11.

'*

~

The examination of the prisoner was

inquisitorial, and the examination of the witnesses
was conducted outside the prisoner's presence.

The

process was considered quite harsh until statutory
reform was accomplished in 1848, 1 J. Stephen at
7

225, but it was well established that if the investigation
turned up insufficient evidence of the prisoner's
guilt, he was entitled to be discharged.

~

In Ex yarte Bollman, two men charged in the
I

Aaron Burr treason were committed following an examination
in the circuit court of the District of Columbia.

They

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,
affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to persons
in custody by order of f ederal trial courts.

Then,

following arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement
of probable cause, the Court surveyed the evidence against
the prisoners and held that it did not establish probable
cause that they were guilty of treason.

The prisoners

TLJ'l~~~f' ~,_ ) ~~~
~,.....,.""'""'-""-} ~ ~..,(.~
,

(

12.

15.

A similar procedure at common law, the

warrant for recovery of stolen goods, is said to have
furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the
Fourth Amendment.

The victim was required to

appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath of
probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular
place.

After the warrant was executed, and the goods

seized, the victim and the alleged thief would appear
before the justice of the peace for a prompt determination
of the cause for seizure of the goods and detention of
the thief.

2 Hale, supra at 149-52;

T. Taylor, Two

Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40

(1969~;

see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
~

Ar~CY\.
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3.120
R. Grim. P./governs the procedure for
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A- warrant may be issued upon a

sworn complaint that states facts showing that the suspect

lk
I

arrest warrants.

committed a crime.

The magistrate may also take

testimony under oath to determine if there is reasonable

13.

Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems
to prov ide
~

is

prelim·nary

has been construed

he ~r ing

upon

with discretion

/

to deny
cf. Karz v. Overton,

18.

The District Court found that the procedures

used in filing i nformations allow a delay of a month or
more between arrest and arraignment.

First, processing

of the information does not be gin until the arresting
officer appears before an assistant state attorney and
files an affidavit of facts.

This appearance is delayed

anywhere from 24 hours to two weeks after arrest.

If the

state attorney decides to file an information, the papers
are prepared and the information is filed and set for

14.

@
officer appears and the time of arraignment is ten to
fifteen days.
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of
this case, that the defendant would have an opportunity
to challenge the probable cause underlying the information
at his arraignment)
.ehe

~r&~:i:sion

~ut

"The basis for that

for a: bi:H of

part-i~.:rs

a.ss-~i{)n..wasa

It noted

that if the assumption was groundless, a person charged
by information would have no opportunity to challenge
probable cause before trial.

483 F. 2d at 781, n. 8.

The Florida rule governing arraignment does not suggest
that the procedure contemplates a challenge to probable
cause or any consideration of pretrial custody.

It merely

provides that the arraignment shall consist of reading
the indictment or information to the defendant and calling
upon him to plead.

Fla. R:r crim.

P f~.16o.

15.

19.

By contrast, the Court has held that

an indictment, "fair upon its face," and returned by
a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines
the existence of probable cause and requires issuance
of an arrest warrant without further inquiry.
United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250

(1932). ~

co

Ex f'arte
I

S~e ~ls9

,rue~

Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958).
The willingness to let a gran! jury's judgment substitute
for that of a neutral and detached magistrate is attributable
to the grand jury's relationship to the courts and its
historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution.

342-46 (1974).

3

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,

~

16.

20.

The Court had earlier reached a different

result in Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) ,
a criminal

~Q from

the Phillipine Islands.

Under a

statutory guarantee substantially identical to the Fourth
Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902,

c~ 1369,

§ 5, 32 Stat.

693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could
issue solely upon a prosecutor's information.

The Court

has since held that interpretation of a statutory guarantee

s

applicable to the Phillipines

1
~

of a cognate provision in the

~ederal

United States, 355

u.s.

,.- 1...

not

en c

t.,v.

1

~•

interpretation

Constitution

Green v.

184, 194j(8 (1957) .

the result reached in Ocampo is incompatible with the later
holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and Shadwick.

21.
:,

See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).

JZh :::P

--

The opinion in Beck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91 (1914), for the same proposition, but the validity
of prosecution by information without a prelDffiinary hearing
was not at issue in that case.

The only issues were whether

'l1·

ilA•

Because the standards are identical, there

is no need for further investigation -following

arr-es ~

before the probable cause determination can be made.

v{I

~~resumably~
whomever the police
arrest on probable cause.M It

~
~

arrest they must
is not the function
of the police to arrest, as it were, at large and to
use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charje before
a committing magistrate on (~robable cause. J ,,
~

\;,'

Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957).

)\ In Morrissey v. _Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee
or probationer arrested prior to revocation is entitled to
an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with
some provision for live testimony.
U.S., at 786.

408 u.s., at 487; 411

That preliminary hearing, more than the

probable cause determination required by the Fourth

~RRB~

Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving
frequently
live testimony, since the final revocation

hearing ~is

held at some distance from the place where the violation
occurred.

408 u.s.J at 485; 411 u.s.1 at 872-873 n.5.

Moreover, revocation proceedings may offer less protection
from initial error than the more formal criminal process,
where violations are defined by statute and the prosecutor
has a professional duty
crime
cause.

not to charge a

1N"f !~ ~ ~
r
sdt:~;~i r ~ <
~ing
ind.ep.endent

e 1

suspect with

ass-essment

o~

probable

See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, D.R.

7-103(A) (the prosecubor has a professional responsibility
"not [toJ institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges

Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4(c).

The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules
of Criminal Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and

[

the A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent.

f'Jo•

No.

DraftAS, 1972, and Tent. Draft ASA, 1973) are instructive.
Under the Uniform Rules, a person arrested without a
warrant is entitled, ''without unnecessary delay," to a
first appearance before a magistrate and a determination
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant.
The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony,
in the presence of the accused.

Rule 311.

Persons who

remain in custody for inability to qualify for pretrial
release are offered another opportunity for a probable
cause determination at the detention hearing, held no
more than 5 days after arrest.

This is an adversary hearing,

and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay

18.

@
may be considered.

Rule 344.

The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure
also provides a first appearance, at which a warrantless
arrest must be supported by a reasonably detailed
written statement of facts.

~

§ 310.

The magistrate may

make a determination of probable cause to hold the accused,
but he is not required to do so and the accused may
request an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the
first appearance to be held within 2 "court

days ~'.'

At

that session, the magistrate makes a determination of
probable cause upon a combination of written and live testimony:

~The
arrested person may present written and
testimonial evidence and arguments for his

1

discharge and the state may present additional
written and testimonial evidence and arguments
that there is reasonable cause to believe that
he has committed the crime of which he is
accused. The state's submission may be made
by means of affidavits, and no witnesses shall
be required to appear unless the court, in the
light of the evidence and arguments submitted
by the parties, determines that there is a
basis for believing that the appearance of one
or more witnesses for whom the arrested person
seeks subpoenas might lead to a finding that
there is no reasonable cause.
No•
§ 310.2(2) (Tent. DraftASA, 1973).
/

..

19.

'2.S·

~

In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the

United States, the Solicitor General suggested that McNabb
~,d ~ t , u 1
r I' , \ o ~
""e •
v. Mallory had mistaken the purpose of the first appearance ,

te " ;

r .,.

0~ Note.~ l}ob:~lok, Ca«~ ~ ~ r~~ahel

i Waft/(cu>1-tfe~<fs.,

t/5 So,Caf.
~ .McNabb, of course, was a ecided before the adoption of the l~l~v,
(l<l 7~)'

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

_ll

It interpreted a

statutory requirement that an arrested person be brought before
a magistrate without unnecessary delay.

318

u.s. 1 at

342.

Mallory was decided after the federal rules were adopted,
and although the interpretation of the federal rules was
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view:

-

C( 354
.
rY'

"The scheme for initiating a federal
prosecution is plainly defined. The police
may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only
on "probable cause." The next step in the
proceeding is to arraign the arrested person
before a judicial officer as quickly as
possible so that he may be advised of his rights
~ ·
and so that the issue of probable cause
may be promptly determined."

U.S • at 454. _(The use of the word "arraign" was
1

e.l,.~-t ~ "'l;

m i sts~

as arraignment occurs later in the process.

R~rim. P ~~-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson was
held in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether either was arrested under a warrant.
1
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution of offenses punishable by death. All other criminal
offenses may be prosecuted by information, and violations of municipal ordinances may be prosecuted by a
simple affidavit or docket entry. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc.
,3.140 (Supp. 1974). At the time respondents were arrested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure authorized
only one method for determining the existence of probable
cause to hold a suspect in jail pending trial. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). This proceeding, an
adversary preliminary hearing, was not available to a
suspect who had already been charged by information.
See Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972). 2 In those instances when a preliminary hearing was held and the suspect discharged, the
prosecutor could reinstate the charge and return him to
custody by filing an information. See Montgomery v.
State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965) ; Baugus v. State, 141
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). As a result, a person charged by
information could be detained pending trial solely on the
decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and· Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court, 8 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relie£.4 Respondents Turner and
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131, but that procedure is not challenged in
this case.
8 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
4 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They only asked that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was

73-477-0PINION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

3

Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 5 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 6
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F.
Supp. 1107 (SD Fla. 1971). After certifying the case
as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2),
the Court held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information a
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable
cause. The District Court ordered the Dade County
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for
further detention. 7 It also ordered them to submit a
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. F. Supp. - . Because release was neither asked
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for
which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 29732974 (1974).
5 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soli citing a ride and posse~sion of marihuana.
6 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
one who petitioned for certiorari following the Court of Appeals'
decision.
7 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detf'ntion without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense to the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not

73-477-0PINION
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted
by information.
Only one such plan was submitted, and the District
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F.
Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The
magistrate would explain the charges, advise the accused of his right's, appoint counsel if he was indigent,
and proceed with a prooable cause determination unless
either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If
either asked for more time, the magistrate would set the
date for a "preliminary hearing," to be held no more than
four days later if the accused was in custody and no more
than 10 days later if he had been released pending trial.
At the hearing the accused would be entitled to counsel,
and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, to summon favorable witnesses, and to
have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate
found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged.
He then could not be charged with the same offense by
complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30 days. The plan also provided sanctions for failure to hold hearings at the prescribed times.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951).

73-477-0PINION
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130. This "first appearance" is similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3:131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 282 So. 2 d - (Fla. 1972). 8
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.
1286. Reaffirming the original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutionaP The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems to provide that every
defendant confined for 30 days is entitled to a mandatory preliminary
hearing upon application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently
has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion to deny the
hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). But
cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971).
9 Although this ruling held a statewide '"legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then em8
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. I d., at 788. 10 State Attorney
· bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
· had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand , the ronstitu1 ionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
·t he criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory · judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conrlusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the state~ide rule. See 483 F.
2d, at 788. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez , 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 ,606-608 (1960).
'10 The major differenre between the Dist~ict Court's order and
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a
arrested persons charged
' probable cause hea'ring is required for
by informntion or only for those ronfined prnding trial. The DiRt rict
Court's original decree required pn;liminary hearings for all arrested
persons. 332 F. Supp., at-. On remand, the Dist rict Court made
an exception for persons charged with misdemranors who neither
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction.
355 F. Supp., at - . The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jailed
· pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also Sllf/;gests , without
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony
defendants who are confined pending trial. !d., at 787, 789.
The Court of Appeals vacated both the portion of the District
Court's order that prescribed time periods different from those in
the amended rules, and the sa nrtions for failure to comply with the
hearing requirements. It affirmed the District Court's holding on
remand that the amended rules' extended time periods for capital
and life-imprisonment offenses was a violation of equal protection.
Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree.

all
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Gerstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari
because of the importance of the issue. 11 We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
II

As framd by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respondents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of cases in which
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the
claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, No.
73-762. Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most
unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them respondents were still in custody awaiting trial when the
District Court certified the classification. Despite the absence of
such a showing, which would ordinarily be required to avoid mootness under Sosna, this case is not moot. The length of pretrial
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual would be in pretrial
custody long enough for a district judge to certify a class action.
Moreover, this is the kind of case in which the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we may
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case. This controversy, therefore, is a suitable exception to
the Sosna rule that mootness of a class action that is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" ordinarily is governed by determining
whether the named representatives were members of the class at
the time of certification. See Sosna, supra, at - ; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159 (CA9 1972).
11
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and '·
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294- 295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
oircumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect 1 had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 479 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175- 176
(l949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948).
This standard represents a compromise between the individual's right to liberty and the community's responsi~
bility for controlling crime.
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter~
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
'ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
'on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce~
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when·
e~er possible. The classic statement of this principle
appears in Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20- 22 (1968).
Maximum protection of individual rights c_ould be
a~sured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
would severely handicap legitimate law enforcement. In
striking a balance between these opposing interests, the
Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest
warrants when possible, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479482 (1963), but it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers had
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705
(1948). 12
12

Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v.
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-thescene assessment of probable cause is legal justification
for arresting a person suspected of crime. The policeman's judgment also justifies a brief period of detention
to take the administrative steps necessary for arrest, but
once the suspect is in custody the reasons that justify
dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There is no longer any danger that the suspect will
escape or commit further crimes while the police submit
their evidence to a magistrate. And, from the suspeces
point of view, the consequences of prolonged detention
may be more serious than the interference occasioned by
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's
job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships. Even pretrial release may be accompanied
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91
(1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972).
When the stakes are this high , the detached judgment
of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded
interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on
11berty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by
'Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a warrentless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474
(1971); id., at 510-512 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United
States, 357 U. S. 493, 499-500 (1958).
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(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown
116- 117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115
U. S. 478, 498-499 (1885). 1 a The justice of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1 Hale, supra, at
583-585; 2 Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 ( 1883) .14
, 18

The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of a felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
. "1. He may carry him to the common goal, ... but that is now
rarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill , who may either
carry him to the common gaol, ... ore to a justice of the peace to
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to :my justice of peace of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining."
1 id., at 589-590.
14 The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the examination of the witnesses was conducted outside the prisoner's presence. The process was considered quite harsh until statutory reform
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The initial determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 Hawkins, supra, at 112- 115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure iri America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 15 Ex parte Burford,
7 1J. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806); Ex parte Hamilton, 3
U. "8. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J:, dissenting). 16
was accomplished in 1848, 1 J. Stephen, at 225, but it was well estab·
lished that if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of the
prisoner's guilt, he was entitled to be discharged.
15 In Ex pm·te Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr treason
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendrpent requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause· that they were guilty of treason.
The prisoners were discharged;
16 A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery
of stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
and detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. ~· 616, 626-629 (1886).
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B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a per~
son arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause determination.17 There is no provision for a test of probable
cause at the first appearance before a magistrate or at
the hearing to set bail, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; see
Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CA5 1973),
and the suspect canot demand a preliminary hearing.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a). The Florida Supreme
Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to test
the probable cause for detention under an information.
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla.
1951). The arraignment may be delayed as much as a
month, and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause
may be raised then. 18
17 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true.
18 The District Court found that the procedures used in filing
informations allow a delay of a month or more between arrest and
arraignment. First, processing of the information does not begin
until the arresting officer appears before an assistant state attorney
and files an affidavit of facts. This appearance is delayed anywhere
from 24 hours to two weeks after arrest. If the state attorney
decides to file an information, the papers are prepared and the
information is filed and set for arraignment. The avrrage delay
from the time the arresting officer appears and the time of arraignment is 10 to 15 days.
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of this case, that the
defendant would have an opportunity to challenge the probable
cause underlying the information at hi arraignment, but noted
that if the assumption was groundless, a person charged by informa-
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Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the
prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a
determination of probable cause and that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants affords a measure of protection against unfounded
detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure.
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a
United States Attorney's information was invalid because
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the
prosecutor's official oath could not fun'lish probable cause,
that conclusion was implicit ih the judgment that the
arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. 10 More
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
449-453 ( 1971) , the Court held that a prosecutor's
tion would have no opportunity to challenge probable cause before
trial. 483 F. 2d, at 7 1, n. 2. The Florida rule governing arraign~
· ment doe not suggest that the procedure contemplates a challenge
to probable cause or any consideration of pretrial custody. It
merely provides that the arraignment shall consist of reading the
indictment or information to the defendant and calling upon him
·to plead. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160.
io By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
'grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974).

•
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responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate.
We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be
determined by someone independent of police and prosecution.20 The reason for this separation of functions was
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
(')f soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943).
20 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islands. Under a statutory guarantee substantially identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has sinre held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and
Shadwick.
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In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's deCision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite
to prosecution by information. Lem W oon v. Oregon,
229 U.S. 586 (1913). 21 Nor do we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S.
519 (1952); Ker v·. Illinois, 119- U.S. 436 (1886). Thus,
as the Court of Appeals noted below, a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, but a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without probable cause. 483 F. 2d, at 78fr-787.
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968),
with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 442
F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,- U. S. App.
D. C. - , 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
a'ccompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeg.u ards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
QOmpulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
21 See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 (1962).
The
opinion in Beck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91 (19i4),
for the same proposition, but the validity of prosecution by information without a preliminary hearing was not at issue in that case.
The only issues were whether grand juries were required in the
Philippines and, as discussed in n. 20, supra, whether the prosecutor's
decision to file an information furnished sufficient probable cause for
·an arrest warrant.
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970); Y Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article
330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972). When the
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of the issue to both
the State an the accused justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on crossexamination. This kind of hearing also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 ( 1970). And, as the hearing assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more complex, the less likely it is that it can be held
promptly after arrest. See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraingment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending such
further proceedings as may be afforded by law. This
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. 22
22 Because the standards are identical, there is no need for further
investigation before the probable cause determination can be made.
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were,
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354

U.S. 449,456 (1957).
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That standard- probable cause to believe the suspect has
committed a crime- traditionally has been decided in
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes
of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).
Cf. M ~Gray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 ( 1967).
The use of these informal procedures is justified not
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969).
This is not to say that Confrontation and cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of probable cause
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determinations in some cases, but in most cases their
value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of
constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable
cause. 23 Our system of criminal justice is already overourdened, and it is subject to valid criticism when overemphasis on procedural and evidentiary formalities results in delayed justice, repetitive trials, and burdensome
e'Xpense for both the State and the accused.
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
1
' critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
appointed counsel. We have identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
2 3ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or probationer arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
t.he Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 872-873 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of' Professional Responsibility, D. R. 7-103 (A) (the prosecutor has
a professional responsibility "not [to] institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supported by probable cause") ; ABA Standards
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Functino, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers,
Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c).
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(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions identified
two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama
law the function of the hearing was to determine whether
the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that
he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment
probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in preparation of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman.
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary
hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on
' the merits could be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply to the informal,
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth
Amendment.
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding appropriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an
opportunity to be present and participate in the determination .24 Our system of justice operates on the premise
24 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Proredure (Tent. Draft No . 5, 1972, and T ent.
Draft No . 5A, 1973) arc instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a
person arrested wit hout a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant . The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to
partic!pate unless there is good reason to exclude him.
See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107,
122-123 (1873). The Fourth Amendment is not incon~istent with that concept. The procedures normally followed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frustrate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969).
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to appear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remnin in custody for inability
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay may be considered. Rule 344.
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state mny present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. SA, 1973).
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration
along with the State's presentation could enhance both
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding. The
burden on the State would be minimal. Virtually all
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) , and every jurisdiction
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247- 365 (1972). Since the
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may be decided at that time with little or no
inconvenience to the State. In fact, the suspect's first
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been
considered the proper time for determining whether there
is probable cause for detention. 1 Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas
of the Crown 116--117 (4th ed. 1762); see M cNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342- 344 (1943); Amsterdam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowledge this function of the first appearance, this Court has
interpreted them to require a determination of probable
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S.
214 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454
(1957). 2 5
In an amicus brief filed on behalf of tho United States, the
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb v. Mallory had mistaken
the purpose of tho first appearan ce, and that actual practice is otherwise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appe..1.rance in Warrantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972) ; M cNabb , of course,
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested
25
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'JThere is no single proper method for making the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The States have many different patterns of criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the
least burden to its system. · Like many jurisdictions,
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typically relied upon in making this decision is the weight of
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial
Release § 5.1 ( 1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Expanding that determination to a test of probable cause
would be a natural way of integrating the probable cause
decision with existing procedures.
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Some States
already authorize a hearing on probable cause at or
immediately following the suspect's first appearance.
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view:
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined.
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454.
The use of the word "arraign" was in error, as arraignment occurs
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10.
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E. (J., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708709. Others may choose simply to accelerate their existing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 26 is a reliable
determination of probable cause made either before or
promptly after arrest, and preferably no later than the
first appearance before a judicial officer. If made after
arrest, the suspect must be allowed to be present. Each
.State may ch'oose the procedure that best accommodates
th.is determination to its existing practice.2'7

IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that' the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
S)Jspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There arc many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Reelase § 5.2 ( 1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 331 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
27 Of course, if the State incorporates the probable cause determination into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed coun. sel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principle
of Coleman v. Alabama, S!Upra.
·,
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson was
held in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether either was arrested under a warrant.
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution of offenses punishable by death. All other criminal
offenses may be prosecuted by information, and violations of municipal ordinances may be prosecuted by a
simple affidavit or docket entry. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc.
3,140 (Supp. 1974). At the time respondents were arrested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure authorized
only one method for determining the existence of probable
cause to hold a suspect in jail pending trial. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). This proceeding, an
apversary preliminary hearing, was not available to a
suspect who had already been charged .by information.
See Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla .) , cert. denied,
411 U. S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972). 2 In those instances when a preliminary hearing was h~ld and .the suspect discharged, the
prosecutor could reinstate the charge and return him to
custody by filing an information. See Montgomery v.
State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Baugus v. State, 141
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). As a result, a person charged by .
information could be detained pending trial solely on the
decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District ·
Court, 3 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relie£.4 Respondents Turner and
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
vnder indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131, but that procedure is not challenged in
this case.
3 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
4 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They only asked that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
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Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 5 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 6
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F.
Supp. 1107 (SD Fla. 1971). After certifying the case
as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2),
the ¢ourt held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information a
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable
cause. The District Court ordered the Dade County
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for
further detention. 7 It also ordered them to submit a
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. F. Supp. - . Because release was neither asked
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for
which habeas corpus is the exrlusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 29732974 (1974) .
5 Turner was bring hrld on a chnrge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11 , 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soliciting a ride and posseRsion of marihuana.
6 The named defendants included justices of the peare and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
one who petitioned for certiorari<ifoUowing th@ Court. of Appeal~
deei~;ion.,_7 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younaer v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
·The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense f the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not

__,....-1
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted
by information.
Only one such plan was submitted, and the District
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F .
..Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The
magistrate would explain the charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent,
and proceed with a probable cause determination unless
either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If
either asked for more time, the magistrate would set the
date for a "preliminary hearing," to be held no more than
four days later if the accused was in custody and no more
than 10 days later if he had been released pending trial.
At the hearing the accused would be entitled to counsel,
and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, to summon favorable witnesses, and to
have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate
found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged.
He then could not be charged with the same offense by
complaint or information , but only by indictment returned within 30 days. The plan also provided sanctions for failure to hold hearings at the prescribed times.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. L edesma, 401
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130. This "first appearance" is similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 282 So. 2d (Fla. 1972). 8
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.
1286. Reaffirming the original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutionaJ.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems to provide that every
defendant confined for 30 days is entitled to a mandatory preliminary
hearing upon application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently
has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion to deny the
hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). But
cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971).
9 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by vir1rue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then em-
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. I d., at 788.' 0 State Attorney
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had .
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appmls
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. Sec 483 F.
2d, at 788. Accordingly, a district court of threP judges was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603,606-608 (1960).
1.o The major difference between the District Court's order and
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a
probable cause hearing is required . for all arrested· persons charged
by inform~tion or onlv for those confined pending trial. The District
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested
persons. 332 F. Rupp., at--. On remand, the District Court made
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction.
355 F. Supp., at - . The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who arc jailed
pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also ~uggest8, without
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id., at 787, 789.
The Court of Appeals vacated both the portion of the District
Court's order that prescribed time periods different from those in
the amended rulPs, nnd the sanrtions for failure to comply with the
hearing requirements. It affirmed the District Court's holding on
remand that the amended rules' extended time periods for capital
and life-imprisonment offenses was a violation of equal protection.
Our disposition of the case makPs it unnecessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree.
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Gerstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari
because of the importance of the issue. 11 We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
II
As fr~ by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respondents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of cases in which
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the
claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, No.
73-762. Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most
unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them FeSf:l6f'lfieHt!l;hwere still in cus~ awaiting trial when the
District Court certified the class!S}~,M\.· Despite the absence of
such a showing, which would ordinarily be required to avoid mootness under Sosna, this case is not moot. The length of pretrial
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual would be in pretrial
custody long enough for a district judge to certify a class action.
Moreover, this is the kind of case in which the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we may
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case. This controversy, therefore, is a suitable exception to
the Sosna rule that mootness of a class action that is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" ordinarily is governed by determining
whether the named representatives were members of the class at
the time of certification. See Sosna, supra, at - ; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159 (CA9 1972).
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 , 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 479 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~ 176
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948): /
This standard represents a ~mpr:£na:is8tbe ween the indi/ J-jA,;
,......_ _ _vidual's ri~ht to liberty and theJo6HtMURit~i!Cresp~si \ , - L ei1ity tOf-.COD~rime.
;-...,.._ ..___ _

-

( ~

"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
bn their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
(!;ourt has required that the existence of probable cause
oe decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
appears in Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

r

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
('" would se¥e~ety haooi0a.p legitimate law enforcement. In
striking a balance between these opposing interests, the
Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest
warrants when ~ ' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479482 (1963), but it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers had
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705
(1948). 12
J. 2

Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v.
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-thescene assessment of probable cause is legal justification
for arresting a person suspected of crime. The policeman's judgment also justifies a brief period of detention
to take the administrative steps necessary for arrest, but
once the suspect is in custody the reasons that justify
dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There is no longer any danger that the suspect will
escape or commit further crimes while the police submit
their evidence to a magistrate. And, from the suspect's
point of view, the consequences of prolonged detention
may be more serious than the interference occasioned by
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's
job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family
relationships. Even pretrial release may be accompanied
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91
(1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972).
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment
of a neutral magistrate is et':sential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded
interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on
liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a warr~ntlcss arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474
(1971); id., at 510-512 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958).
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(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown
l16-117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115
U. S. 478, 498-499 (1885). 13 The justice of the peace
Would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter:rp.ine whether thete was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, tne suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending· trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1 Hale, supra, at
583-585; 2 Hawkii1s, supra, at 116-119'; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England' 233 (1883). 14
u The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of a felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry him to the common ~1, ... but that is now
rarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the viii, who may either
carry him to the common gaof, ... o1t to a justice of the peace to
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may c;;.ry him immediately to any justice of peace of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining."
1 ii, at 589:._590.
14 The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the examination of the witnesses was conducted outside the prisoner's pres~nce. The process was considered quite harsh until statutory reform

73-477-0PINION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

12

The initial determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure ih America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 15 Ex parte Burford;
7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806); Ex parte Hamilton, 3
U. R (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., dissenting). 16
was accomplished in 1848, 1 J. Stephen, at 225, but it was well estab-

l~hed that if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of ~
p;iseHeP'~~ was entitled to be discharged.
In Ex; parte' Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr treason
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason.
The prisoners were discharged.
1 6 A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery
of stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
and detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24- 25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, G26-629 (1886).
15

pi"''I6a61e
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B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause determination.17 There is no provision for a test of probable
cause at the first appearance before a magistrate or at
the hearing to set bail, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; see
Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CA5 1973),
and the suspect canot demand a preliminary hearing.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a). The Florida Supreme
Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to test
the probable cause for detention under an information.
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla.
1951). The arraignment may be delayed as much as a
month, and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause
may be raised then. 18
, 17 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true .
. 18 The District Court found that the procedures used in filing
informations allow a delay of a month or more between arrest and
arraignment. First, processing of the information does not begin
until the arresting officer appears before an assistant state attorney
and files an affidavit of facts. This appearance is delayed anywhere
from 24 hours to two weeks after arrest. If the state attorney
decides to file an information, the papers are prepared and the
information is filed and set for arraignment. The average delay
from the time the arresting officer appears and the time of arraignment is 10 to 15 days.
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of this case, that the
defendant would have an opportunity to challenge the probable
cause underlying the information at his arraignment, but noted
that if the assumption was groundless, a person charged by informa-

?
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Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the
prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a
determination of probable cause and that furnishes suffici~nt reason to detain a defendant pending trial. Alose.~.t.ib'oll\
though a conscientious decision that the evidence warpr ~affords a measure of protection against unfounded
detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure.
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a
United States Attorney's information was invalid because
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the
prosecutor's official oath could not furnish probable cause,
that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the
arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. 19 More
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
449-453 (1971), the Court held that a prosecutor's
tion would have no opportunity to challenge probable cause before
trial. 483 F. 2d, at 781, n. 2. The Florida rule governing arraignm1mt does not suggest that the procedure contemplates a challenge
to probable cause or any consideration of pretrial custody. It
merely provides that the arraignment shall consist of reading the
indictment or information to the defendant and calling upon him
to plead. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160.
19 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
i~suance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 4 7 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974).
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responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate.
We reaffirmed that principly in Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be
,determined by someone independent of police and prosecution.2Q The reason for this separation of functions was
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
tlie misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
that safeguards must be provided against the dangEi"rs of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
c"riminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
20

The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islands. Under a statutory guarantee substantially identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and
Shadwick.
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In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite
to prosecution by information. Lem Woon v. Oregon,
229 U.S. 586 (1913). 21 Nor do·we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S.
519 ( 1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 ( 1886). Thus,
as the Court of Appeals noted below, a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, but a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without probable cause. 483 F. 2d, · at 786-787.
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968),
with Brown v. Fauntleroy, U. S. App. D. C. - , 442
F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, U. S. App.
D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
21 See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 (1962).
The
opinion in Beck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (19i4),
for the same proposition, but the validity of prosecution by information without a preliminary hearing was not at issue in that case.
The only issues were whether grand juries were required in the
Philippines and, as discussed inn. 20, supra, whether the prosecutor's
decision to file an information furnished sufficient probable cause for
an arrest warrant.
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 ( 1970); Y Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
·Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
'\('he standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but it may apJ?roach a prima facie case of. guilt. A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article
330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972) .. When the
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of the issue to both
the St~he accused justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on crossexamination. This kind of hearing also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970). And, as the hearing assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more complex, the less likely it is that it can be held
promptly after arrest. See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraiv~ent Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending such
further proceedings as may be afforded by law. This
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. 22
Because the standards are identical, there is no need for further
investigation before the probable cause determination can be made.
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were,
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449, 456 (1957).
22

73-477-0PINION
18

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

That standard-probable cause to believe the suspect has
committed a crime-traditionally has been decided in
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes
of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).

Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
The use of these informal procedures is justified not
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence
sup(ri'i
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller,,l.T he Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969).
and cross-examinaThis is not to say that,~onfrontation
,
tion might not enhance the reliability of probable cause
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determinations in some cases, but in most cases their
value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of
constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable
eaus._e. 23 J Our·,system of criminal justice is already ove~
burdened, and it is subject to valid criticism when overemphasis on procedural and evidentiary formalities resuits in delayed justice, repetitive trials, and burdensome
\ expense for both the State and the accused.
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause . determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
appointed counsel. ~l.<Ien1i1ie'Oas r critical
!ltages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
3ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) , and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 ( 1973), we held that a parolee or probationer arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest , with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 872-873 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, D. R. 7-103 (A) (the prosecutor has
a professional responsibility "not [to] institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supported by probable cause") ; ABA Standards
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Funct~ §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers,
Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c).
2

/

Lv-A-

A

~
+-o

~~- ,~~
~ V{.t
t.•

-~LJ-

o--1

~

~;}

73-477-0PINION

20

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,226 (1967).
In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions identified
two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama
law the function of tb-e)fearing was to determine whether
the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that
he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment
probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in preparation of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman.
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary
hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on
the merits could be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply to the informal,
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth
Amendment.
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding appropriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an
opportunity to be present and participate in the determination.24 Our system of justice operates on the premise
24

The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent.
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a
person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him.
See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107,
122-123 ( 1873). The Fourth Amendment is not incon-sistent with that concept. The procedures normally followed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frustrate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969).
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to appear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in custody for inability
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay may be considered. Rule 344.
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. ·The
magistra.te may make a determination of probable cause to hold the
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration
along with the State's presentation could enhance both
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding. The
burden on the State would be minimal. Virtually all
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented
to a fudicial officer within a short time after arrest, see
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may be decided at that time with little or no
inconvenience to the State. In fact, the suspect's first
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been
considered the proper time for determining whether there
i's probable cause for detention. 1 Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas
of the Crown 116--117 (4th ed. 1762); see McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 (1943); Amsterdam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowledge this function of the first appearance, this Court has
interpreted them to require a determination of probable
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S.
214 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454
(1957) .25
In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the
Solicitor General suggested that McNabba;:Mallory had mistaken
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is otherwise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in Warrantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972); McNabb, of course,
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested
25
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There is no single proper method for making the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The States have many different patterns of criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions,
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typically relied upon in making this decision is the weight of
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial
Release § 5.1 (1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Expanding that determination to a test of probable cause
would be a natural way of integrating the probable cause
decision with existing procedures.
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Some States
already authorize a hearing on probable cause at or
immediately following the suspect's first appearance.
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view:
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined.
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454.
The use of the word "arraign" was in error, as arraignment occurs
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10.
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E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708709. Others may choose simply to accelerate their existing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 211 is a reliable
determination of probable cause made either before or
promptly after arrest, and preferably no later than the
first appearance before a judicial officer. If made after
arrest, the suspect must be allowed to be present
ach
State may choose the procedure that best accommodates
this determination to its existing practice. 27

IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

26 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Reelase § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 331 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
.
_
'3-v\J 27 Of course, if the State incorporates the probable cause determilAV'\IteJ. $'t~UJ.l.v. Wak
nation into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed coun~ . at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles

uAColeman v. Alabama, srupra.
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's inforrrration is constitutionally entitled to a judicial deterrrrination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's inforrrration. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
hirrr carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson~
fleti in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether iithe1.1 a&anested under a warrant
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Florida law also denies preliminar~· hearings to persons confined
under indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131, but that procedure is not challenged in
this case.
· · 8 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
4 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They 1only(asked)that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a pr0'15abie cause determination. This was
2
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Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 5 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 6
"""- ' [ v~ . ~ j )After an initial dela.y while the Florida legislature con- ___ '){1;;_ ~-v
1
sidered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear.
r tl
1+
ings to persons charged by information, the Distr.ict Court ~
· t!
granted the relief sought. Pu~ainy;atet;~33~ F . ·
· d,
Supp. 1107 (SD Fla. 1971).~ffi% ~ ase tDf.:"1
as a ,~l~s3 action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), ~·
~held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information a
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable
eause. The District Court ordered the Dade County
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for
further detention. 7 It also ordered them to submit a

0

,r·.\

also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. F. Supp. - . Because release was neither asked
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for
which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 29732974 (1974).
5 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana.
• 6 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
one who petitioned for certiorari following the Court of Appeals'
decision.
7 The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense ..wt1i'ecriminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not

r
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted
by information .
.Gfily one sHefi f'la:n was sabt~ and the District
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F.
Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The
magistrate would explain the charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent,
and proceed with a probable cause determination unless
e~ther ;p~~{futor or. the accused .was unprepared. If
either a,~ more time, the magistrate would set the ~
date for a "preliminary hearing," to be held ~
four days -~ if the accuS€d was in custody and M mere ~
~ 10 days~ if he had been released pending trial.
~he heaf'iftlj...the accused would be entitled to counsel,
and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, to summon favorable witnesses, and to
have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate
found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged.
He then could not be charged with the same offense by
complaint or information , but only by indictment returned within 30 days. l'Be }31RI'l al~" p1 "~ided sttll@o
tiQj;JS IQr faihm~ to h-old hQ.aring ~t~ pr€mberl Mffi@8.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the caS€
was awaiting decision , the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the cac::e for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d l073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130. This "first appearance" is similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 282 So. 2d (Fla. 1972) .8
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.
1286. Reaffirmmg t;e original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutionaP The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), seems to provide that every
defendant confined for 30 days is entitled to a mandatory preliminary
hearing upon application for writ of habeas corpus, but it apparently
has been construed to vest trial courts with discretion to deny the
hearing. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). But
cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971).
9 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then em8
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary heari'ng provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. !d., at 788. 10 State Attorney

j
~strict

bodied only in judi'ci'al deci'sions. The
Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On rrmand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn i'nto question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F.
2d, at 788. Accordingly, a district court of three judgrs was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U. S. 603, 606-608 (1960).
1.o The major difference between the District Court's order and
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a
probable cause hearing is required for all arrested persons charged
by information or only for those ronfined pending trial. Tlw District
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested
persons. 332 F. Supp., at-. On remand, the District Court madE'
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction.
3'55 F. Supp., at - . The Court of Apprals explicitly limited the
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jailed
pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also suggests, without
stating explicitly, that the h0aring right is similar!~' limited to felony
defendants who are confined pending trial. !d., at 787, 7R9.
The Court of Appeals vacated 6oth the ~he District
Court's order that prescribed time periods different ft.'om those in
the amendf'd ruiE'~~sanctions for failurE' to compl~r with the
hearing requirf'ments. .,It..:Mfu·mffi tl ~r~t Geurt~ hmd1ng- ona
~--tftat the- tHnended rules' extended time periods for oapiteb,
!Mt!i life ~flmeflt offenses was a violation of equal proteetion
Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree.

_.

los.c

1
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Gerstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari
because of the importance of the issue. 11 We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
II
As frar{d by the proceedings below, this case presents
t'wo issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respondents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention ~aersfs11~ has
ended, but this case belongs to that narrow class of cases in which
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the
cl&ims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa, No.
73-762. Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most,
u11;likcly that any given individual could have his constitutional claim
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them «~l"Jo!'ld:er;jl. were still in~~~:~ awaiting trial when the
District Court certified the class
·
:Elespite the absence ufJ...
Such a showingi. ~9Jordinarif~be required to avoid moot- _
ness under Sosnl1€) tB:is Bfll98 is . ;aet JB8~ The length of pretrial
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual would be in pretrial
custody long enough for a district judge to certify a class action.
Moreover~ i~ tas kililel-4 case iH wfiien the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we may
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case. 'F'kie eel'l'ti!'ocmJ, th~efme,··is a S'Uita.ble exception to
1!fte Bosna tr:rle-tha iJamO'Otrreee of""!.'~~~~ "c8:p'8bl:e..of
Fiii'itiii9~s''olit inra.diug ,1'/W~W" {)f~ • governed by ·d&-emrining
'll'he~her Mw memed reptesellNltives ~ernbe!il of t+le ~ at
the tim of ~tioo. See &mMJ, 8M1'.M , t- "':"'"ef. Ri~I'(J«"11.
F.:reeman,-469 F. 2d 1159 (CA91972) 1
11
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
'detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp \T.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294_:295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Bur·.ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806). The standard fot
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
'believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com•
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 479 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~176
. (1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.:._ S. 10 (1948) . .. '1\tUSSa~
.
This standar~ epresents a ~etween the indiac(\ ~d.?.'tc-v\..
v~~ual's right . o _Ebert_y and the e_9{lllfmni~r~oo-s~

1
~·h?:J:;s'~llilo!; ...-.
/..--.- ··
/[
~

.

~.he

~ 11 ~-t. 's J.v t_ to

long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citiz~ns . from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
~the course of executing their duties are more or less
·ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.

~~

L
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
appears in Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

11u.u.:.,

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
would1t:r,'eie~ handicapflegitimate law enforcement. ~
-z,J ~ le.. ~£1rbalanee between -these opposing interest~ the
Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest
warrants when~ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96
·(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479482 (1963), ~it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers ~
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
. (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705
' (1948). 12
!1

2

Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v.
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prov•'d.r$

Under this practical compromise, a ~eman's on-thescene ass~ssment of probable cause J;~l~~al justifica~ion ~ ~-r
for arrestmg a person suspected of .cnme.> .q'~fiee
m.:ui'l!l jydgmsn& alee justi~ a brief period of detention
~ ~-<--~ 4
fc,
to take tM administrative steps HQQ8ilSaFr fe~est. ~
,gnce the suspect is in custod~}(he reaSons that justify
ilispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There@no longe~ny danger that the suspect will~
1
escape or commit further crimes while the police submit Awl._.)
~ st~tes
their evidence to a magistrate. Afid;-from th~suspeot!~ feasor.S to"" ~a~g
~is:~,ihe consequences of prolonged detention \ s v..ww111.~ ad:.t.fN.·
S u_b ~ 1cl....o; .) +kt..d.
may be more seFious than the interference occasioned by
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's r.Su.Spet! s ;1'\.eel ,
0
· b , mterrupt
·
h'1s source of mcome,
·
·
· h'1s f am1·1y "diA.u
'~' a n e.u..
JO
an d 1mpa1r
. 1 .
. 1 reeasemay
1
b eaccompame
· d
f'l
t W...vv\<'1
1 . h'1ps. E<venpretna
reatwns
"\rolo.?.olo(e ~
by ?urdenso:ne conditions that effect a significant re- ) ~-tts,e 1Y\e.Jr.Q.., s.c.s
stramt on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 ~V\A he~~ .
(1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972).
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment
of a neutral magistrate js essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded
interference with liberty. Acco:rdingly, we hold that the
Fourth Amendment requires .a judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on
liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149

wlu!P.

!

:'Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1~50), which was overruled in turn by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752.
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
.circumstances an offlcer may enter a suspect's home to make a wart rentless arrest.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474
(1971); id., at 510--512 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958).
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(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95 (1736); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown
116-117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115
U. S. 478, 498-499 (1885). ~ The justice of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
wpuld be discharged from custody. 1 Hale, supra, at
583-585; 2 Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883). 14
1

?
c

;u The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
cpmmitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of a felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
e1ac I
"1. He may carry him to the common P., ... but that is now
r'arely done.
' "2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, ... or~ to a justice of the peace to
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to :my justice of peace of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining."
1 id., at 589-590.
H The examination of the prisoner __was inquisitorial, and the ~ _
afftisatisQ sf U., witnesses was ~·~outside the prisoner's presence. q'he ptoee~ was considered quite harsh)lmti:l: B~tttor) refer~
H
4-ll'
~
,
cf r.>"('Oc'CI(t ;_ t
~

I

0/
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The initial determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2' Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen; supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); H Ex parte Burford,
7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806); Ex parte Hamilton, 3
U. R (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). 16
wtt!! fll888Hlf!liehe!i ;n ~1 J. Stephen, at 225, ~twas well estab.
lished that}.,if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of ~ h 1 S
fH'~SHer!l guil@l~e wae eH*'i-tled-te be-disehMged""
St.
15 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr -t~s~
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
p'ersons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason.
The prisoners were discharged.
16 A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery
of stolen goods , is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
and detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886).

73-477-0PINION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

13

B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause determination.17 rhere is no provision for a test of probable
. e8J't:I:Be at the Erst appearance before a magistrate or a
.the hearing to set bai~Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; se
Pugh v. Rainwater, t~U· 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CA5 1973 •
~The suspect ca~T- ~emand a preliminary hearing
Fla. Rule Crim. P oc. 3.131 ~)4t 'WiFlorida Suprem
Court has held that habeas corpus cannot be used to tes
the probable cause for detention under an information
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory.~ 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla.
~arraigiJ:rn~n may be delayed as much as a
month, and it is not':Clear that the issue of probij,ble cause
~be raised then. 18 .J
· 17 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true.
-i-'*:'Ph...-'Fm:'h'i1<r"~o,uff"10Uncrtl1at the procedures used..{ri filin
'nforma · ns allow a delay of a month or more between arrest an
/Jrocessing of the inf rmiJ,tion does not- b ·
n officer appears before n assistant state at rn
davit of..iacts. This app arance is delayed a whe
urs to two week after ' rest. If the state ' ttorn
apers are prepare and th
· nment. The av rage dela
om t e time the ~sting officer appea:
nd ihe-time of arraign
J&-Wto~~.
I'
The Court of Appeals as~umed, for purposes of · · case, that th
efendan1 would have an opportunity to challenge
e probabl
ause underlying the information at his arru ignm en~ ffi'I'E:-f**<i!Qh
ii-Jhc P<oiin~as-~rotmdlese, a person charged by info

t't .
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Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the
prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a
determination of probable cause and that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant elJ..di.ng trial. Although a conscientious decision at the evidence warrants affords a measure of prot ction against unfounded
deten ion, we do not think prosecutorial judgment
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure.
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a
United States Attorney's information was invalid because
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the
prosecutor's official oath could not furnish probable cause,
that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the
-arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. 10 More
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
449-453 (1971), the Court held that a prosecutor's

1.o By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned ·by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
United States, 2 7 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
'(1974).
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responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate.
We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of
Tarnpa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be
determined by someone independent of police and prosecution.2Q The reason for this separation of functions was
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
@f soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
20

The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States... 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islan~ a statutory guarantee substantially identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693-694, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and
Shadwick.
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In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient ~to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite
to prosecution by information. Lem W oon v. Oregon,
229 U.S. 586 (1913). 21 Nor do we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S.
519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119· U.S. 436 (1886). Thus,
as the Court of Appeals noted below,[a'?uspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, ~a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without) probable cause. 483 F. 2d, at 786-787.
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968),
with Brown v. Fauntleroy, - U. S. App. D. C. - , 442
F. 2d 838 (1971) , and Cooley v. Stone,- U. S. App.
D. C. - , 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards- counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
See also B eck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 (1962). The
opinion in B eck cites Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91 (19l4) ,
for the same proposition, but the validity of prosecution by information without a preliminary hearing was not at issue in that case.
The only issues were whether grand juries were required in th e
Philippines and , as discussed in n. 20, supra, whether the prosecutor's
decision to file an information furnished sufficient probable cause for
an arrest warrant.
21
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S.
1 (1970); Y Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but/Jtmay approach a prima facie case of guilt. A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article
330, at 90--91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972). When the
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of the issue to both
the State an!_the accused justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on crossexamination. This kind of hearing also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970). And, as the hearing assumes increased importanc a~d the procedures become
l1k~y: it i~ that it can be held
more complex, the
promptly after arrest See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraingment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending ~
further proceedingil . ~may be afforded by law This
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. 22
r vJ.J.n.-OJ-J -lM

1eJi

22 Because the standards are identical,[there is no need for further
investigation before the probable cause determination can be made~ '
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were,
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354
u.s. 449, 456 (1957).

,.)
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That standard- probable cause to believe the suspect has
committed a crime-traditionally has been decided in
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes
of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence connned to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).

J

Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
The use of these informal procedures is justified not
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969).
. ,.
/.This is not to say thatfonfrontation and cross-examina~ tion might not enhanc the reliability of probable cause

/\Jv../
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~eterminations

in some case~~ in most cases.> their
value would be too slight to justify hOlding, as a matter of
cop.stitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable
pause. 23j Our system of criminal justice is already over
· subject to ....valid criticism when overburdened, and~'t
emphasis .J»t oc~ural ~a evidentiary fo ru.alities results.-rn'delaye justice, repetitive trials, and burdensome
expe.ns.e for both the State and the accused.
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
appointed counsel. We H.~ identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1

l

2 3Jn Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 ( 1973), we held that a parolee or proba-

tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U.S. , at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U. S., at 485; 4H U. S., at 872-873 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, D. R. 7-103 (A) (the prosecutor has
a professional responsibility "not [to] institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supported by probable cause") ; ABA Standards
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Funct#, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers,
Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c).
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(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
Jn Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a preiiminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions identified
.two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama prelim,inary hearing fro~ the prol;>able cause determination re.quired by the Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama
law the function of the hearing was to determine whether
the evidence justified charging the suspect with an of.fense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that
he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment
probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in prepara. tion of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman.
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the p_reliminary
hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on
the merits could be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring or pJ;eserving the w!tnesses' testimony. This consideration does no~ apply to the informal,
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth
Amendment.
The reasons that make ~ nonadversary proceeding appropriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an
opportunity to be present. and participate in the determination.24 Our system of justice operates on the premise
24

The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal
.Procedl}.re (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent.
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are inst ructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a
· person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination
. that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him.
See Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107,
122-123 ( 1873). .!fhe Fe.ttrth Amendment is not- inoon~ncep
The procedures normally followed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frustrate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969).
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to appear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in custody for inability
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more
'd.t,¥teC...
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsayJillay be con- e "'
sidered. Rule 344.
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration
,
s
along with the State's presentation could enhance ~,tl/-- ll-u ~v.£ Fe!
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding.1)"~
r e..<;.~ ~
bttr6en tm-tfte...SW w~4- Virtually all
paJ-t"tt ~~ tt ""~
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented
-w-~ 1
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see·
.J .J " .s '.!6k
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230•Jt.
o-,....
231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction
'f/:.c...
,;)'\<! •
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other
.
·~ ~
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may be decided at that time with little or no
inconvenience to the State. In fact, the suspect's first
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been
considered the proper time for determining whether there
is probable cause for detention. 1 Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 Hawkins, Pleas
of the Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1762); see McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 (1943); Amsterdam, Perspective on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal
11ules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowledge this function of the first appearance, this Court has
interpreted them to require a determination of probable
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S.
214 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454
(1957). 25

r

(<

t-....._

In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb v. Mallory had mistaken
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is otherwise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appe..uance in Warrantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972); McNabb, of course,
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested
. 25

Tfos.t
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There is no single proper method for making the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The States have many different patterns of criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions,
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typically relied upon in making this decision is the weight of
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial
Release § 5.1 (1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Expanding that determination to a test of probable cause
would be a natural way of integrating the probable cause
decision with existing procedures.
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Some States
already authorize a hearing on probable cause at or
immediately following the suspect's first appearance.
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view:
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined.
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454.
The use of the word "arraign" was in error, as arraignment occurs
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10.
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.E. g., Colo. l}ev ..Stat. § 39-2-7; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708709. Others may choose simply to accelerate their existing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 26 is a reliable
determination of probable cause made either before or
promptly after arrest., and preferably no later than the
first appearance .b_efore a j~~~i;l officer. If made after _c.v¥\0.. 1,
arrest, the suspect must be
~to be presentA Each
State may choose the procedure that best accommodates
'
this determination to its existing practice.z7

IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
,do not ag.ree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

26

Because the probable rause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Reelase § 5.2 (1974): Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 331 (Proposed Final Draft 1974) . We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is ignifi.cant restraint on liberty.
27 Of course, if the State incorporates the probable cause determination into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed counsel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles
Dr}foleman v. Alabama, srupra.
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in })ade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
, d
. carne
. d a potentia
. ll"f
eMatYir!
h 1m
1 e sentence, an d H en derson u.~
~
~in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested_,(March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether \4ther WM 1trreeted under a-warrant~
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution
of capital offenses .

Prosecutors may charge all other crimes

by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and
without obtaining leave of court.

Fla. Rule Grim. Proc.

3.140(a); State v. B ernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1968);
DiBona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).

At

the t ime respondents were arrested, a Florida rule seemed
to authorize adversary preliminary hearings to test
probable cause for detention in all cases.
Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972).

Fla. Rule Grim.

But the Florida courts had held

that the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's
right to a preliminary hearing.

See State ex rel. Hardx

v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972).

?

They ·,had also held

that habeas corpus could not be used, except perhaps in
exceptional circumstances, to test the probable cause for
detention under an information.

See Sullivan v.

ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d 794, 797 (Fla. 1951).

State
The only

possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination
of probable cause were a special statute allowing a

3

preliminary hearin g after thir~ y days, Fla. Stat. Ann.
3
§ 907.045 (1973 ) ~ and arraignment, which the District Court
found was often delayed a month or more after arrest.

~

'l.

'R_~\rwJa~~ 3 3;t

r:. Supp.

110'l11lO (

A As a result, a person charged by

1> F/a. 1Cf7/), t/

nformation could be

detained for a substantial period solely on the decision
of a prosecutor.

3

This statute may have been construed to make the

hearing permissive instead of mandatory.

See Evans v.

State, 197 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Atty
Gen. 067-29 (1967).

But cf. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d

763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971).

It may also have been

superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
criminal procedure.

In re Florida Rules of Criminal

Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (1972).

The Florida rules do not suggest that the issue
of probable cause can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.160, but counsel for Petitioner represented
at oral argument that arraignment affords the suspect an
opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of the evidence
to hold

~him."

Tr. Oral ArglzlHliiM, Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.

The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this
17~,

was true.

483 F.2d A:

781 n.8.
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu~ion f offenses punishable by death. All other criminal
offenses"-nlay be prosecuted by information, and viola~ions of m~icipal ordinances may be prosecuted by a
simple affidavit or docket entry. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc.
3.140 (Supp. 197~). At the time respondents were ar1
rested, Florida's rules of criminal procedure authorized
'only one method for de rmining the existence of probable.
\cause to hold a suspect ~jail pending trial. Fla. Rule
This proceeding, an
1Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended J972).
ladversary preliminary hearing, was not available to a ~
suspect who had already been charged by information.
!See Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 533 (Fla.), cert. denied,
,411 U. S. 916 (1973); State ex rel. Hqrdy v. Blount, 261
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972). 2 In those inst~ces when a preliminary hearing was held and the suspect discharged, the
!prosecutor could reinstate the charge and return him to·
custody by filing an information. See Mont(Jomery v.
!I3tate, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965); Baugus v. St«:_te, 141
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962). As a result, a person char'ged by
lin rmation could be detained pending trial solely on the
ecision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
CourtJ claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. ~ Respondents Turner and
Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),
Ia. Rule Crim. roc. 3.131J:but that procedurels not challenged in
his case.
a The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
I Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
--1 • • ~
an alternate remedy. They~
askedithat the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
2

G)

a>

-, ... _

'-
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Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened.~ Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants .~
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, ~~h. s.~a.
Stipp. 1107 (SD Fla. 19-71)~ l.rfteF eeF~~tlie case - Tha.. c.cWtt c.vt"t,\~G(
as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b )(2),
~j~he GouP~ held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information a
right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable
cause. The District Court ordered the Dade County
defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for
further detention." It also ordered them to submit a~----------

*

at

also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
~
1115-111,.
respondents.
F. Supp. ~Because release was neither aske
)
nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class of cases for
which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ot. 2968, 99?3? 1-\-1'1 U.$, - - ) 2~(1974).

f Turner waR heing held on a rharge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11 , 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soliciting a ride and posse~sion of marihuana .
- The named defendant included justices of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearmgs in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
one who petitioned for certiorar~ellewiHg tee Ceurtr-m-Apf'e!lltt'J.,.
aeeisie'R ..II •
1 A The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense _.t(the criminal prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not

0

~
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plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted.
by information.
OH:ly efl:e suoh plan wa~bmitt~ and the District
Court adopted it with modifications. The final order
prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F.
Supp. 490. Upon arrest the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first appearance hearing." The
magistrate would explain the charges. advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent,
and proceed with a probable cause determination unless
either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If
e~more time, the magistrate would set the
.t ~
1
date for fl. "preliminary hearing ," to be held 'R-9 :R'l9FQ tll.~ w
n
four days ~if the accused was in custody and HOmo~ w;t~V\
rl \. _ o~d..C2.f'
t.ha.i-t 10 days ~if he h ad been released pPnding trial.
pcol/ id-A.~
(------~~~~re~tM''l'M!I the accused would be entitled to counsel,
SO\'"'c-~~ ... ~ fa~
and he would be allowed to confront and cross-examine
J { ai lv.xe to hold
adverse witnesses. to ~ummon favorable witne:::ses, and to
1 l ~c.>. he.;\t'i Yl.o.s
have a transcript made on request. If the magistrate
\ ot p«<e<i ~d
found no probable cause, the accused would be discharged.
:e ~;,_~a~
He then could not be charged with the same offense by
1
•
"
~ ..J
complaint or information, but only by indictment reB't"tVI~
turned within 30 davs. ~e plan alro ~rovirlef:l Ba41c-,r.
~ailure 1i6 hold hearings at the preseriboo times.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed t e
District Court's orrler pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision . the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development. the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County svstem. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida

----·

prejudice the conduct of trial o'n the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. L edesma, 401
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951).

I
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Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130A This "first appearance" is similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate docs not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure or
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 28 So. 2d.f*- (Fla. 197~) ."---·-·
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp. _ _
1286. Reaffirming m, original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutionai.f'' The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
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778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par~
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear~
\
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
I10CI
custody pending trial. !d., at ~~State Attorney- 1gg ... ro 1•
bodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the conRtitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rttle. Sec 483 F.
-1'JO. - - - 2d,- at 788). Accordingly, a district court of three judgrs was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. M endozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. N estor, 363
~
U.S. 603, 606-608 (1960).
~
';)10 The major difference between the District Court's order and
II
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a
probable cause hearing is rC'quired for all arrested persons charged
by information or only for those ronfined pendin~~: trial. The District
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested
JMI
persons. ~F. Supp., at~ On r~mand, the Distri ct Court made
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon ronviction.
11'10 - 355 F . Supp., at:t\-. The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jniled
pending trial. 483 F. 2d, at 789. Its opinion also suggest;;, without,....stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id. , at 787, 789.
The Court of Appeals vacated eete te~tie~ of the DistriCt")
Court's order that prescribed time periods different from those in j
the amended rules.t, a n~ samtions for failure to comply with the
urt'.s. holding ~
hearing requirements . ...ft -t~ffit·med t:he- DistrietJ:emL'cnd tmt+-the- tmteruled ntl:es~ extendffi t~me periods for CfttHtttl
aJJa life im}'lriS6flm~wat!- s,..~J.atigu.
equal protc_cl.ion.
Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree.

-t1illse.

c»
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erstein petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari
because of the importance of the issue.n t("We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
II
-As fr~ by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial

- 1./ vf u. .s'. ' oro 2 .

L
' -----

n At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respondehts have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ehded<e)~ !_his case belongs,{totnat narrow class of cases in whicli
the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the
(\ll'l$)
claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,~ L{, S,
~Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most
unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim
decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted. The
individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is
certain that other persons similarly situated will be detained under
the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim, in short, is
one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them PeBfleHfiest"were still in custody awaiting trial when e
District Court certified the gl~eat'ie~ e pite the abseil%-~
such a showing ~would or inarifY\ be required to avoid moot~ess under , osnC!€) ·
·
fllOO\,. The length of pretrial
custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no m"n' oo<t•in that •ny givon individuo!.(Wou!d bo in
i'f'l _custody l~g enough for a district judge to certify (Clas10!Mltie
Moreover, this ·
ki~ case iii "'Mi81)._ the constant existenc
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we~ ca VI.
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case. Cfflis ee!ltrovCISJ, taepefeFe, ·
~;table- exception- 1i6
t81! ~88~ul6. hat mootness of a elsss action that is "capable of
Jiifl91i+;err,-yet nding Teview" ordinarily i go rned by determining
~-t.Re named representatives were members of th
cia s at
th ti
~ ~tifir..a.tion. ~ee Sosna, supra, at - ; cf. Rivera .
F1eent8NJ ~8Q f, ~a llW {GA91972).

class.

""::£\

11

_
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on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the stand.ards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 44( (1806). -The stanaard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, A79 u. s. 89, 91 -3
{1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brineg.ar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~ 176
(1949)1, tlohnMn v. United States, BmHY.- S.--tp--(!9'48 .
This standa~epresents a comp~i between the in ividual's right to liberty and the ~~tyls-r.es
·
'Qi:tit;¥ fef' e(mtreHi:t:rg-erim~
"These long-prevailing
guard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter~
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also · seek to ·give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of exec.uting theirrduties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those v f
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
, their conclusions ·of probability. The rule of pro · able cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
. for accommodating these often opposing interests.
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Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforce.
ment. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
ag'a inst unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when·
US
ever possible. The classic statement of this principle
appears in Johnson v. United States, s~F~ 13-14~333 ·.'
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
( lq~g),
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

l0

~

c~ditu-le. <>Y\
IV'Itnl~ab\e

-

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20- 22 (1968).
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual /
justification pr;ior to any arrest1 but such a requirement
~
woul~handicap~legitimate law enforcement. ~
O'('
· ·
ba.lan~e- betweea-these opposing inter~sts~ the
ourt has expressed
a preference for the use of arrest
r
·'I
..W:
T~SIIO e.>
warrants when ~o~ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479482 (1963), ~it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers h..,..,.--......
failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374
U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705
(1948). 1~ ,

l f Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United S~ates v.

J

73-477-0PINION
10

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-theprovi d.es
scene assessment of probable cause ~gal justification
~ .f.o V"
for arresting a person suspected of crim8)' ~
~mas's jHtlgmeHt.-also jHstifie~a brief period of detention
~ howt.l/~'f'-1' _
to take the administrative steps .Aeeessap~:k)~ arres ,
)
once the suspect is in custodJA.the reasons that justify
aispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evapoT;,...
rate. There~no longerkany danger that the suspect will
escape or commit further crimes while the police subm.;;.it;....-_
their evidence to a magistrate. AHd, fFofl'l the s
~ ef vie
jJJ.e consequences of prolonged detention
may be more s~ious than the interference occasioned by
arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's
job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his famil
_
relationships. A., Even pretrial release may be accompanied
--

See)~.>

f

bY burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91

Ig

I U, ', C, § 3J4(,(a)('l) \ (1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). l
\ (5)
.>J
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment
\...

· -

__.../

of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded
interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on
liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149

'Ia/ a).

aabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) which was overruled in turn by
Chimel v. Clilijornia, 395 U.S. 752r--I

The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a wara~ntless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474
~
U971); id., at 510-512)_ (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v. United
~
States, 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958).

1....

481

1•.:n

We reiterated
~es ~ixzx

Ws

~principle

District

Cour~,

in United States v. United

407 U.S. 297 (1972).

~RBXKIUIXIIX:imBiJEBiHKHBHH*HJH£1Ai&iium:E~

In )

terms that apply

equally to arrests, we described the "very heart of the
Fourth Amendment directive" as a requirement that "where
practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent
both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful
acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected
evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's
private premises or conversation."

Id.1 at 316.

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968) .

iiiK*Mil
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(1925). At common law 'it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice M
of the peace shortly after arrest. ,Wfale Pleas of th~ ·
W.
Crown 77, 81, 95~(1736); 2AHawkins, Pleas of the Crown
116- 117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115
1
U. S. 4\!fi, 498-499 (1885).ltii The justice of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter--- -mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1JHale, supra, at · "'·
583-58FZ'AHawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J . Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).w '

1)11\

W, t, I

..,.l.'!! The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
~When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of A felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dis/
miss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry him to the common ~~ ... but that is now __.l./l...
rarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either
-(
carry him to the common gaol, ... orJ,_ to a justice of~ to
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require;")....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to :my justice of peace 'Of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or priva~
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
M, 4J.-a\ t,~Killexpect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining."
~
1 · at 589-590.
>
lo4' he examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the --.
• _J
~
-·- tr
w&e.. aiA.es..t
1oW'Ie.q
• ,
· ~ t-l~ witnesses WAA
a~:tetej_ outside the prisoner's pres'L
'M~~~-4 k~{ \Ms
:ence. 'fh:e pwec"- was considered quite harsh1'aatil: s~att~t.6i¥· r~f{)l~

~oc ~

· c:>
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The initial determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
'~Hawkins, supra, at 112- 115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
2,43; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97~01 ( 1807).
This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll- I '1
~_
rr~,an., 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807) ; ~ Ex parte !}urfor~ _ U 'ted. ('~ f V,
7 U. S. (3 Cranch~ t4J\ (1806); E~ rfiti.Hamilton, 3 .
nl ~ ~
U. 'S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a mod~
for a "reasonable" s~izure . See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., dissenting).l<l'

W

+k rr-•'so·;-~
wa~

e.v";nte/;(

to loe.. cU:_~ Vt. ~

/'
h\~

_

\ N L~ s~oV\ J .
a c;~ '
d ) '\-

2Qe1-)a LJ.l,s-tDr-4 ._.,..f
I

( l)t.ve. O'fV'VIeMt'

0

11
t II\ C.

)

Fou.d'h J!r.M.'WI.rJ.IM~v

+o tR,_ l.AM.A'U J Sta~.S

U

~sh'·h.dioll\
( l'i 3 7),
•

IS-I b
_,.,.

c-;
-- ~lqi_n i8~1 J. Stephen, at,\225, ~it was well established thail.if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of ~
WIOilliiQQ8Hloptish8a

~iBen~Yrl,guiltJ~ed t~isGllii~

ease.

~ l-li'Jn Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr~

Lt. at

233,

ere committed following an examination in the circuit court of
t'he District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
~ustice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the ,Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason.
---Toe prisoners were discharged.
..
,
_.-lf<-;;n)A similar procedure at common law, the wa'rrant for recoverJl
~f -aolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasor:.:J
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a. justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warraiJ.t was executed, aiJ.d the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
M
for a prompt determination of the cause _for seizure of the gC?_ods
lJ,nd detention of the thief. 2 Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor,
'
Two Studies ,in , Constitutional nterpretation 24-25, 39-40 ( 1969) ;
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 026-{)29 (1886).
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B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
ftrlal without any opportunity for a probable cause deter~nation. l'f
·
· ·
o a
rause at-t
rst a pearance before a magistrat~ or a
the he ing to t ba"l, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130; see
ugh v. '{_lainwater, 4 3 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8 (CAS 1973 ,
nd the ~uspect canot demand a preliminary hearl g.
}'la. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a). The Florida Supreme
Court has heJd that habeas corpus cannot be used to test
he probable cause for detention under an information.
Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla.
~951). The arraignment may be delayed as much as a
:Jnonth, and it is not clear that the issue of probable cause
bay be raiaed then.18

r

__R_

~ A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
jtidicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true.
,
~found the 4
procedures- med in filin~/
nfoliil..@;tions allow a delay of a month or ore between arrest andj
rraignment. First, proce;>eing of the informo,tion does not begin
ntil the arresting oifJ.rer appears before an assistant state attorney
nd files an affidavit of facts. This appearance is dl'4!:ycd anywher
rom 24 hours to two weeks after arrest. If the state attorney
erides to file an information, the papers arc prepared flnd th~ J2__
nf&mation is filed and set for arr.ai~nment. The average dela~
'romt l time thl' arresting officer appears and the time of arraign
ent is 1 tp 15 days.
The Court of Appeals assumed, for purposes of this case, that th
defendant would have an opportunity to challenge the probabl
cause underlying the information at his arraignment, but not.e
that.ii. the a · umption was groundlesS', a person charged by informa
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Petitioner defends this practice on the ground that the
rosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a
determination of probable cause ~that furnishes suffi.
cient reason to detain a defendant pending trial. Al-~.~
though a conscientious decision that the evidence war:c-oS~Voo""'
f
~--....-:r~a:-:::n:rr:"ls affords a measure of protection against unfounded
detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment
standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous
decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure.
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the
Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a
United States Attorney's information was invalid because
the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although
the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the
prosecutor's official oath could not furnish probable cause,
that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the
arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.;.o More
recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443,
449-453 (1971), the Court held that a prosecutor's
'on would ~ave no opportunity to challenge prob, ble cause beforfl
ial. 483 4'. 2d, at "t{li1 n. 2. The 'Florida rule go erning arraign;ent
e,i not suggest ~at the procedwe contemplat a challenge
o prob le cause or an~ considerf!tio of pretria c $ody.
erely, provides tha . the
raignm~bt sh ~ consist of re ding th~
ndic ent or infor,rnation to the defendant and tailing up
hi~
-t&-ffit'11!1t:-.-i"±rr:-.Rnte Grim. Proc. 3.166.
By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
Its face,), and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry . Ex parte
Unit ed States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 ( 1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magist rate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974).

E
1.'

a

'2
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responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the
constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate.
We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of
Tarnpa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be
determined by someone independent of police and prosecu~ The reason for this separation of functions was
expressed by Justice Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
i.n tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943).
30

The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine IS!an~a statutory guarantee substantially iden~
tical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693~, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court ha since he
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,
194--198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo/
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, ana
Shadwick.

J
•
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In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's
Prior holding that a judicial hering is not prerequisite
l --1
lJ.&s~
to prosecution by information. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 1 W-as.L. ,.__,V•... f-o,..J '1
229 U.S. 586 (191~ . Nor do we retreat from the estab!!::"'~~
1
lished rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void
3 ~'1 U. 'S' 1
a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 1 511~ 51/5
'
519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus,
( 1'7h2.) • __
as the Court of Appeals noted below,[a suspect who is q\t\.u, ~
presently detained may challenge the probable cause fo,:.__
lA-o
that confinement, ~a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial withoutJ.yrobable cause. 483 F. 2d, at 786-78 .
Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968) ,
with Brown v. Fauntleroy, - U. S. App. D. C. - , 442
F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,- U. S. App.
D. C. - , 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

t:;, __

J

III

----------------

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accmppanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearin·g of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
1 See also Beck v. Was ·ngton, 369 T.J· S. 54
(1962). "The
opim in Beck cite/ Ocampo . nited Spates, 234 . S. 91 (1914),
lidity of prosecuti
by inforfor the me prorJlsition, but the
'mation wi ut preliminary hearing as not at issue in at case.
The only isst
were whether gra
jur.·es were required ·n the
discussed inn. 2 , supra, ~ther t~~ prosecu or's
Philippines d,
decision to/ le an i ormation fur 1shed sufficirnt probable cause br

·an._a.r.rest warrant.

L
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many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S.
1 (1970); wKamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," buiJ:it may approach a prima facie case of guilt. A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article
330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972). When the
hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of the issue to both
the State ~the accused justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on crossexamination. This kind of hearing also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v.
Alabama,
8. l {1970) And, as the hearing assumes increased importance and the procedures become
I ike.l I ~ooG\
more complex, the less lil~t i~ that it can be held
promptly after arrest See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearra~ent Procedure, supra, at 33-3~4~·--~~-:-~~-These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending
further proceeding~ m.a,r be afforded by lftW
issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary
hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. 22

.U.

22

Because the standards are identical,fthere is no need for furth ef'1
investigation before the probable cause determination can be marW
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were,
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354
U. S. 449, 456 (1957).
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at standard-probable cause to believe the suspect has
committed a crime-traditionally has been decided in
nonadversary proceedings on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes
of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and' by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded'
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual an
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).

-

Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
The use of these informal procedures is justified not
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence su seeu~~ :
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, The De- , ro
cision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969). • V
This is not to say that }tonfrontation and cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of probable cause
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determinations in some caseflD~ in most cases.l\their
value would be too slight to justify h~ding, as a matter of
constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable
cause:f' ptt{-system orcriminal justice ·s already over----n-nr
- denJ.d) and it i 1 subject to valid criMc.tsm when over- ....{_
emph,sis on pr edural and evidentiary f~malities rer
sults in delayed ju ·ce, repetitive trials, and rdensom
expense for both the ate and the accused.
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require -n. rt
t
.~
lVI~ LO~~
appointed counsel. We~identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
3ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) , and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or probationer arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U.S., at 786 . That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
t.he Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
181-'783
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U.S., at~ n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less proterti~n from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
o Professional Responsibility, .f)~ 7-103 (A) ~rosecutor ~
a. profuisional esponsibili-ty-"not ~institute or cause to be insti- - 0\
tuted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supported by probable cause"); ABA Standards ~ /
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
FunctiP&, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers,
C<i'deOT'Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c~ {\q72).
2

DR

l< s'oa \)

Criminal justice is already overburdened by the
volume of cases and the complexities of our system.

The

processing of misdemeanors and the early stages of
prosecution generally are marked by delays that can
seriously affect the quality of justice.

A constitutional

doctrine requiring full adversary hearings for all persons
detained pending trial could exacerbate the problem of

1

~as
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· (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226)0.967).
In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions identified
two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination re'q_uired b.Y the 'Fourth Amendment. First, under Alabama
law the function of th~hearing was to determine whether
.the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that
he would not be tried at all. 1'he Fourth Amendment
probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to
some extent the defendant's ability to assist in preparation of his defense, but this is not the kind of substantial·
harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman.
Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and
cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary
· hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on
the merits could be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply to the informal,
nonadversary procedure required under the Fourth
mendment.
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding appropriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an
opportunity to be present and participate in the determination.a-4 Our system of justice operates on the premise
Jt4 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Criminal
.Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. I. Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent.
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a
person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him.
seqRees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 1rl'r- - .
122-123 (1873). 4'he Fourth Amendment is not incon-~
~th that concept. The procedures normally followed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings
by necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frus___..
trate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 ( 1969).
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to appear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remnin in custody for inability
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the
ties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsayJffiay be conered. Rule 344.
he Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported
by a r&'lsonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may presmt written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may pre ent additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he_is accused. The state's submission may be made by mean~
of affidavits, and no witnesEes shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
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to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration
along with the State's presentation could enhance both
- TI-le sv~r~cis
the reliability and the fairness of the proceeding. "'tt~t..:R<,....._
r res<amce. CV\1\d..
b1:1:FdeH en tl:l.Q State v;ould - be-ffii.tt.imah.,. Virtually all
p~-tA·~r ~t: ""
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presen e.
wo-u..ltl...:.
lvvvro~ ')1...0
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see
sl€-vu.~'c
~
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230b u.ttdUII\ a""231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction
ik ("" t G\"te..,
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may be decided at that time with little or no
inconvenience to the State. 1n fact, the suspect's first
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been _ /
considered the proper time for determining whether there./" M
'is probable cause for detention. 1[ Hale, Pleas of the.
'
CroW'ilJ.589-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2kffawkins, Pleas W,
of the grown 116-1~(4th ed. 1762); see McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344 (1943); Amsterdam, Perspectiv~on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. 1 ..
Rev. 349, 391 & n. 408 (1974). Although the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly acknowl· i~~
edge this function of the first appearance, ~Court ha
interpreted them to require a determination of probabl
cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S.
T214}.(1965); Mallory v. Tlnited States, 354 U. S. 449, 454
(1957).ad'
-'fin an · amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb f\J!.allory had mistaken
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is otherwise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in Warrantless Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972),( McNabb, of course,
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
-Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested

-G)
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There is no single proper method for making the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amend~
inent. The States have many different patterns of criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a
~wift and reliable probable cause determination with the
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions~
Florida requires every arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that
~ppearance the defendant is told of the charges against
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typically relied upon in making this decision is the weight of
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial
lease § 5JA (1974); see 18 U. S. C. § 3146 (b). Exnding that determination to.(a test of probable cause · e.M.c..o-~ass
uld be a natural way of integrating the probable cause
ision with existing procedures.
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the
-with. cw..~ ~orrequirement of the Fourth Amendment{' Some States
-adj ~.otst~e.;tA..ts .
already authorize a ~&Ping o probable cause at or
immediately following the suspect's first appearance.

dela~y~.--------

person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary
318 U. S., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal ruies were
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view:
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined.
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454.
The use of the word "arraign" was ~error, as arraignment occ~rs
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10.

,n
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E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2- ; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708- 't (5) ( l'tiDil); Vt · ~~~c:
Others may choose simply to accelerate their exist<:!.riM."Proc. 3 (b) J
ing preliminary hearings. What the Fourth Amendment ,.,
S(e) { 1q'7~ ) .
2
requires for pretrial restraint on liberty ~ is a reliable
determination of probable cause made either before or
promptly after arrest, and preferably no later than the
first appearance before a judicial ()fficer. If made after _ a~ +v \:le.. l-teMd,
arrest, the suspect must ~to be present;-Each
tate may choose the procedure that best accommodates
this determination to its existing practice ~

Y'.

o~r o ~tu..."'\tlj

IV

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion .

:.116 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
tl1at they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
)I..
Pretrial Reji'ase § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
,/ Rule 3 1 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define spe.,. cifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
w1 Of course, if the State incorporates lhe probable cause determination into a multipurpose hearing, the necessity for appointed counsel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles
,____o';I\Coleman v. Alabama, supra.
.,.
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Court.
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony . Respondent Henden;on was arrested on March 2, and charged
by information on -March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether there was an arrest warrant in either ca~:<e .

.
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu~
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear.~
ing and without obtaining leave of court. F la. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing,.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972).~ They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an informa~
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 ( 1973) ," and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).4 As a result, a person charged
Florida law also, denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, ~ee Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged
in this case.
"This statute may have been eonstrued to make the hearing permissive instead of mandatory . See Evans v. State , 197 So. 2d 323
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf.
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments t o the rule~ of
criminal procedure. In -re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) .
4
The .Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable
cause can be raised at arraignment., .Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but
2
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by information could be detained for a substantial period
solely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court," claiming a constitutional right to a judiuial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.G Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
The Court certified the case as a class action under Fed.
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraignment aft'ords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold tim." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n . 8.
~The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy . They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respEmdents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsmt d1d not come within the class
of cases for which habea~ corpus is the exclusive remedy . Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U. S.
- , - (1974) .
7 Turner was being ht.>ld on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of solicitmg n ride and posHe~mon of marihuana .
8 The named defendant::; included justict>s of the peace and judges
of small-claims court1:>, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearmgs m crimmal ca::;es, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
QUI' who pPtJtionl:'d for <'('rtiorari.
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 ( b )(2), and held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 0 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed postarrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused
was unprepared.
If either requested more time, the
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing,"
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing"
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
u The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by tlw rquitahle ret;trictions on federal intervention in ;;:tate prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) .
The injunction was not direrted at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the lrgality of pretrial dctrntion without a judicial hear ..
mg, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U . S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by mformation or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
fn a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutionaP() The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. 1d., at 788-789.11
10

Although this ruling hE-ld a statewidE' "legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then embodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
(!)f a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F.
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges wa~ not
req•.1ired for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603,606- 608 (1960) .
11 The major difference betweE-n Hw District Court's order and
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a
probable cause hearing is required for all arrested persons charged
by information or only for those confined pending trial. The District
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested
persons. 336 F. Supp., at 491. On rE-mand, the District Court made
an exception for persons charged with misdemeanors who neither
suffered pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction.
355 F . Supp., at 1290. ThE' Court of Appeals explicitly limited the
hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jailed
pending trial. 483 F . 2d, at 789, Its OJ)inion also suggests, without,
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State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue. 12
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony
defendants who are confined pending trial. !d., at 787, 789.
The Court of Appeal~ vacated those parts of the District Court's
order that prescribed time periods different from those in the
amended rules and imposed sanctions for failure to comply with the
hearing requirements. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree.
12 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respondents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,
~ U. S . - (1975). Pretrial detentions is by nature temporary,
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
ih short, is one that iS distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
oause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court
cenified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avord mootness under Sosna . But this case is a suitable exception
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at - - n. 11; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of preirial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain · that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to
certify the class. Moreover, in this ca~f' the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can
·safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest
in the casr.
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II
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.

A

Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the · Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 ( 1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S.160, 175-176
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime.
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men , acting on facts leading sensibly to·

r
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their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.

To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
appears in Johnsan v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 13
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
n We reitPrated this princ1ple in United States v. United State~
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally

to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment
directive" as a reqmremr>nt that "where practical, a governmental
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongfnl act~ and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
Citizen's private premise<> or convrrslltion." Id., at 316. See also.
Terry v. Ohio, :392 U. S 1, 20...-22 ( 1968) .
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would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible,
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to seeure a warrant. See Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United. States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, 705 (1948). 14
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-thescene assessment of probable cause provides legal j ustification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
jncident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice
Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by
Chimel v. Califm·nia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) .
The issue of 'warrantless arrest that has generated the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war-.
rantless arrest . See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U . S. 443,474481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (WHml, J ., diHsenting) ; Jones v.
l!mted .States, 357 U. S. 49:~ , 499- 500 (1958).
14
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Is the Crime 51-62 ( 1972). Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. § 3146
(a) ( 2), ( 5). When the stakes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold
that the l<..,ourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885). 15 The justice of the peace
15 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of felony, he may detain him in cu;:;tody till he can rea~onably dismiss himself of him ; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. -He may carry lnm to the common gaol, . . . but that is now
rarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, .. . or to a justice of peace to
be examined, and farthrr procet>d agamst as case shall require . .. .
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit h1rn, as the case shall require.
'r.And the bringi'ng the offender eithrr by the constable or private

73-477-0PINION
12

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter~
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisone1•
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to Jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J . Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 ( 1883) .16
The initil;tl determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807); 17 Ex parte Burford,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795). and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect n, Mittimus for his warrant of detaining."
1M. Hale, supra, at 58!}-590.
16
The exammation of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the
witnesHes were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen,
at 21!}-225, it waH well e~tabli~hed that the pnsoner was mt itled to be
d1scharged if tlw investigat10n turned up insufficient evidence of his
gmlt !d., at 288.
17
In Ex parte Bollman , two men charged m the Aaron Burr case
were cmrumtted following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbut. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corp\lS in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
.JustiCe Marshall, affirmed 1ts jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal tnal courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the cv1dence against the prisoners and held that
it chd not establi::h probable cause that they were guilty of treason_
The pmoners were discharged
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for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U. 8. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). 18

B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. 19 Petitioner defends this practice on the
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-.
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273'
18 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937).
A :;imilar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods, 1s said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and i.he alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace·
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
and deteution of the thief. 2 M. Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
111
A per~on arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
judicial detf'fmination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facti:! ~howing that the suspect has committed a crime. The·
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if therereasonable· ground to l~lieve the complaint is true .

m

..
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U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.20 More recently, in Caolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 449'--453 ( 1971), the Court held that a
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad'Wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 2 ' The reason
By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury'~ relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
20

(1974) .
~1

'

The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippinr Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment , Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
:32 Stat . 693 , the Court held that an an·est warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip-pmes is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,.
194-198 (1957) . Even if it were, the result reached in OcampO'

73-477-0PINION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

15

for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided i~1to
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite
to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369
U. S. 541, 545 (1962). Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S.
586 (1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause fo:r
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, an<t.

Shadwick,
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that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393
:F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968), w1th Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
U. S. App. D. C. - ·, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled .after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996--1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing
assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly
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after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without a full adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest. 22 That standard-probable cause to
believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally
has been decided in nonadversary proceedings on hearsay
and written testimony, and the Court has approved these
informal modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
22
Because the st<mdards are identical, ordinanly there is no need
for further mvestigation before the probable cause determination can
be made.
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob.
able catise.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were,
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause'" Mallory v. United States, 354
449, 456 (1957),

u.s.
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practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
The use of these informal procedures is justified not
only by the lesser consequences of a probable ca.use determination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64109 (1969). 2 :J This is not to say that confrontation and
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of
2 H In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-

tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedingtl may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is oatisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of Profe::;~wnal ResponsibilitY, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall
not m;;titnte or cause to b<:> m::;tituted criminal charges when he knows
or It is obvwus that the charges are not supported by probable
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the AdministratiOn of Criminal .Jm;tice, The Proseeutwn Function,§§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American Col!Pge of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c)
(1072).
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probable cause determinations in some cases. In most
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause. 24
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this is not the
kind of substantial harm identified as con trolling in Wade
and Coleman. Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to
24

Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of ca:;es
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors
and the early :;tages of prosecution generally are marked by delays
·that can seriousl y affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doctrine requirmg full adversary hearings for all persons detained
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretnal delay.
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confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the
preliminary hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's
defense on the merits could be compromised if he had no
legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses'
testimony. This consideration does not apply to the informal, nonadversary procedure required under the
Fourth Amendment.
The reasons that make a nonadversary proceeding ap~,
propriate, however, do not justify denying the suspect an
opportunity to be present and participate in the deter- .
mination. 25 Our system of justice operates on the premise
25 The procedures suggested in the Uniform Rules of Crimina'!
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft 1974) and the A. L. L Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent.
Draft No. 5A, 1973) are instructive. Under the Uniform Rules, a
person arrested without a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary
delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony, in the presence of
the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in custody for inability
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no mote
than 5 days after arrest. This is an adversary hearing, and the·
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay evidence may be
considered. Rule 344.
The Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported'
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony :
"The arrr~sted person may present written and testimonial evidence·
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is a.ccuscct The. state's submission may be made by mean&
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that the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitled to
participate unless there is good reason to exclude him.
See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 502 (1972); Rees v.
City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107, 122-123
( 1873). The procedures normally followed in applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings by
necessity, as notifying the suspect would often frustrate the purpose of the warrant. See T. Taylor, Two
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81-82 (1969).
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to appear before the magistrate and giving him an opportunity
to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration
along with the State's presentation could enhance both
the reliability 'and the fairness of the proceeding.
The suspect's presence and participation would impose no significant burden on the State. Virtually all
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented
to a judicial officer within a short time after arrest, see
A. L. I., Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230231 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other
conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is
the Crime, Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Since the
defendant is already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may be decided at that time with little or no
inconvenience to the State. In fact. the suspect's first
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been
considered the proper time for determining whether there
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more w1tnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cam;e.'•
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) .
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is probable cause for detention. 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 585-586. 589 590 ( 1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 W.
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-119 (4th ed. 1762) ; see
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-344 (1943);
Amsterdam. Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 391 & u. 408 (1974). Although the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly
acknowledge this function of the first appearance, the
Court has interpreted them to require a determination of
probable cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449, 454 ( 1957) ,26
There is no single proper method for making the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The States have many different patterns of criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions,
In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the
Solicitor General suggested that McNabb and Mallory had mistaken
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is otherwise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in Warranties:; Arrests, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev.ll28 (1972). McNabb , of course,
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It interpreted a statutory requirement that an arrested
person be brought before a mag1strate without unnecessary delay.
818 U. S., at 342. Mallory wa:; decided after the federal rules were
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was
dictum, 1t clearly outlined the Court's view:
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined.
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable
cnuse.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested'
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may
be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may
be promptly determined." 354 U. S., at 454.
The u~e of the word "arnugn" was an error, as arraignment occur:5.
later in the process. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 10.
26
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Florida requires every arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typically relied upon in making this decision is the weight of
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Pretrial
Release§ 5.1 (b) (1974); see 18 U.S. C.§ 3146 (b). Expanding that determination to encompass a test of probable cause would be a natural way of integrating the probable cause decision with existing procedures.
In other States, existing procedures may satisfy the
requirement of the Fourth Amendment with only minor
adjustments. Some States already authorize a determination of probable cause at or immediately following the suspect's first appearance. E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. 39-2-3
(1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. ~ 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt.
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). Others may choose
simply to accelerate their existing preliminary hearings.
What the Fourth Amendment requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 27 is a reliable determination of probable
cause made either before or promptly after arrest, and
preferably no later than the first appearance before a ju-

s

Becamw thf.' probable <'aU~P dC'termmation is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
susr1ects who suffer restraints on librrty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There arP many kinds of pretrial release
and many degree:; of conditwnal liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standnrd~ Relatmg to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretnal Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Fmal Drnft 1974). We cannot define specifi<'ally those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key facto:r JS significant rf.'~traint on liberty.
27
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dicial officer. If made after arrest, the suspect must be
given an opportunity to be present and to be heard. Each
State may choose the procedure that best accommodates
this determination to its existing practice. 2 8

IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Of Cour:;r, if the State mcorporate~ the probable cau~e determination mto a multipurpo~e hearing, the necessity for appointed counHcl at thr combined proceeding mu~t bP governed by the principle1;.
of United States v. Wade and Coleman v. ALabama, o'Upra.
28
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested ·
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him ca.rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
1 Respondent Pugh was anested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
ft•lony . Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whethf)r them wus an arrest warrant m either case.
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu~"
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hear.~
ing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972). 2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an informa~
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 ( 1973) ,~ and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971). 1 As a result, a person charged
Florida law also, .denies preliminary hcal'ings to persons confined
under indictment, see Sangar6e v. Hcmlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged
· in this case.
~ This statute may have been construed to make the hearing permissive instead of mandatory . See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf.
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules of Cnminal Procedure,
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) .
~The Florida rules· do not suggest that the issue of probable
-cause can be ra1sed at arrai~nment, Fla . Rule Crirn. Proc. 3.160, but
2
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by informatiOn could be detained for a substantial period
solely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court,n claiming a constitutional right to a judi~ial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.G Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
.Qc_ The ¢ourt certified the case as a class action under Fed.
\
V\

counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraignthe suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold
Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8.
~The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was
ne1ther asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class
of rases for which habeas corpu;; i;; the exclusive remedy. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (197:3); sec Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S.
- , - (1974)
7 Turner was bemg held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soliCJtmg a ndr and po~~e-swn of marihuana.
8 The named drfendant~ mcluded jus1ices of the peace and Judges
of small-clmms courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearmgs in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County Gerstem was the only
Olle who petitioned for ct>rtwrarJ

-~~ffor<!_s

Nm."

78-477-0PINION
4

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), and held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a judicial hearing, on the question of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 0 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in aU cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed postarrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused
was unprepared.
If either requested more time, the
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing,"
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing"
thP. accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
iJ The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in !'tate prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearmg, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F . 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1978); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U. S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
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to summon favorable witne~ses, and to have a transcript
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; ~ee In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection , since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.
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1286. Reaffirmmg its origmal ruling, the District Court
declared that the con tin uatwn of this practice was unconstitutional.lQ The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
778, modifying the Distnct Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. /d., at 788-789. 11
10

Although tlus rulmg held a statewide "legislative rule" unconstitutional, 1t was not outside the jurisdictwn of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then embodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opimon can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F.
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a distmt court of thr!:'e judges was not
req•Jired for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603,606-608 (1960) .
11 The major diff0renre brtween the Distnct Court's order and
that of th<.> Court of Appeals rentered on the question whether a
probable cause hearing is required for all arrested persons charged
by informahon or only for tho~e ronfined pending trial. The District
Court's origmal decree reqmred prelimmary hearings for all arrested
person~. 3:36 F. 8upp., at 491
On rema;ld, the District Court made
an exceptwn for person:-; charged with miSdemeanors who neither
suffered pretrial detentiOn nor faced 1mpnsorunent upon conviction.
355 F. Supp., at 1290. The Court of Appeals explicitly limitPd the
hearing right for m18dm1eano1 defendant~ to those who are jailed
pending tr1al. 48a F 2d, at 789 Its opinion also suggests, without
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State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue. ~
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
1

stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id., at 787, 789.
The Court of Appeals vacated those parts of the District Court's
order that prescribed time periods different from those in the
amended rules and imposed sanctions for failure to comply with the
hearing requirements. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree.
12 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respondents have been convicted. Their pretrial' detention therefore has
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa.J.
~ U. S . - (1975). Pretrial detentio~ah1re temporary,
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
review.''
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
oause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in Cll::>tody awaiting tnal when the District Court
cerl ified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avoid mootness under Sosna. But th1s case i::; a suitable exception
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at - - n. 11; cf. Rivem v.
F'reema'n, 469 F. 2d 11.59, 1162--1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea , as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
would be m pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
repre::;entlng the named re~pondents IS a public defender, and we can
"Safely assume that he hall other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case.

~
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II
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 ( 1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect 1 had committed or was committing an offense/' Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 17&--176
( 1949) . This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime.
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to·
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their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of 'probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
appears in Johnsan v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968)? 3
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
13 We reiterated thi::; principle in United States v. United States
D1strict Court, 407 U. S. 297 ( 1972). In terms that apply equally

to arrest::;, we de~cribed the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment
rlirective" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
Citizen's privati' prem1ses or conversation.'' ld., ·at 316. See also.
Ten"!/ v. Ohio, i~92ll. S. 1,20--22 (1968).
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would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a
StAp-r~ -at qc,. _preference for the use ot arrest warrants when feasible,
->
)
Beck v.-Ghio~ U 8. 89,96 (!~Wong Sun v. Unite
States, 371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to seeure a warrant. See Ker v.
Californ·ia, 374 U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699, 705 ( 1948) .14
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-thescene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime. and for
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how ...
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con-:
finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income. and impair his family relationships.
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice
11 Another a»pect of Tntpiano was overruled in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 5t> (1950), which was overruled in turn by
C'hirnel v Caltfornia, 395 0 . S. 752 (1969)
The issue of warrantle~s arrest that has generated the most controverlly, and which remains unsettled, is whether ·and under what
circumstances an officer· may e11ter a suspect's home to make a war-.
rantJess arrest See Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 U.S . 443,474481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (WHITE, J., diHsrnting), Jones v.
Umted States, 857 U. S. 493,499-500 (1958).
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Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. § 3146
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925) . At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116--117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498--499 (1885)."i The justice of the peace

p'f'oceeded.

15 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
dete!ltion.
" When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of felony, he may detain him in cu~tody till he can reasonably dismills himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these thmgs.
''1. He may carry him to the common gaol, .. . but that is now
rarely done.
··2. He may deliver him to the <'• ,able of the vill, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, , .. or to a justice of peace to
'lJe ·cxamnwd, and ~against as case shall require . ...
"3 Or he may carry him in· ,,, uately to any justice of peace of the
county where he is taken , who .lJ>on exammation may discharge, bail,
or commit hun, as the case shall require.
'':And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private-
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would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deter~
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisonet
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883). 16
The initi~tl determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at.
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll~
man, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 17 Ex parte Burford,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795). and there are indications that.
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a M·ittimus for his warrant of detaining."
·
1M. Hale, supra, at 589~590.
LB The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen,
at 219-225, it was wrll e~tablished that the prisoner was entitled to be
ch:scharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of hi~
guilt !d., at 23a
17 In .Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case
were cornniitted following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
.Justice Marshall, affirmed its JUrisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons i.n custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it d1d not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason~,
'fhe prisoners were discharged.
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for a "reasonable" seizure.

13

See Draper v. United States,
(DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). 18

358 U.S. 307, 317--320 (1959)

B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. 19 Petitioner defends this practice on the
ground th11t the prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273'
18 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 ( 1937).
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
::>tolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re-.
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
ef probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace·
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
and detentwn of tlw thief. 2M. Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
lu A person arre,ted nuder a warrant would have received a prior
judwial determinatiOn of probable cause Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states fads showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The·
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there•
.t~ rPaRonabJle grounrl to believe the complaint iH true.
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U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.20 More recently, in C:Jolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 449'-453 (1971), the Court held that a
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 21 The reason
20 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecutwn. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974)'
21
The Court had earhE'r reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S 91 (1914), a crimmal appeal from the
Philippme Islands. lnterpretmg a statutory guarantee substantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Aet of Jnly 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 69:3, the Court held that an arrest warrant could Issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippmes is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitutwn, Green v United States, 355 U. S. 184,.
194-198 (1957). Even 1f tt were, the result reached in Ocampo•
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for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dig~
nity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance ·
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled ·
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." .MeNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).

1\
)

In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is ntitled to judicial oversight or review of
iier ~ e- .
cision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's
pri.:>r holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite
to prosecution by information. Beck v. Wa,shington, 369
U. S. 541, 545 ( 1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S.
586 (1913). Nor do we retreat from the established r
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952);
.Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
is incompatible ·with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and

Shadwick,
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that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C. - , 442 F. 2d 838 ( 1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
U. S. App. D. C. --·, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S.
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996--1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of
thf' issue to both the State a11d the accused justifies the
presentation of witne:?ses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing
assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly
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after arrest diminishes. Ree A. L. I. .Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with()~ adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest. 22 That standard-probable cause to
believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditi. onal~
has been decided -5f10nadversary proceedingt on hearsay
and written testimony, and the Court has approved these
informal modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technicnl; they are the factual and
22 Because the standards are identical, ordinanly there is no need
fot· further investigation before the probable cause determination can
be madE'.
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob.
able cause' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were,
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquartel'8
m order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 3.5{
449, 4.56 (1957),

u.s.
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practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).
Cf. McCray V. Illinois, 386 U.S, 300 (1967).
.
The use of ~informal procedure! is justified no~
only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determinatio
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64109 (1969). 23 This is not to say that confrontation and
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of
3ln Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v.
Scm·pelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba2

tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U.S., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may ofi'er less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall
not mstJtute or cause to be mst1tuted cnminal charges when he knows
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal .JustJCe, The ProsecutiOn Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-·
ican Colle11;e of 'Tr~al Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c)
(1972).

an
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probable cause determinations in some cases. In most
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment d~termina
tion of probable cause. 24
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First~
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear-J
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretnal custody. To be sure, pretrial
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's abilit
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this if.~'*tVI'H~
~of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade
and Coleman . Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to
Crimmal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cal:les
and the complexities of our sy~tem. The processmg of misdemeanorvs.l
and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked by delays
that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doctrine reqmrln~ adversary hearings for all persons d{'taine<l
pending trial could exacerbatp the problem of pretrial delay.
24
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confront and cross-examine G"osecution witnesses at the
preliminary hearing. Thet~~urt noted that the suspect's
defense on the merits could be compromised if he had no
legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses'
testimony. This consideration does not apply ~nQ ~~
.fe:Hnal, -B-ena~t>y- -prooodure !'-equirea under- t~
~!llimt
.
-The re ons hat make a nonadversary proceeding ap-, \
propriate, H ever, do not justify denying the suspect an
opportunity,
be present and participate in the deter- )
mination. 2 Ou system of justice operates on the premise

-

· w~e-v- i·t. ~ror~c.vt~
i ~ 1\-0t '<'e~ I y-ed., it>
ero"-uce. witvlessc:s
{Ur e'l'oSS •E.'IC~Y\'\lV\Stl&~.

'•

~ll.~UP'F~t@~~ll the Uniform Rules of Crimina:!
Procedure (Proposed Final Draft-i974~theA. I.r. T:·Model Coder,
ef Pte ana1gmnent Pro~l'e (.:fent., Draft. No. 5.;. 1~72, 4tnd T&n~
-Brnft-No. 5A:, '1:973}' me instructive. Under the Bnifoun Rttl~ a
person arrested withoRt a warrant is entitled, "without unnecessary
delay," to a first app~rance before a magistrate,and a determination
that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant. The determination may be made ~n affidavits or testimony, in the presence of
the accused. Rule 31L Persons who remain in custody for inability
to qualify for pretrial release are offered another opportunity for a
probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no mote
than ,j7 days after arrest. This is au adversary hearing, and the·
parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay evidence may be
.
·
considered. Rule 344. .
Thei{Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure{aiso provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported'
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts, § 310. The
magistrate may make a detrrmination of probable cause to hold the
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may requeSt
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of 1he first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate :makes·
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony :
" The aw')sted person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi·
tiona! written and testJmomal evidence and 'arguments that there is
reasonable cause ~o believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused.. The. state'r-; s_ubm1ssion may be made by means:

(T~t.1)r·aft No. SJ
lq72.) CAAd. l~t-.

J)y-nft

No. SA, rq73)
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the subject of a judicial proceeding is entitle?}o
\ ~articipate unless there is good reason to excludel!~·
See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U. S. 496, 502 ( 1972); ljees v.
\ City of Watertown, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 107, ,122- 123
( 1873). The procedures normally followed 1n applying for warrants are ex parte proceedings by
necessity, as notifying the ·suspect would often frustrate t.he purpose of the warrant. See /1'. Taylor, Two
Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 81.,...82 (1969) . ,
But when the suspect is already in custody, and the only
1
issue is probable cause for detention, he should be allowed
to participate in the determination. Allowing him to appear before the magistrate artd giving him an opportunity
I to speak or to submit written evidence for consideration
along with the State's presentation could enhance both
,
Q
· the reliability 'and the fairness of the proceeding.
The suspect's presence and participation would im- / - . . -·
pose no significant bu{den on the State. Virtually all
jurisdictions require that arrested persons be presented
to a judicial office:r within a short time after arrest, see
' A. L. I., Model Qode of Pre-arraignment Procedure 230-, 231 (Tent. Dr;:tft No. 1, 1966), and every jurisdiction
1
makes some provision for setting bail or determining other
1
1conditions of pretrial release. See L. Katz, Justice Is
the Crirr~; Appendix B, at 247-365 (1972). Sirtce the ,
defendapt is already in the courtroom, the issue of probable cause may be decided at that time with little or no ~
inc9nvenience to the State. In fact, the suspect's first
appearance before a magistrate traditionally has been
considered the proper time for determining whether there

!

of affidavits, and no WitnesseR shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more w1tnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause.'"
§310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft N(). 5Al 1973) .

LFP/gg

Gerstein - Revision of 1st Draft
(S~gested substitute conunencing
wit first paragraph on p. 20
and extending to Part IV on p. 24).
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~ Although we conclude that the Constitution does
not require an adversary determination of probable cause,
we recognize that state systems of criminal procedure
~

vary widely.

There is no single preferred pre- rial

v

procedure, and the nature of the probable cause
determination usually will be shaped to accord with a state's
,
,,
C'\ .1 proce dure v1.ewe
.
d as a whl
pre+-trl.a
o e.

While we limit

'-"'

our holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility
and experimentation by the states.
,....-

It may be found

;"

desirable, for example, to make the probable cause
determination at the suspect's first appearance before
5

I

a judicial officer,

see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.

332, 342-344 (1943)

or the determination may be

25. Several ~tates already authorize a determination
of probable cause~ at this stage or immediately t~7reafter.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawa1.1. Rev.
Stat. § 708-9(5) (1968); Vt. Rules Crim. Proc. 3(b),
5(c) (1974). This Court has interpreted the Federal Rules

,]

incorporated into the procedure for setting bail or
fixing other conditions of pretrial release.

In some

states, existing procedures may satisfy the requirement

r

Several states

a determination of

probable cause at

following the suspect's

\\

I

first appearance.
&u~)·

See Colo.

ev. Stat. § 39-2-3 (1965

"f

~ G1:i!IT ·

Rule~

Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 7 8-9(5) (1968); Vt-

Proc. 3(b), 5(c) (1974 ) .
e

,

~u e •

•1

a-&-~

Others may_Js imp±y

I' .,. ..,r; lt

.I ....-: •

- their exi ting preliminary hearings.
/\.

)

,
Current

proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other ---ways of testing probable cause for

detention.~

Whatever

procedure a state may adopt, it must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition
27
.
. f.1cant pretr1a
. 1 restra1nt
.
f or any s1gn1
on 1"1b erty,\~/ an d

this determination must be made by a judicial officer
either before or promptly after arre st.
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1-s.._probable cause for detention. 1 M. Hale, Pleas ofi{he
Cro'\'n 585-586, 58n-590 (1736); 2 id., at 77-95; 2 W.
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-119 (4th ed. 1762); see
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-344 (1943);
Amsterdam. Perspectives on the Fourth Ame,ndment, 58
Minn. L. Rev. 349, :3~)1 & n. 408 ( 1974). Although the
Federal Rul€\s of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly
acknowledge this function of the first appearance, the
Court has interpreted them to require a determination of
probable cause at that stage. Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449, 454 (1957). 20
There is no single proper method for making the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The States have many different patterns of criminal procedure, and each may adapt its own to provide a
swift and reliable probable cause determination with the
least burden to its system. Like many jurisdictions,
In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, the
Sohcitor General suggest<'d that McNabb and Mallory had mistaken
the purpose of the first appearance, and that actual practice is otherwise. Cf. Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in WarrantlE:>ss ArrE:>sts, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1128 (1972). McNabb, of course,
was decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. It interpretE'd a statutory requirement that an arrested
person be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
318 U. 8., at 342. Mallory was decided after the federal rules were
adopted, and although the interpretation of the federal rules was
dictum, it clearly outlined the Court's view:
"The scheme for initiating a federal prosecution is plainly defined.
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on 'probable
cause.' The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested
person before a judicial oilicer as qmckly ll.S possible so that he may
be a.dvised of his rights and so that the is<me of probable cause may
be promptly determined." 354 U . S., at 454.
The nse of the word "cura1gn" was an error, as arraignment occurs.
later in the process. Fed Rule Crim. Proc. 10.
26

l
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Flori4ar reqmres every arrested person to be brought
before a magistrate within 24 hours, unless sooner
released. Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.310 (b). At that ,
appearance the defendant is told of the charges against
him, furnished a copy of the complaint, advised of his
1
constitutional rights, and provided counsel if he is indigent. The magistrate then sets bail or prescribes other
conditions of pretrial release. One of the factors typi- 1
cally relied upon in making this decision is the weight of
evidence against the accused. ABA Standards Relating
to the Administration Qf Criminal Justice, Pretrial
Release§ 5.1 (b) (1974); see 18 U.S. C.§ 3146 (b). Expanding that determination ~o encompass a test of prob0
able cause would be a natural: way of integrating the probable cause decision with exi'sting procedures.
/'In other States, exiyting procedures may satisfy the
requirement of the Fourth Amendment with only minor
adjustments. Som~ States already authorize a determinatioJJ of probable cause at or immediately following the suspect's first appearance. E. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-3
(1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt.
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). Others may choose
simply to accelerate their existing preliminary hearings.
What the Fourth Amendment requires for pretrial restraint on liberty 27 is a reliable determination of probable,
cause made either before or promptly after arrest, a}ld
Ipreferably no later than the first appearance before a ju
27 Because the probable cause determmation is not a constitutional
prerequisite t.o the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restramts on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for tnal. There are many kinds of pretrial release.........-and many degrees of conditi:mal hberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Prrtrial Release § 5.2 (1974) , Uniform Rules of Crimmal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1074). We cannot define spemfically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, bt~t the key {actor is significant Jt>.-:;traint on liberty.
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\ dicial officer. If made after arrest, the suspect must 1;'
given an opport~o be present and to be heard. Each 1
tate may choose_the proce_d];J-re that best accommodates\
his ®.tm>mtnation to its exiStmg practice. 28

,(_

IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion .

.l-.·

28

.-0.1·.·"¢o. ur.se,if .the···State Jncorp)¢'.ates the probable cause determi:'
()
nation mto a multipurpose hear1r(g, the necessity for appointed coun- _..-><..sel at the combined proceeding must be governed by the principles.
Qf United__$tat!}§ v, W(lde 4-rfd (/ol(1man v. Alabama, 13"Upra.
1
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The issue in this case is whether a person arresteq
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally en•
titled to a judicial determinAtion of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson wer~
arrested in Dade Countr, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses tinder a prosecutorjs information.1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re.:.
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,,500
bond.
1 Respondent Pugh waa anested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged
by informati~n on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicat~
''whetMr there was an arre~t warrant in either case.

.
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972). 2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an information. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), 3 and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more a.fter arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).4 As a result, a person charged
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, see Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970),
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a) , but that procedure is not challenged
in this case.
8 This statute may have been construed to make the hearing permissive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323
(I<1a. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967) . But cf.
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also
have been ;:;uperseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
crimmal procedure. In re Florida R~de& of Criminal Procedure,.
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) .
4 The Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable
<l'<tUS_e can b_c rai!le<l at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc . 3.160, but.
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by information could be detained for a substantial period
solely on the decision of a prosecutor,
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court, 5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicia.! hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. 6 Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of severa1 defendants. 8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed.
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraignment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8.
5 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
6
Respondents did not ask for release from state custody,. even as
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
also the only relief tht-tt the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S.
- ·, (1974) .
7 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges·
of soliciting a ride and possesswn of marihuana.
s The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts,. who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers:
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
-on~ who petitionefl for certiorarL
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 9 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed postarrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused
was unprepa.red.
If either requested more time, the
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing,' 1
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing'r
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnessesr
The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter-·
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ..
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,.
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hcarmg, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F . 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); ef. Perez v. Ledesma, 40:f
U. S.. 82 (197.1),; StefaneUi v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (19.51).
9
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript
made on request. If the magistmte found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
l~arning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
·new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of CriminalProcedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutional.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par•
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac•
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. I d., at 788-789.11
Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then embodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F,
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a distnct court of three judges was not
req•1ired for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza,.
Martinez,' 372 U.S. 144, 152-155 (19~3); Flemming v. Neator, 363
u.s. 603,606-608 (19~0).
11 The major differencl' between the District Court's order and
that of the Court of Appeals centered on the question whether a
probable cause hearing is required for alt arrested persons charged
by information or only for those confined pending trial. The District
Court's original decree required preliminary hearings for all arrested·
persons. 336 F. Supp., at 491. On remand, the District Court made
an exce:vtion for persons charged with misdemeanors who neithersufferp,d pretrial detention nor faced imprisonment upon conviction,
355 F. Supp., at 1290. The Court of Appeals explicitly limited the
'hearing right for misdemeanor defendants to those who are jaile~
pending trial. 483 F, 2d, at 789. Its opinion also suggests, withO\lt
10
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State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue. 12
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse, in part.
stating explicitly, that the hearing right is similarly limited to felony
defendants who are confined pending trial. Id., at 787, 789.
The Court of Appeals vacated those parts of the District Court's
order that prescribed time periods different from those in the
amended rules and imposed sanctiOns for failure to comply with the
hearing requirements. Ou;r disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to address the specific terms of the District Court's decree.
12 At oral argument counsel mformed us that the named respondents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,
D. S. (1975). Pretrial detrntion is by nature temporary,
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."
At the time the complaint was filr,d, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avoid mootness under Sosrw,. But this ease is a suitable exception
to that reqmrement. See Sosna, supra, at · - n. 11; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-116a (CA9 1972). The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal ot conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to
certify the class. Moreover, m th1s case the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can
tutfely assume that he ha& other dients with a continuing live interes~
\n t.h0 case,

,.
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II
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution,
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amend~
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176
( 1949). This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime.
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many sit uations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are ~ore or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly t01
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their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterpnse of ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohw, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 ( 1968) .13
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
13
We mteratrd this principle in Umted States v. United States
Distnct Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally

to arrestb, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment
dtrectivc'' as a reqmrement that "where practical, a governmental
;;e'arch and seizure should represent borh the effotts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the Judgment of the magi:stratc that the collected evidence ts sufficient to justify mvasion of a
citizen\.; private prerni>cs or convcr~atwn.'' ld., at 316 See also
Terry v. Ohio 392 U. S . 1,2G-22 (1968)
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would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible,
Beck v. Ohio, :mpra, at 96; Wong 8un v. United 8tates,
371 U. S. 471 , 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California,
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S.
307 (1959); Tr'upiano v. United 8tates, 334 U.S. 699, 705
(1948). 14
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-thescene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a. magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Ka.tz, Justice
Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in turn by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
14

The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a warrantless 'arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-·
481 (1971); id., a~ 510-.112 n. 1 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, ,199-500 (1958).

73-477-0PINION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

11

Is the Crime 51-62 ( 1972). Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig~
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3146
(a) ( 2) , ( 5). When the stakes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from un~
founded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter~
mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend~
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga~
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885). 15 The justice of the peace
15

The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one ~uspected
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry hun to the common gaol, ... but that is now
tarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace to
hr Pxammed, and farther prorPeded ag:nm8t as case shall r<:qmre . .. .
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case Rhnll require
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private

73-477-OPINION

12

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to deterJ
mine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883). ~
The initi?<l determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807); 17 Ex parte Burfordr
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
1

person t.o a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining."
1M. Hale, supra, at 589--590.
16 The examination .of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although
this mrthod of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen,
nt 219-225, it wa::; well e~tablished that the prisoner was entitled to bt·
discharged if the mvestigation turned up insufficient evidence of his
guilt !d., at 233.
11 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case·
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
.Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, followingarguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable causer.
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason_
The prisoners were discharged,
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for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U .S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). 18

B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. 19 Petitioner defends this practice on the
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause that fur-·
nishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273
18
See al~o N. Lasson, The History and DPvelopment of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937).
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a JUstice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
and detention of the thief. 2M. Hale, S'Upra, at 149-152; T. Taylor,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
seo Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
19 A prrHon arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
,ludJcial determmat10n of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim .
Proc. 3.120, a. warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the ;;;uspect has committed a crime. The
magio.trate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
k r;e~tsouablr ground: to bdl<>ve the complaint is true"
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U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.20 More recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 449'----453 (1971), the Court held that a
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States· v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 21 The reason
20 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). ' The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974) .
21 The Court had earlier reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision irr
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,.
19,4-198. (1957}. Even ii it were, the result reached in Ocampl)lo
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for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
that safeguards must b~ provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S.
541, 545 ( 1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, an<l

Shad;wick,
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that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393
F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C.-, 442 F . 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
-U.S. App. D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards--counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing:
assumes increased importance and the procedures become
:more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly-
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after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre~
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest. 22 That standard-probable cause to
believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court
has approved these informal modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case 'must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
erystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
22 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can
be made.
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were,
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 35!

u..s. 449, 456 (1957)'.
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practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 ( 1967).
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only
by the lesser conseque11ces of a probable cause deter.
mination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64109 (1969). 23 This is not to say that confrontation and
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of
23 In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagru:Jn v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-

tioner a.rrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code·
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows
or it is obvioue that the charges are not supported by probable
cause") ; ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Crim-·
ina! Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); Amer-·
ican College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c)
(1972) ..
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probable cause determinations in some cases. In most
cases,-however, their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause. 24
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First,
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not\
present the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in HI ade and Coleman. Second, Ala24 Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases
and the comp!Pxlties of our ~ystem. The processing of misdemeanors,
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked
by delays that can senously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional dor-trine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay.
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bama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring
of preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply when the prosecution is not required
to produce witnesses for cross-examination.
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not
requirE' an adversary determination of probable cause, we
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure,
and the nature of the probable cause determination
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial
procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our holding to. the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable,
for example, to make the probable cause determination at
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer/~
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344
( 1943), or the determination may be incorporated in to
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of their existing preliminary hearings. Current
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other
Several State::J already authorize a determination of probable
cause at th1s stage or immediately thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.) ; Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt.
Hules Crirn. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States,
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory V· United States, 354 U. S. 449),
454 (1957).
20
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ways of testing probable cause for detention. 26 WhateveP )
procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition
for any signifieant pretrial restraint on liberty,Z 7 and this

I

za Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled,
!'without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance befo~e a magistrate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest
warrant. The determination may be made on afEdavits or testimony,
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay
evidence may be considered. Rule 344.
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent. \
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. SA, 1973) also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The state)s submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
~ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
27 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
'prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for thosesuspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
'that they appear for ttial. There are many kinds of pretrial relea~
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determination must be made by a judicial officer either
before or promptly after arrest.

IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,.
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974) ; Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974) . We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significl;Ult restraint on liberty.
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether there was an arrest warrant in either case.
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu•
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960). At the time r~spondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases,
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the·
Florida courts had held that the· filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing,
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972) .2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an information. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for obtah1ing a judicial determination of probable cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 907.045 (1973), 3 and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more after a.rrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).4 As a result, a person charged
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, ~:~ee Sangar-ee v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla . 19i0);
Fla. Rule Crim. Pro c. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged
in this case. See n. 19, post, at 14.
8 Thie statute may have been construed to make the hearing permissive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967) . But cf.
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,.
272 So. 2d 55 (1972) .
4 The Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable·
<CJJ.'I,l.&e ca:n be raised at arraignment, F1,1a. :Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, hut
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by information could be detained for a substantial period
solely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court, 5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. 0 Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed.
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraignment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8.
5 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
0 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the dass
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S.
- , - (1974).
1 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana.
8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
ooe who petitioned for certiorari.
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 9 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in ~11 cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post·
arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appea.rance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either t,he prosecutor or the a.ccused
was unprepared.
If either requested more time, the
magistrate would set the date for a 11 preliminary hearing,''
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing"
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial ' detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte~
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U. S. 82 {1971); Stefanelli v. Minar:d, 342 U. S. 117 (1.951).
9
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b). Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
a. judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.
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Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutionaP0 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac·
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. I d., at 788-789.
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue. 11
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
1286.

10

Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then embodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F.
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza,.
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963}; Flemming v. Nestor, 363
u.s. 603,606-608 (1960).
11 At oral argument counsrl informed us that the named respond.
ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,
U. S. (1975). Pretrial detE'ntion is by nature temporary,
~nd it is most unlikely that any given individual could have h)$
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II
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burconstitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at - - n. 11; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be €0ded
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can
flafely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case,

73-477-0PINION

8

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 ( 1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com..
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime.
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.

To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded mvasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
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appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 1 2
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible,
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California,
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S.
307 (1959); 'l'rupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705
(1948).13
12 We rE>iterated this principle in United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) . In terms that apply equally

to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
citizen's private premises or conversation." /d ., at 316. See also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
u Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v.
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-thescene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifi...
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice
Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3146
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish me!'Lllingful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
:Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), whjch was overruled in turn by
Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969).
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most controversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
cjrcumstances an officer may ,enter a suspect's home to make a warrantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (W;arTE, J., dissenting); Jones y.
lJ1;1titerJ States, 351 U. S. 493, 499- 500 (1958),
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obliga- '
tory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885). 14 The justice of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883). 15
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing a!! offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
wmmitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now
rarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace to
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the
eounty where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimu$ for his warrant of detaining."
1 M. Hale, supra. at 589-590.
15 The examination of the pri~oner wa~ inqui>utorial, and the
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although
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The initial determination of pr6bable cause also could b~
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll~
rnan, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807) ; 16 Ex parte Burford,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of RigMs regarded it as a model
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S.307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAs,J.,concurring).17
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen,
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of his
guilt. !d., at 233.
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
th~ Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason,
The prisoners were discha1·ged.
17 See al~o N. Lasson , The History and Development of the·
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937) .
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was re,quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
,of probable cause that his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
·and the alleged thief would appear ·before the justice of the peacefor a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
:and detention of the thief. 2 M. Ha:lel supra, at 149-152; T. Taylor.,
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Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. 18 Petitioner defends this practice on the
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273
U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.10 More recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
18 A person arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true.
10 By contrast, the> Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
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403 U. S. 443, 449'--453 ( 1971), the Court held that a
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972).~ The reason
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974).
to The Court had earh<'r reachrd a differPnt rc~ult in Ocampo v
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and

Shadwick.
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that safeguards must be provided against the dan·
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S.
541, 545 ( 1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 39:-3
F. 2d 6 (CAS 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Caoley v. Stone,
U. S. App. D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).
-

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing
assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more comple'X, the likelihood that it can be held promptly
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest. 21 That standard-probable cause to
Because the standards nre identical, ordinnrily there is no ueed
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can
be made.
,
1
'Presumably, whomever the police ar:rest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were.
21
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court
has approved these informal modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict·
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecuat large and to use an inte1 rogating process at police h~adquarters
in order to determine whorn they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354
449J 456 (1957).

u.s.
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tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64109 (1969). 22 This is not to say that confrontation and
,cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of
probable cause determinations in some cases. In most
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of .erobable _,efause. 23
Because of its limited function and its' nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
In Morrissey v. B1"ewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba22

tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786, That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U.S., at 485; 411 U.S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows
or it is obviou11 that the charges are not supported by probablt>
cause") ; ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c)
(1972).
2 :; Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases
and the complexities of our ~ystem. The processing of misdemeanors,
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay.
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First,
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability
to assiet in preparation of his defense, but this does not
present the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Alabama allo·wed the suspect to confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply when the prosecution is not required
to produce witnesses for cross-examination.
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure,
and the nature of the probable cause determination
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial
procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our hold ..
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable,
for example, to make the probable cause determination at
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer, 2 ·i
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344
(1943), or the determination may be incorporated into
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as accelCurrent
eration of existing preliminary hearings.
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other
ways of testing probable cause for detention. 2 ~ Whatever
24

Several States already authorize a determination of probable
cause at this stage or irnmediatdy thereafter. See Colo. Rev . Stat.
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hnwaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt.
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States,
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,
454 (1957).
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed
Final Draft 1974), a. person arrested without a warrant is entitled,
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arreBt
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or te~tJmony,
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release arc offered another
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hearmg, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay
evidence may be comotidered. Rule 344.
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be support~d
by a reasonably detailed wntten statement of facts. § 310. The
magistrate may make a determinat10n of probable cause to hold the
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty/ 6 and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either
before or prompt1y after arrest. 27
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accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present addi-·
tional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
26
BecauHe the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define specifically those that would require a 'prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
r--::--2_7 . .::,1::.:,n_h::.:ii:i concurring opinion, post, at - - n. --, MR. JusTICE
S'I'}]WART suggests that the Court offers less procedural protection
to a person in jaj] than it requires in certain civil cases. Here we
deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case nnd a threshold
right [;Uaranteed by the Fourth Ammdment. The historical basis
of the probable cause requirement is quite different from the rela-·
tively recent application of variable procedural due process m debtor.
creditor dispute~ and termination of government-created benefits.
The Fo11rth Amendme~.tt ~was tailored exp!Jcitly for the criminal
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IV
Wr ngrrr with tlw Court of Apprnls that thr Fourth
Amendment requ1res a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JU~:>hce ~~·~tern,

and ito balance bPtwecn individual and pubhc intPre~tP
ha,.; bem thonght to defiur thP ''proceS8 that i~ due" for
>'<'JZUn's of pert<on or pro]wrty in criminal ca~r,.,. :\lon·over, tlH'
Fourth -\mPndmC'nt probablr cnu~c detPrmination IS 111 fact only the
first stagP of an elaborate ~y,tem, unique in JUrisprudencr, de~igned
to safe ·uard the right,: of those act·uscd of criminal ·onduct. Tlw
relHtivel~ t<impl Civil procedures (e. (]., prior mterview with ochool
]Jrmc1pal bt>forl' ~u~:>pen::;ion) prpscntrd m the cases c1trd in the con
currmg opnuon arr mapposite and irrelevant in tht wholh d1ffcrrnt.
<;QntPxf of the rrimiun 1 iustJce ~ystem..
alway~

~ rlt would not be practicable to follow the further
~ ~uggestion implicit in Mr. Justic e Stewart's concurring
opinion that we leave for another day determination of
the procedural safeguards that are required in making
a probable cause determination under the Fourth
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares
the right not to be _. detained without a probable
cause determination and affirms the District Court's
order prescribing an adversary hearing for the
implementation of that right. The circumstances of
the case thus require a decision on both issues.

I

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Ju~~ ice Dougla s
Mr. Juct'cu Bre ~n an
Mr. J-l1~~: t ·Lee :~: :;r-m·:.rt
Mr. tJr;~3J~..-L.n . 3 V~/~11t 1 :1
M'r. t"T, :.:; ··.: "l <:. :; L ·:.1 :3.~J:-.~ ll
tLr-. J L.,.. J·L or~ . -~_ .... '-. ~-·! .. :m·;·J1

4.th DRAFT

Nr.

Juo~lOG

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S'lb\IJFBPn·IF,P...T •
No. 73-477
Richard E. Gerstein, State Attorney for Eleventh Judicial On Writ of Certiorari
Circuit of Florida,
to the United States
Petitioner,
Court of Appeals for
v.
the Fifth Circuit.
Robert Pugh et al.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's infm·mation is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him ca.rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond,
1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.
On March 16an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged
by infot·matio:a on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether there was lln ane&t warrant in either case ..
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu•
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all othel'
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a ); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968) ; Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960) . At the time respondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972). 2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an informa....
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951) . The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of prohable cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973),S and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971 ).• As a result, a person charged
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, see Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970) ;
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged
in this case. See n. 19, post, at 14.
{
8 This statute may haYe been construed t o make t he hearing per·
missive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067- 29 ( 1967 ). But cf.
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (F1a. Ct . App. 1971). It may also
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rule& of Criminal Procedure,
272 So. 2d 65 (1972).
• T he Florida rules do not suggest that the issue of probable
.cause can be raised at arraignment, F1a. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but
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by information could be detained for a substantial period
!olely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court,u claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. 6 Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear~
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed.
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraignment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8.
6 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U.S.
- , - (1974).
1 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana.
8 The named defendants included justict>,s of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
bearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officer~
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
.om~ who petitioned for certiorari.
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), and held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a JUdicial hearing on the ques..
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 9 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused
If either requested more time, the
was unprepared.
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing,"
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing"
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
9 The District Court correctly held that rei:ipondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v.!Iarris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearmg, an is~ue that could not be r'lised in defensr of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearmgs could not
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Monte,..
muro, 477 F. 2d 1073 lOE\2 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 40'
U S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v Minard, 342 U. S 111 (1951),
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript
made on req uest. If the magistrate found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own, Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the Di-strict Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.181 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
In a suppiemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
~judicial detertnination of probable cause. 355 F. Supp.

I
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of thls practice was uncon..
stitutional,lQ The Court of Appeafs affirmed, 483 F. 2d
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par..
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear•
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac•
ceptable, as long as it was provideq to all defendants in
custody pending trial. !d., at 788-789.
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.11
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
tQ Although this ruling held a statewide 'flegislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any ~tate statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the prrctice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then embodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial mjunction, and the Coui't of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were uneonstitutionat; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; an!f the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent w1th the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F,
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1903); l~'lemming v. Nestor, 363
u.s. 603,605---608 (1960).
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respondents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore hM
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a rlas,; represent!'.tive's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnanwd members of the class. See Sosna v. lowa,
..- U. S (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary,
.and it is most unlikely that any gjven indivi4ual could bave h~

I
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As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendm
ment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burconstitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
in Short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
.review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cau~e determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at n. 11; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. Zd 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
wo4ld be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to
cert.ify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of
a cl~ss of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can
safely assume that. he haflj other clients with a continuing live iRterel!$
in the case.
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for
a.rrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91
(1964) . See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175---176
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz~
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime.
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. ·The rule of probable cause is a prac~ical, nontechnical conception
affording the best c01npromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unquly hamper law enforcelnent. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Btinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutra1 and detached magistrate whenever possible, The classic statement of this principle
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appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferepces be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 12
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible,
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at .96; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U. S. 471, 479'-482 ( 1963), it has never invalidated
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California,
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S.
307 (1959); 1'rupiano v. United Stq,tes, 334 U.S. 699, 705
(1948), 13
l 2 We reiterated this principle in United State$ v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) . In terms that apply equally

to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
citizen's private premises or conversation." !d., at 316. See also
Terry v .. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
1a Another (lSl)ect of Trupiano waK overruled in United States v.
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the..
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justin•
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit fu~ther
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis..
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference o~ce.sioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom !32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice
Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U, S. C. § 3146
(a) (2), (5) . When the stakes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnieh meaningful protection from un ...
founded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a. prerequisite to extended
restramt on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
Rabinowitz, 33() U, S. 56 (1950), which WaJ! overruled in turn by
Chimel v. Coltforr:w, 305 U.S. 752 (1969) .
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con•
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
cjrcumstance3 an offic:?r may enter a suspect's home to make a warrantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (W~ITE, J., dissenting); Jone8 ¥.
United States~ 357 U S, 493, 499-·500 (1958}"
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v, United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).H The justice of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).u
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to ha.ve
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now
rarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace to
be examined, and farther pror:eeded against as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimus for his warrant of detaining."
1M. Hale, supra, at 589--590.
10 The examination of the prisoner was inq\tisitorial, and the
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Although

..
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The initi!tl determination or probable cause also could b~
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75 ( 1807) ; 16 Ex parte Burford,
7 U.S. (3 Cra.nch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
for a (/reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307,317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., concurring).17
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen,
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of hiff
guilt. !d., at 233.
16 In Ex pm·te Bollrnan, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case
were committed following an e,.;aminatlon in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia, They tiled a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
·Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment .requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason,
The prisoners were discharged.
"1 7 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937).
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason.able" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a justice of th\l peace and make an oath
of probuble cause thafhis goods could be found in a particular place.
,After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
and detention of the thief. 2M. Hale, supra, at 14~-152; T . Taylor~
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B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. ~ Petitioner defends this practice on the
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an informa-.
tion is itself a determination of probable cause that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution .affords a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273
U.S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.10 More recently, in Coolidge v. 'A·ew Hampshire,
1

Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
18 A per::;on arrested under a wanant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issuro upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony undet oath to determine if there
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true.
19 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requirea
i~uance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parie
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403 U. S. 443, 449-453 (1971), the Court held that a
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon..
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral a.nd de·
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of Ta'mpa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States
Di.r;trict Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (19·72). 210 The reason
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher..
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974) .
20
The Court had earlier reached a d1fferrnt result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that mterpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip.,
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal ConstitutiOn, Green v. Ur~ited States, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957) . Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, .anc;l

.Bhadwtek.
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that safeguards must be provided against the dan•
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
proc~ss of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943).
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v. W a..<:hington, 360 U. S.
541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
--U.S. App D. C.-, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the oetermination of probable cause must be
accQinpanied by the full panoply of adversary safe-
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary'
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing
assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more complex, the likelihood that it ca,n be held promptly
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue ie whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with ..
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest.21 That standard-probable cause to
21 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need
:for further investigation before the probable cause determination can
be made.
~'Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must aTrest on 'prob~ble ca1,\se.' It is not the function of the police to arrest, as it we:r~
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court
has approved these informal modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-P5 (1949).
Cf. McCray v.Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
The use of an informal procedure is ju~tified not only
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determihation
itself. It does not require the tine resolution of conflict.
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidenee supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu..
at large and to use an interrog-ating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause!" Mallory v. United States, 35.£
(J, 449~ 456 (1957).

s.
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First,
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not
present the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This considera..tion does not apply when the prosecution is not required
to produce witnesses for croSfil-examination.
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure,
and the nature of the probable cause determination
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial
procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our hold..
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend·
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable,
for example, to make the probable cause determination at
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer, 24
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344
( 1943), or the determination may be incorporated in to
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Others ma:y require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing preliminary hea.rings. Current
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other
ways of testing probable cause for detention. 25 Whatever
24

Several States already authorize a determination of probable
cause at this stage or immediately thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt.
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States,
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449,
454 (1957).
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled,
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony,
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay
evidence may be considered. Rule 344.
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft N(). 5A, 1973) also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. Th~
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold tb.~
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty,Z 6 and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either
before or promptly after arrest. 27
accused, but he is not required to rio so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
26 Because the probable cause dete\ffiination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
27 In his concurring opinion, post, at n. - , MR. Jus1'ICE
STEWART objects to the Court!s choice of the Fourth Amendment as
the rationale for decision and suggests that the Court offers less procecj.ural protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil
cases. Here we deal with the complex procedures of a. criminal case
and a threshold right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The
historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different
from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due
process in debtor-creditor disputeR and te'rmination of government-
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IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

created benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for
the criminal justice system, and its balance betwren individual and
public interests always has been thought to define the "process that
is dur" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact
only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence,
designed to saJeguard the rights of those accusrd of criminal conduct.
The relatively simple civil procedures (e. g., prior interview with
school principal before suspension) presented in the cases cited in
the concurrmg opmion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly
different context of the criminal justice system.
It would not bt> practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit
in MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion that we leave for
another day determination of the procedural safeguards that are
reqmred in making a probable cause determination under the Fourth
Amendment. The judgment undf>f review both declares the right
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and
affirms the District Court's order prE'Scribing an adversary hearing
for the implementation of that right. The circumstances of the
case thus reqmre a dPcision on both if'..'>nes
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty,
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him ca.rried a potential life sentence, and Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond,

a

1 Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971.
On March 1&
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrel:lted on March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether there was an arrest warrant m either case ..
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu•
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968) ; Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960) . At the time respondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972) .2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an inform~V
tion. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of prohable cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973) ,a and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla.1971)! As a result, a person charged
2 Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, see .Sa11{Jaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970) ;
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged
in this case See n. 19, post, at 14.
8 This statute may have been construed to make the hearing permissive inst<''l.d of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf.
Karz v. Overton, 2'19 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971) . It may also
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rt.de1 of Criminal Procedure,
272 So. 2d 65 (1972) .
4 The Flonda rules do not suggest that the issue of probable
.cansc can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but
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by information could be detained for a substantial period
t!olely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court, 5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. 6 Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
interven~d.
Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hear.
ings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed.
7

counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraign~
ment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974,. at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deci4ing, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8.
~The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cauee determination. This was
also the only relief tha.t tbe District Court ordered for the named
respol'.dents. 332 F. Supp., at U15-1116. Because release was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. M~Donnell, 417 U. S.
- , - (1974) .
1 Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March ll, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on charges
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana.
8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
bearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officer~
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein wa& th~ onl~
m\C who petitioned. for eertiorari.
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Rule Civ. Proc. 20 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and
.Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques..
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 9 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed postarrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing,"
to be held within four days if the accused was in cust,ody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hear~
ings at prescribed times. At the 11 preliminary hearing"
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
9

The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directNI at the state prosecutions as such,
~mt only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearmg, an 1ssue that could not be tmsrd m defenRC of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
tJrejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. M ant.!~
mttro, 477 F'. 2d 107:{ 1082 (CA3 1973), cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 40'
U.S, 82 (1971) i Stefand1t v. Minaul, 3·i2 U, S. 117 (1951),
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript
tnade on request If the magistrate found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
hot be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the Di-strict Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This 11 first appearance" is
similar to the 11 first appearance hearing" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3131; see In re Rule 3.131 (b), Florida Rules of Crimin,al Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
In a suppiemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant eharged by information still could be detained pending trial without
t\ judicial determination of prQbable cause. 355 F. Sup}!).
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court

declared that the continuation of tflls practice w~s uncon•
stitutionaP0 The Court of Appe~fs affirme~, 483 F·. 2d
778, modifying the District ,Coqrt'$ decree iq minor par"
ticulars and suggesting that the fpl"m of prelirpinary hear•
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be ac•
ceptable, as long as it was provide4 ~o all defendants in
custody pending trial. !d., 1\t 788-'789.
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.11
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and r~verse· in part.
10 Although this ruling held a statewide '!legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did ~ot ask for
an injunction against enforcement of a~y ~tate statutf;) or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the prfctice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by mformation' 'was then
bodied only in judicial decisions. The Distr~ct Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction; and the Co~rt of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into que~tion for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F,
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1903); Flemming v. Neltor, 363
u.s. 603,605--608 (1960).
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respopd,.
~nts have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,
,.._. U. S. (19'75) . Pret rial detention is by nature temporary,
.and it is most unlikely that any gjven indivjt;lual could have h~

em-
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II
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution.
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex pa,rte Bur·
constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The elaim,
in ~hort, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cau~e determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at n. 11; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at l).ny time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
would be in pretrial custody lonv enough for a district judge to
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of
a elass of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can
safely assume that, he has other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case.

i

i
I

I
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, ;379 U. S. 89, 91
(1964) . See also Henry v. United State8, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty an9 the State's duty to control crime,
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To Implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neuttal and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
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appears in Johnson v, United States, 333 U.S, 10, 13-14
(1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that thoseinferences be
drawn by a neutral and detacl).eq magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferretin'g out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 12
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review' of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, whil~ the Court has expressed a
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible,
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated
an arrest supported by probable cause solely- because the
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California,
374 lJ. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S,
307 (1959); 7'rupiano v. United States, 334 U, S. 699, 705
(1948). 13
l 2 We reiterated this principle .in United States v. United States
Di.strict Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972) . In terms th11>t apply equally

to arrests, we de$cribed the 1'very heart of the Fourth Amendment
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
citizen's private premises or conversation." ld., at 316. See also
Ter ry V" Ohio, 392' U.S. 11 20-22 (1968) .
:~a Another 8Sl)ect of Trupiano was overrt\led in United Sto;te8 v.

iO
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the..
scene assessment of proba..ble cause provide$ legal justin•
cation for arresting a pereon suspected of crime, and for
a brief period of detention to take the
administrative steps
I
•
incident to arrest. Once the suspect i~ in custody, how~
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit fu~thel'
crimes while the police submit ' their evidence to a magis..
trate. And, wllile the State's reasons for taking spmmary
.action subside, the s1,1spect's need fo~ a neutral determination of probable cause ipcreMes significantly. The con~
sequences of prolonged detention may be mpre serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impa..ir his family relationships.
See R . Goldfarb, Ransom !32-91 (196[)); L. Katz, Justice.
Is the Crime 51- 62 ( 1972) . Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions tha~ effect a sig..
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., lS U, S. C. § 3146
(a) (2) , (5). When the st akes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from un..
founded int erference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a. prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which W3/! ove.rruled in turn by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1009).
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con.
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
circumstances an offi,cer may enter a suspect's home to make a war·
rantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 474-:-481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (W,a:ITE, J., qissenting); Jones y.
U'IJ,ited States~ 357 U. S. 49il%499...:500 (1958).
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th&t has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v, United States, 267 p, S. 132, 149
(1925). At common law 1t was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. ~ale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W.lfawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116-117 (4thed.1792). See ;alsoKurtzv.Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885).a The justipe of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect wpuld
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119'; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of Englanq 233 (1883) .u
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mzttimm, waa required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person bath arr61!ted a felon, or one suspected
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with lUI much l!lpeed 1\8 conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry him to ihe common gaol, ... but that is now
rarely dcne.
"2. He may deliver hirn to the constable of the vill, who may either
carry him to the commot• p;aol, . . , or to a justice of peace to
be examined, and farther proceeded ngainst as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the
county where he is taken, who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, as the case shall requtre.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usuat and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimtt~ for his warrant of detaining."
1 M. Hal~. supra, :\t 589-590.
u The examination of the prisouer was inquisitorial, and the;
witnesses were questio ed outside thl" prisoner's pre8ellcc. Although

GE~'l'EIN

v. PUGH

The initi~l determination of probable cause also could b~
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, 't 112-1\5; ~ J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte BollrJUtn, 8 U. S. ( 4 Cranch) 75, 97101 (1807), This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see :Ex parte Boll·
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 16 Ex parte Burford,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,
3 U, S. (3 Dall.) 17 ( 1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
for a "reasonable" seizure. ,See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S.307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAB,J.,concurring).17
this method of proceeding was considered quitfl har!lh, 1 J. Stephen,
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of hi!>
guilt. ld., at 233,
'
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case
were committed following an examination in the cirouit court of
the District of Columbia, They filed a petition for writ of habeas:
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, In an opinion by Chief
·Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason,
The prisoners were discharged.
17 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937) .
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment . The victim was re·
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that'his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, a.nd the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before tl1e justice of the peace
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
£J.nd detention of the thief. 2 :M, HalfJ 1 supra, at 141}....15Z i T. Taylor.•
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Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for ~ probable cause
determination. 18 Petitioner defends tpis practice on the
ground that the prosecutor'IS decision to file an informa-.
tion is itself a determinatiop of prob~ble cause that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decblion tl)at the evidence warrants prosecution :affords ·a :me8$qre of protection against unfounded detention, ~e dp not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the require·
ments of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions .compel disapprqval of the
Florida procedure, In Albrecht v. Unitf3d Stq,tes, 273
U. S. 1, 5 ( 1927), the C!)q.rt held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's infor111ation
was invalid' because the accqmpa,nying affidavits were dec
fective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conplusion w~s hnplicit in the J~dg
ment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.19 More recently, in C~olidge v. New Hampshire,
l

.

I

Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
1 8 A per~on arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable ca:use. Under Fla,. Rule Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint 'that
state.CJ facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony undet oath to determine if there
is reasonable ground to believe the complaint Is true. ·
10 By contrast , the Court has held that an iudictment, 11 fair upon
its face ," and returned by a 11properly constituted grand jury" cons
elusively determines the existence of probal>le cause an4 requires
i~~Suauco of an a,rrest warrax\t without further inquiry. E:e parte
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403 U. S. 443, 449-453 (1971), the Court held that a
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon..
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de..
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shad..
wick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States
Di.crtrict Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (19-72). 20 The reason
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in i.racking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cher..
ished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magist,rate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974).
20
The Court had earlier rPached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
.32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warr<:mt could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's informatioo. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip..
pmes is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision iJJ
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957). Even If it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later hold ings of Al()recht, Coolidge, a..n4
Shadwick.
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that safeguards must be provideq against the dan..
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various p&.rticipants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943) .
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is en~
titled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court'('! prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S.
541, 5t5 ( 1962) ; Lem W oon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952) ;
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968) , with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
-U.S. App. D. C.-, 414 F . 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accQinpanied by the fuU p.~noply of ~dversa.ry safE?
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full · preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeleq after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S,
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. I~rael, Modern
Crimipal Procedure 957-!')67, 996-1000 (4th ed, 1974),
The standard Qf proof requjred of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," butin some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The iJnportance of
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alaba711a, w,pra. And, as the hearing
assumes increased importance &nd the procedures become
more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Pre..
arraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with...
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest.21 That stand~trd-proqable cause to
21 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can
be made,
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on 'prob..
~iblt;~ caQ.se.' It is t\Ot the functiot\ of the police to arrest, .as it we.r~
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believe the suspect has committed a crii~e~trarlitionally
haa been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court
has approved these infor~al modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in fhe common-law tradition,
to aome extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence co:p.sistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property,
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities,
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and 'prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordlngly correla..
tive to what must be proved." Brinega,r v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).
'
Cf. McCray v.Illinois, 386 U.S, 300 (1967),
The use of an informal pro~~dure is justified not only
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determihation
itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflict...
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup..
ports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu..
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.' " Mallory ·V. United States, 35•
449 ~ 456 (1957).

\)', s,
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tion: The Decision ~o Charge a Suspect with a Cri~e 64109 (1969). 22 This is not tq ~y that confrontatiop and
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of
probable cause determinations jn some cases. In most
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these
formalities and safe~uard11 desigped for trial must also be
employed in making the Foufth Amendment determination of probable cause.23
Because of its limited function and its nonadvereary
character, the proqable cau~e petermination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and GQ{Jnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba~
22

tioner arrested prior to revocatioJt is entit~ed to an informal pr~
liminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U.S., at 487; 411 U. 8., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Mqreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, wher~ violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is satisfied of vrobable cause. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c)
(1972).
23 Criminal jlliltice is already overburdened by the volume of caee:s
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors,
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay,
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing wa~ a critical stage of an Ala.barna prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause deter~
mination required by the Fourth Amendment. First,
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hear~
ing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure·, pretrial
custody may affect to some e:x;tent the defendant's ability
to assist in preparation of hi~ defense, but this does not
present the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring
or preserving the witness~s' testimony. This considera,.o
tion does not apply when the :prosecution is not required
t,o produce witnesses for cross-examination"
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we
recognize that sta.te systems of criminal procedure vary
widely. There is 'no single preferred pretrial procedure,
and the nature of the probable cause determinatiofi
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial
procedure viewed 8iS ~ whole. While we limit our hold...
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend..
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. 'It may be found desirable,
for example, to make the probable cause determination at
the suspect's first, appearance before a judicial officer, 24
see McNabb v. United State~, 318 U. S. 332, 342~344
( 1943)' or the determination may be incorporated into
the procedure for setting bajl or fixing other conditions
of pretrial release. In some 'states, existing procedures
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing preliminary hea.rings. Current
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other
ways of testing probable cause for detention. ~ Whatever
2

24

Several States already authorize a detertnination of probable
cause at this stage or rrn'mediately. thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt.
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination
of probable cause at the first appearanGe. Jaben v. United States,
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449,
454 (1957).
2
~ Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed
'Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled,
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony,
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons ' who remain in
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial re1ease are offered another
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary
hearing, and the partie~ may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay
evidence may be considered. Rule 344.
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft N~. 5A, 1973) a1so provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. Tile
magistrate may make a determination of probable c.ause to hold th~
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition
for any significant pretrial restraint on Uberty, 26 and this
determination mud be made by a judicial officer either
before or promptly after arrest.~ 7
accused, but he is not required to tio so and t4e acct1-sed may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At tpat session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may ' present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has col!lmitted the crime of
which he is accus¢. The state's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses sha~ be r~uired to 1\P:Pear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a l:)asis for believing that the appearana~ of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
26
l3ecause the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restrainte on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There are many ldnds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft ~974). We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
21
In his concurring opinion, os at - · ~1. -MR. Jus'l'IC
STEWAR'l' objects to the Court.'s choice of the Fourth Amendment as
the rationale for decision and suggest~ that the C01~rt offers Jess prorequral protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil
cases. Here we deal with the COlJtP!ex procedures of a. criminal case
and a threshold :right guaranteed 'by the Fourth Amendment. 'Fheo
hir.;torical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different
from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due
process in debtor-creditor disput<>s cmd temlirnttiq~ bf government~

....
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IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

created benefits. The Fourth Amendment waE> tailored explicitly for
the criminal justice system, and its balance between indivjdual and
public interests always has beep thought to define the "process that
is due" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases_, ,(Moreover, the Fourth Aml)ndment probable cause determination is in fact
only the first stage of an elaborfl,te system, unique in jurisprudence,
designrd to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct.
The relatively simple c1vil procedures (e. (]., prior interview with
:>chool principal before suspension) presented in the cases cited in
the concurrin~S opinion are inapposlt(' and irrelevant in the wholly
different context of the cnminal jm>tice system.
It would not be practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit
in Mn. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion that we leave for
another day determination of the proredural safeguards that are
reqmred in making a probil bl e cause deterrnina tion under the Fourth
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares the right
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and
affirms the District Court's order prt'l'lcribing an adversary hearing
for the Implementation of that right. The circumstances of the
case thus reqmre a deciswn on both lP.'>UPS.
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The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty,
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosec\Jtor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges aga.inst
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond,
Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16
an. information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a copcealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during com~nission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and assault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether there was an arrest warrant in either case.
1
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In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu"
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972).2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exc':lptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an information. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), 8 and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971)! As a result, a person charged
F1orida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, see Sangaree v. HamUn, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla.1970);
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged
in this case See n. 19, post, at 14.
8 This statute may have been construed to make the hearing per..
missive instead of mandatory. See Evans v. State, 197 So. 2d 323
(F1a. Ct. App. 1967) ; Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 067-29 (1967). But cf,
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). It may also
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
criminal procedure. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
272 So. 2d 65 (1972).
• The Florida rules .do not suggest that the issue of probabl-~
cause can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. P:roc. 3.160, ibl;lt
2
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by information could be detained for a substantial period
solely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court, 5 claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearw
ing on the issue of probable cause a..nd requesting declaratory and injunctjve relief. 6 Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened. 7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants.8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
The court certified the case as it class action under Fed.
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraignment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8.
6 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was baGed on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3).
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
also the only relief that the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because release was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the class
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U. S.
- , - (1974).
'~ Turner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrested on March 19 on chargeS'
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana.
8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges
of small-claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
hearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officer$
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
Q~f) who petitioned for certiorari,
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2), and held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the ques·
tion of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 9 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed postarrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the
magistrate would set the date for a upreliminary hearing,"
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearings at prescribed times. At the upreliminary hearing"
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
9

The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. M vntemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82 (1971); StefaneUi v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951),

7~
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to summon favorable witnesse~, and to have a transcript
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is
similar to the "first appearance hearing" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the· magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.131 (b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
tl. judicial determination of probable cause. 355 F, Sup}'.

T

13-477--0PINION
GERSTEIN v, PUGH

1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was uncon•
stitutional."0 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par•
ticulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hear..
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would pe ac..
ceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. ld., at 788-789.
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.n
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse, in part.
" 0 Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged b~r information was then embodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were unconstitutional; the injunctive decree was never
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F,
2d, at 788-790, Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not
required for the issuance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoza,.
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
u.s. 603, 606-608 (1960) .
11 At oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond ..
.ents have been convicted. Their pretrial detention therefore has
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnamed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,
U. S. (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary,
:and it is most unlikely that any gjven individual could have h~
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II
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution,
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burconstitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that oti1er persons similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at n. 11; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F . 2d 1159, 1162-1163 (CA9 1972). The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a. guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction ~tfter trial. It is
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of
a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can
safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live int~rcat
in the caee.

...

73-477--0PINION

8

GERSTEIN v. PUGH

ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91
(1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz·
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime,
"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and. from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection,
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
· Court has required that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle
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appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
{1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro~
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 12
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring R magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible,
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U. S. 471, 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California,
374 U. S. 23 ( 1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S.
307 (1959); 1'rupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705
(1948).13
We reiterated this principle in United States v. United States
District Court, 40i U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally
12

to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental
search and seizure should represent. both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
citizen's private premises or conversation." /d., at 316. See also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
ta Another tlSpect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v.

10
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-a
scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifl·
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how•
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis·
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary
.action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice
Is the Crime 51-62 ( 1972). Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U, S. C. § 3146
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty, Accordingly, we hold
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial deter..
mination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which wa, overruled in turn by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) .
The issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con~
troversy, and which remains unsett1e4, is whether and under what
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war..
rantless arrest. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-.
481 (1971); id., at 510-512 n. 1 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Jones v.
United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499-500 (1958).
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amend•
ment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U. 8.487, 498-499 (1885). 14 The justice of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883).15
14 The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that 11 judicial warrant of
commitment, called a. mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of felony, he :tnay detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with a!! much epeed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now
rarely done.
"2. He may deliver him to the constable of the vill, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace tQ
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of peace of the
county where he is taken; who upon examination may discharge, bail,
or commit him, a~ the ease shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimm for his warrant of detaining."
1 M. Hale, supra, at 589-590.
u The examination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and tbt
witness~ were questioned outsicle the prisoner's presence. Although

I
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'the initi!tl determination of probable cause also could b~
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97101 ( 1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Boll·
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 16 Ex parte Burford,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., concurring).H

I.

this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen,
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of his
guilt. Id., at 233.
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case
were committed following an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court, The Court, In an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
persons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probable cause that they were guilty of treason,
The prisoners were discharged.
17
See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937).
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reasonable" search under the Fourth Amendment. The victim was required to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause thafhis goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
for a prompt determination of the cause for seizure of the goods
llJl.cl detentjon of the thjef. 2M. Hale, suprq, at l~-15~; 'f, Taylor,
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B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a perliOn arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. 18 Petitione1· defends this practice on the
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause· that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution afforus a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273
U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.19 More recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886).
18
A per:;on arrested under a warrant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Rule Crim,
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
is reas<.onable ground to believe the complaint is true.
19 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" con~
elusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. Ex parte
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403 U. S. 443, 449-453 (1971), the Court held that &
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 210 The reason
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also GiordeneUo v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a

grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974).
211 The Court had earher reached a different result in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islands. Interpreting a statutory guarantee subi\tantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 19CY2, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's infonnation. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philip·
pines is not conclusive for interpretation of a cognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957). Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later hoi-lings of Albrecht, Coolidge, and
Shadwick.
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that safeguards must be provided against the dan..
gers of the overzealous as well a.s the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943).
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S.
541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229, U. S. 586
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v, Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C. - , 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
-U.S. App. D. C. - , 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determinatio:1 of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe...
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guards-counsel, confrontation, cross..examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial under an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing
assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more comple!X, the likelihood that it can be held promptly
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably with..
out an adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest. 2' That standard-probable cause to
Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can
be made.
"Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must a:rrest on 1prob.
able cause.' It is not the functiou of the police :to arrest, as it were,
21
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary pro..
ceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court
has approved these informal modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, Jiberty and property.
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act. The ~tandard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949).
Cf; McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967),
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only
by t.he lesser consequences of a probable cause deter~
mination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It does not require the tine resolution of conflict..
ing evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibiliW determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecu...
at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause,' " Mallory v. United St(ltes, 354:
449, 456 (1957).

u.s.
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tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64109 (1969). 22 This is not to say that confrontation and
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of
probable cause determinations in some cases. In most
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause. 28
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
22 In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagrwn v.
ScarpeUi, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba-

tioner arrested prior t.o revocation is entitled to an infonnal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U. S., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause detennination required by
the Fourth Amendment, l!erves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more fonnal criminal process, where • iolations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
with crime unless he is l!atisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable
cause"); ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function,§§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (c)
(1972).
n Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases
and the complextties of our system. The processing of misdemeanors,
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay.
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense em the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First,
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure·1 pretrial
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not
present the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Ala-·
bama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could'
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply when the prosecution is not required'
to produce witnesses for cross-examination.
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not.
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we·
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial proc~dure,.
and the nature of the probable cause determination
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial
procedure viewed a..a a whole. While we limit our hold..
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amend·
ment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable,
for example, to make the probable cause determination at
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer,2 "'
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344
(1943), or the determination may be incorporated into
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing preliminary hea.rings. Current
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other
ways of testing probable cause for detention. 25 Whatever
24

Several States already authorize a determination of probable
cause at this stage or immediately thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt.
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States,
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449,
454 (1957).
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled,
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony,
in the presence of the accused . Rule 311. Persons who remain in
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay
evidence may be considered. Rule 344.
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) also provides a
first appearance, at which a warrantless .arrest must be supported
by a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. The
magistrate may make a determination of probable cause to hold the
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procedure a Sta.te may adopt, it must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty/ 6 and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either
before or promptly after arrest. 27
accused, but he is not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The ~>tate's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
26 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
27
In his concurring opinion, Mn. JusTICE STEWART objects to thr Court's choice of the Fourth AmEJndment as the
rationale for decision and suggests that the Court offers less procedural protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil
cases. Here we deal with the complex procedures of a criminal caseand a threshold right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Thehistorical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different
from the relatively recent applicat10n of variable procedural due
J?rocess in deb.tor-credJtor dispu~s and termination of government-
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IV
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

created benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for
the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and
public interests always has been thought to define the "process that
is due" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial. Part II-A, ante:. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact
only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence,
designed to safeguard the rights of those accused of criminal conduct.
The relatively simple civil procedures (e. g., prior interview with
school principal before suspension) presented in the cases cited in
the concurring opinion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly
different context of the·criminal justice system.
It would not be practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit
in MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion that we leave for
another day determination of the procedural safeguards that are
required in making a probable cause determination under the Fourth
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares the right
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and
affirms the District Court's order prescribing an adversary hearing
for the implementation of that right. The circumstances of the
case thus require a decision on both issues,

J

;NOTE: Where tt is feasible, a syllabus {hea<lnote) will be released, as Is being done ln connection with this case, at the time
the oplnlon Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the oplnlon
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the s_onvenlence of the reader. See United States v. Detro't Lumber
Oo,, ;oOO U.S. 321, 337.
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1. The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of prob-

able cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Accordingly, the Florida procedures challenged here
whereby a person arrested without a warrant and charged by
information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause determination
are unconstitutional. Pp. 7-15.
(a) The prosecutor's assessment of probiible cause, s,tanding
alone, does not meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
and is insufficient to justify restraint of liberty pending trial.
Pp. 13-15.
(b) The Constitution does not require, however, judicial oversight of the decision to prosecute by information, and a conviction
will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained
pending trial without a probable cause determination. P . 15.
2. The probable cause determination, as an initial step in the criminal JUstice process, may be rnP.de by a judicial officer without an
adversary hearing. Pp. 15-2L
(a) The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings, and this issue can be determined reliably by the use of informal procedures.
Pp. 16-18.
(b) Because of its hmitecl function and its nonadversary char~
acter, the probable cause determination is not a "critical stage"
in the prosecution that, would require appointed counsel. Pp . 18-19.
483 F . 2d 778, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court,
The issue in this case is whether a person arrested
under a prosecutQr's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
pretrial restraint of liberty.
I
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were
arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged
with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. 1
Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against
him carried a potential life sentence, and Henderson re..
mained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500
bond.
t Respondent Pugh was arrested on March 3, 1971. On March 16
an information was filed charging him with robbery, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during commission of a
felony. Respondent Henderson was arrested on March 2, and charged
by information on March 19 with the offenses of breaking and
entering and a8sault and battery. The record does not indicate
whether there was an arrest warrant il1 either case.

13-477-QPINION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecu..
tion of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other
crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.140 (a); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1968); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1960). At the time respondents were arrested, a
Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary
hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases.
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.122 (amended 1972). But the
Florida courts had held that the filing of an information
foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing.
See State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla.
1972).2 They had also held that habeas corpus could not
be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to
test the probable cause for detention under an information. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 29 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probttble cause were a
special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30
days, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 907.045 (1973), 8 and arraignment,
which the District Court found was often delayed a month
or more after arrest. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107, 1110 (SD Fla. 1971).• As a result, a person charged
2

Florida law also denies preliminary hearings to persons confined
under indictment, see Sangaree v Hamlin, 23.5 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970);
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.131 (a), but that procedure is not challenged
in this case. See n. 19, pf)st, at 14.
8 This ~tatute may have been construed to make the hearing permissive instead of mandatory. See Evam v. State, 197 So. 2d 323
(Fla, Ct. App. 1967); Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 007-29 ( 1967). But cf.
Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971) It may also
have been superseded by the subsequent amendments to the rules of
criminal procedure. In re F'lorida Rule1 of Criminal Procedure,
272 So. 2d 65 (1972).
• The Florida rule~:~ do not suggest that the issue of probable
cause can be raised at arraignment, Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.160, but
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by information could be detained for a substantial period
solely on the decision of a prosecutor.
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
against Dade County officials in the Federal District
Court/ claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunct.ive relief. 6 Respondents Turner and
Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently
intervened.7 Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for
Dade County, was one of several defendants. 8
After an initial delay while the Florida legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court
granted the relief sought. Pugh v. Rainwater, supra.
The court certified the case as a class action under Fed,
counsel for Petitioner represented at oral argument that arraignment affords the suspect an opportunity to "attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to hold him." Tr. of Oral Arg., Mar. 25, 1974, at 17.
The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that this was true.
483 F. 2d 778, 781 n. 8.
8 The complaint was framed under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and jurisdiction in the District Court was based on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3),
6 Respondents did not ask for release from state custody, even as
an alternate remedy. They asked only that the state authorities be
ordered to give them a probable cause determination. This was
also the only relief \hat the District Court ordered for the named
respondents. 332 F. Supp., at 1115-1116. Because' release was
neither asked nor ordered, the lawsuit did not come within the cla~s
of cases for which habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 417 U. S.
- , - (1974).
1 Tmner was being held on a charge of auto theft, following arrest
on March 11, 1971. Faulk was arrestcl on March 19 on charges
of soliciting a ride and possession of marihuana.
' 8 The named defendants included justices of the peace and judges
of small--claims courts, who were authorized to hold preliminary
bearings in criminal cases, and a group of law enforcement officers
with power to make arrests in Dade County. Gerstein was the only
one who petitioned for certiorari.
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Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2), and held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged
by information a right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable cause. The District Court ordered the
Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable
cause for further detention. 9 It also ordered them to
submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases
instituted by information.
The defendants submitted a plan authored by Sheriff
E. Wilson Purdy, and the District Court adopted it with
modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed postarrest procedure. 336 F. Supp. 490. Upon arrest the
accused would be taken before a magistrate for a "first
appearance hearing." The magistrate would explain the
charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel
if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause
determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused
was unprepared. If either requested more time, the
magistrate would set the date for a "preliminary hearing,"
to be held within four days if the accused was in custody
and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.
The order provided sanctions for failure to hold the hearings at prescribed times. At the "preliminary hearing''
the accused would be entitled to counsel, and he would be'
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
9

The District Court correctly held that respondents' claim for
relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal inter~
vention in state prosecutions, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)'.
The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such,
but only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hear~
ing, an issue that could not be raised in defense of the criminal
prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not
prejudice the conduct of trial on the merits. See Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1082 (CA3 1973); cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 40:1
U.S. 82 (1971); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 TJ. S. 117 (1951).
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to summon favorable witnesses, and to have a transcript
made on request. If the magistrate found no probable
cause, the accused would be discharged. He then could
not be charged with the same offense by complaint or information, but only by indictment returned within 30'
days.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the
District Court's order pending appeal, but while the case
was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon
learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the
District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida
Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing
preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed
that the District Court should direct .its inquiry to the
new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.
Under the amended rules every arrested person must
be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.130 (b). This "first appearance" is
similar to the "first appearance hea.ring" ordered by the
District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause.
The rule amendments also changed the procedure for
preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges
and codifying the rule that no hea.rings are available to
persons charged by information or indictment. Rule
3.131; see In re Rule 3.1."31 ( b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held
that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without
·a judicial determination of probable cause. 855 li'. Supp.
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1286. Reaffirming its original ruling, the District Court
declared that the continuation of this practice was unconstitutionaJ.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 483 F. 2d
778, modifying the District Court's decree in minor par··
ticulars and suggesting tha.t the form of preliminary hear..~
ing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable, as long as it was provided to all defendants in
custody pending trial. !d., at 788-789.
State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review, and we
granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue. 11
414 U. S. 1062. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
10

Although this ruling held a statewide "legislative rule" unconstitutional, it was not outside the jurisdiction of a single judge by virtue of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The original complaint did not ask for
an injunction against enforcement of any state statute or legislative
rule of statewide application, since the practice of denying preliminary hearings to persons charged by information was then embodied only in judicial decisions. The District Court therefore had
jurisdiction to issue the initial injunction, and the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction over the appeal. On remand, the constitutionality
of a state "statute" was drawn into question for the first time when
the criminal rules were amended. The District Court's supplemental
opinion can fairly be read as a declaratory judgment that the
amended rules were uneonstitutional; the injunctive decree was neve!'
amended to incorporate that holding; and the opinion in the Court
of Appeals is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the District
Court did not enjoin enforcement of the statewide rule. See 483 F,
2d, at 788-790. Accordingly, a district court of three judges was not
required for the is~uance of this order. See Kennedy v. Mendoz~
Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 152-155 (1~3); Ji'temming v. Ne1tor, 363
u. s. 603, 606--608 (1~).
nAt oral argument counsel informed us that the named respond.,;
ents have been convicted. Their pretr~a1 detention therefore haj
ended. This case belongs, however, to that narrow class of cases in
which the termination of a class representative's claim does not moot
the claims of the unnllmed members of the class. See Sosna v. Iowa,
- - U. S. (1975). Pretrial detention is by nature temporary1
and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have h.~
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II
As framed by the proceedings below, this case presents
two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial
on an information is entitled to a judicial determination
of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the
adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the
Constitution,
A
Both the standards and procedures for arrest and
detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. See Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Burconstitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
convicted. The individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other persons. similarly situated will be
detained under the allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The claim,
in short, is one that is distinctly "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."
At the time the complaint was filed, the named respondents were
members of a class of persons detained without a judicial probable
cause determination, but the record does not indicate whether any
of them were still in custody awaiting trial when the District Court
certified the class. Such a showing ordinarily would be required to
avoid mootness under Sosna. But this case is a suitable exception
to that requirement. See Sosna, supra, at n. 11; cf. Rivera v.
Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159,1162-1163 (CA91972). The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended
at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or
a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after triaL It is
by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff,
would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to
certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of
a class of per<Jons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney
representing the named respondents is a publie defender, and we can
safely assume tltat he has· other clients with a continuing live interest
in the case,
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ford, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). The standard for
arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and
circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was com=
mitting an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91
{1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
{1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175~176
(1949). This standard, like those for searches and seiz~
ures, represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime,
1
'These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable inter=
ferences with privacy and from unfounded charges
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in
the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise· that has been found
for accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 176.
To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the
Court has 1·equired that the existence of probable cause
be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic atatement of this principle

>. • •
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appears in Johnson v, United States, 333 U, S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-22 (1968). 12
Maximum protection of individual rights could be
assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual
justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement
would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate
law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a
preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible,
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 96; Wong Sun v, United States,
371 U, S. 471, 479,-482 (1963), it has never invalidated
an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the
officers failed to secure a warrant. SeeKer v. California,
374 U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S,
::\07 (1959); 7'rupiano v, United States, 334 U, S. 699, 705
(1948),18
We reiterated this principle in United States v. United State$
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972). In terms that apply equally
12

to arrests, we described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment
directive" as a requirement that "where practical, a governmental
search and seimre should represent both the efforts of the officer
to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
citizen's private premises or conversation." ld., at 316, See also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
18 Another aspect of Trupiano was overruled in United States v,

1
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Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifi~
cation for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for
a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, how~
ever, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magis-trate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further
crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magis..
trate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary
action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determina..
tion of probable caut~e increases significantly. The con~
sequences of prolonged detention may be more serious
than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial con~
.finement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.
SeeR. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice
Is the Crime 51--62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be
accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a sig.
nificant restraint on liberty. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3146
(a) (2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached
judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnieh meaningful protection from un~
founded interference with liberty, Accordingly, we hold
that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a. prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law
RabinO'witz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), which was overruled in tum by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
'fhe issue of warrantless arrest that has generated the most con..
troversy, and which remains unsettled, is whether and under what
circumstances an officer may enter a suspect's home to make a war...
rantless arrest. s~e Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474481 (1971); id., at 510- ·512 n. 1 (WHITE, J ., dissenting); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958).
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that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925). At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice
of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1792). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885). 14 The justice of the peace
would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner
had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would
be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he
would be discharged from custody. 1M. Hale, supra, at
583-586; 2 W. Hawkir.s, supra, at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883). 15
14

The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have
been the penalty for allowing an offender to escape, if he had in fact
committed the crime, and the fear of liability for false imprisonment,
if he had not. But Hale also recognized that a judicial warrant of
commitment, called a mittimus, was required for more than brief
detention.
"When a private person hath arrested a felon, or one suspected
of felony, he may detain him in custody till he can reasonably dismiss himself of him; but with as much speed as conveniently he can,
he may do either of these things.
"1. He may carry him to the common gaol, ... but that is now
rarely done.
11
2. He may deliver him to the constable of the viii, who may either
carry him to the common gaol, . . . or to a justice of peace to
be examined, and farther proceeded against as case shall require ....
"3. Or he may carry him immediately to any justice of pea<1e of the
county where he is taken, whn upon examination may discharge, bail,
pr commit him, as the case shall require.
"And the bringing the offender either by the constable or private
person to a justice of peace is most usual and safe, because a gaoler
will expect a Mittimw for his warrant of detaining."
1 M. Hale, supra, at 589-590.
u The mmmination of the prisoner was inquisitorial, and the
witnesses were questioned outside the prisoner's presence. Altl1Qugb
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The initial determination of probable cause also could bff
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus.
2 W. Hawkins, supra, at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra, at
243; see Ex parte Boll'm.(Jn, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97101 (1807). This practice furnished the model for
criminal procedure in America immediately following the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); 10 Ex parte Burford,
7 U.S. (3 Cra.nch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and there are indications that
the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it a.s a model
for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 317-320 (1959) (DouGLAS, J., concurring).u
this method of proceeding was considered quite harsh, 1 J. Stephen,
at 219-225, it was well established that the prisoner was entitled to be
discharged if the investigation turned up insufficient evidence of his
guilt. /d., at 233.
16 In Ex parte Bollman, two men charged in the Aaron Burr case
were committed fo11owing an examination in the circuit court of
the District of Columbia. They filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
.Justice Marshall, affirmed its jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to
per'!ons in custody by order of federal trial courts. Then, following
arguments on the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause,
the Court surveyed the evidence against the prisoners and held that
it did not establish probab1e cause that they were guilty of treason.
The prisoners were discharged.
17 See also N. Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 15-16 (1937).
A similar procedure at common law, the warrant for recovery of
stolen goods, is said to have furnished the model for a "reason1l.ble" search under the Fomtb Amendment. The victim. was re.
quired to appear before a justice of the peace and make an oath
of probable cause that'his goods could be found in a particular place.
After the warrant was executed, and the goods seized, the victim
and the alleged thief would appear before the justice of the peace
for a prompt detennination of the cause for seizure of the goods
:and detention o( the thiet 2M. Hale, supra, at 149-152; T. Tayl~r:,
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B
Under the Florida procedures challenged here, a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information may be jailed or subjected to other restraints pending
trial without any opportunity for a probable cause
determination. 18 Petitioner defends this practice on the
ground that the prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause that furnishes sufficient reason to detain a defendant pending
trial. Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affqrds a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think
prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the
Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the
Florida procedure. In Albrecht v. United States, 273
U. S. 1, 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant
issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information
was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly
state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish
probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.19 More recently, iP.. Coolidge v. New Hampshirer
Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 24-25, 39-40 (1969);
see Boya v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-629 (1886) .
18 A person arrested under a warrant would have rrceived a prior
judicial determination of probable cause. Under Fla. Ru·le· Crim.
Proc. 3.120, a warrant may be issued upon a sworn complaint that
states facts showing that the suspect has committed a crime. The
magistrate may also take testimony under oath to determine if there
ifJ reasonable ground to believe the complaint is true.
10 By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon
its face," and returned by a "properly con~>tituted grand jury" conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires
iss1il:a.D.ce of m urest wanant without further inquiry. E~ pane
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403 U. S. 443, 449"--453 (1971), the Court held that a,
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is incon..
sistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and de"'
tached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 ( 1972), and held
that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant
must be determined by someone independent of police
and prosecution. See also United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). 210 The reason
for this separation of functions was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in a similar context:
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against
the misuse of the, law enforcement process. Zeal
in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance
of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law
enforcement does not &lone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled
United States, 287 U. S. 241, 250 (1932). See also Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480, 487 (1958). The willingness to let a
grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral and detached
magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relationship to the
courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 342-346
(1974).
20 The Court had earlier reachr.d a different result, in Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914), a criminal appeal from the
Philippine Islanus. Interpreting a statutory guarantee substantially
identical to the Fourth Amendment, Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5,
32 Stat. 693, the Court held that an arrest warrant could issue
solely upon a prosecutor's information. The Court has since held
that interpretation of a statutory guarantee applicable to the Philippines is not conclusive for interpretatiOn of a eognate provision in
the Federal Constitution, Green v. United State~~, 355 U. S. 184,
194-198 (1957), Even if it were, the result reached in Ocampo
is incompatible with the later holdings of Albrecht, Coolidge, ami

8hadwick.

'13-4.77--0PINION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

15

that safeguards must be provided against the dan~
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be
entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated
process of criminal justice is therefore divided into
different parts, responsibility for which is separately
vested in the various participants upon whom the
criminal law relies for its vindication." MeN abb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943).
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty
pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S.
541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586
(1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detent,ion does not void a subsequent
conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952) ;
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court
of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is
presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending
trial without a determination of probable cause. 483
F. 2d, at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393
F. 2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy,- U.S.
App. D. C.-, 442 F. 2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
-U.S. App. D. C.--, 414 F. 2d 1213 (1969).

III
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
held that the determination of probable cause must be
accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safe..

73477-0l>INION
GERSTEIN v. PUGH

guards-counsel, confrontation, cross-examinatio~, and
compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary
hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in
many States to determine whether the evidence justifies
going to trial ttnder an information or presenting the
case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S.
1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed. 1974).
The standard of proof required of the prosecution is
usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.
A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Article 330, at 90-91 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972). When the he~tring takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of
the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the
presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their
testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing
also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing
assumes increased importance and the procedures become
more comple", the likelihood that it ca.n be held promptly
after arrest diminishes. See A. L. I. Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, supra, at 33-34.
These adversa.ry safeguards are not essential for the
probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further
proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same
as that for arrest. 21 That standard-probable cause to
21 Because the standards are identical, ordinarily there is no need
for further investigation before the probable cause determination can
bema.de.
·"Presumably, whomever the pollee arrest they must arrest on 'prob•.
:able cause:' It is not the fundion of the police 'to arrest, as it we~~.
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believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally
has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court
has approved these informal modes of proof.
"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that
which long experience in the common-law tradition,
to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has
crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded
rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property,
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name .implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act, The standard of proof is accordingly correla,..
tive to what must be proved." Brineg4r v. United
l3tates, 338 U.S. 160, 174-175 (1949)o
Cf. McCray v.Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only
by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination
itself. It doee not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports R reasonable belief in guilt. See F, Miller, Prosecuat large and to use an interrogating process at police headqua.rters
in order to determine whom they should charge before a committing
magistrate on 'probable cause.'" Mallory v. United States, 354
U, S. 449,456 (1957) ,
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tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64109 (1969). 22 This is not to say that confrontation and
cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of
probable cause determinations in some cases. In most
cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify
holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these
formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be
employed in making the Fourth Amendment determinSF
tion of probable cause. 23
Because of its limited function and its nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination is not a
"critical stage" in the prosecution that would require
22 In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), and Gagrum v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), we held that a parolee or proba~

tioner arrested prior to revocation is entitled to an informal preliminary hearing at the place of arrest, with some provision for live
testimony. 408 U. S., at 487; 411 U.S., at 786. That preliminary
hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by
the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently
is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.
408 U. S., at 485; 411 U. S., at 782-783 n. 5. Moreover, revocation
proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute
and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect
wit~ crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause. See ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7- 103 (A) (a prosecutor "shall
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows
or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable
cause") ; ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, §§ 1.1, 3.4, 3.9 (1974); American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, rule 4 (e)
(1972).
.
23 Criminal justice is already ove!'burdt:ned by the volume of case8
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors,
in particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay, ·
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appointed counsel. The Court has identified as 11 critical
stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed
without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1
{1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227
(1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held
that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions
identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First,
under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with a:o1 offense. A finding of no probable
cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial
custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability
to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not
present the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The
Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could
be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring
or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply when the prosecution is not required
to produce witnesses for cross-examination.
Although we conclude that the Constitution does not
require an adversary determination of probable cause, we .
recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure,
and the nature of the probable cause determination
usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial
procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our hold-
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ing to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. It may be found desirablell
for example, to make the probable cause determination at
the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer/'
see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342-344
(1943), or the determination may be incorporated into
the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions
of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures
may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing preliminary hearings. Current
proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest. other
ways of testing probable cause for detention. 25 Whatever
24 Several States already authorize a determination of probable
cause at this stage or irnmediatE>ly thereafter. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-2-3 (1965 Supp.); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 708-9 (5) (1968); Vt
.
. l
Rules Crim. Proc. 3 (b), 5 (c) (1974). This Court has interpreted
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require a determination
of probable cause at the first appearance. Jaben v. United States,
381 U. S. 214, 218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449,
454 (1957).
25 Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (Proposed
Final Draft 1974), a person arrested without a warrant is entitled .
"without unnecessary delay," to a first appearance before a magistrate and a determination that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest
warrant. The determination may be made on affidavits or testimony,
in the presence of the accused. Rule 311. Persons who remain in
custody for inability to qualify for pretrial release are offered another
opportunity for a probable cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more than five days after arrest. This is an adversary
hearing, and the parties may summon witnesses, but reliable hearsay
evidence may be considered. Rule 344.
The A. L. I. Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Tent.
braft No. 5, 1972, and Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973) also provides a
·Est appearance, at which a warrantless arrest must be supported.·
y a reasonably detailed written statement of facts. § 310. Th~
'· gistrate may make detemiination
probable cause to hold tll~
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procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and
reliable determination of probable cause as a condition
for any significant pretrial restraint on liberty/ 6 and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either
before or promptly after arrest. 27
accused, but he i8 not required to do so and the accused may request
an attorney for an "adjourned session" of the first appearance to be
held within 2 "court days." At that session, the magistrate makes
a determination of probable cause upon a combination of written
and live testimony:
"The arrested person may present written and testimonial evidence
and arguments for his discharge and the state may present additional written and testimonial evidence and arguments that there is
reasonable cause to believe that he has committed the crime of
which he is accused. The state's submission may be made by means
of affidavits, and no witnesses shall be required to appear unless the
court, in the light of the evidence and arguments submitted by the
parties, determines that there is a basis for believing that the appearance of one or more witnesses for whom the arrested person seeks
subpoenas might lead to a finding that there is no reasonable cause."
§ 310.2 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 5A, 1973).
26 Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those
suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition
that they appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release
and many degrees of conditional liberty. See 18 U. S. C. § 3146;
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice,
Pretrial Release § 5.2 (1974); Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 341 (Proposed Final Draft 1974). We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.
27
In his concurring opinion, MR. JuS'riCE STEWART objects to the Court's choice of the Fourth Amendment as the
rationale for decision and suggests that the Court offers less procedural protection to a person in jail than it requires in certain civil
cases. Here we deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case
and a threshold right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The
historical basis of the probable cause requirement is quite different
from the relatively recent application of variable procedural due
process in debtor-creditor disputes and termination of government~
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IV
We agree with' the Court of Appeals that the Fourth
Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we
accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we
do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the
adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree,
we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

cteated benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for
the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and
public interests always has been thought to define the "process that
is due" for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial. Part II-A, ante:. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact
only the first stage of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence,
designed to safeguard the rights of those accused o.f criminal conduct.
The relatively simple civil procedures (e. g., prior interview with
school principal before suspension) presented in the case..<> cited in
the concurring opinion are inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly
different context of the crimmal jU&'tice system.
It would not be practicable to follow the further suggestion implicit
in MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opmion that we leave for
another day determination of the procedural safeguards that are
required in making a probable cause detetmination under the Fourth
Amendment. The judgment under review both declares the right
not to be detained without a probable cause determination and
affirms the District Court's order prescribing an adversary hearing
for the implementation of that right. The circumstances of the
ca.se thus require a deci~1on on both issues..

